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Abstract
Entrenched bureaucracies and special-interest politics hamper public
education in the United States. In response, school districts and states
have recently adopted or promoted reforms designed to release schools
from bureaucratic control and empower them to meet strengthened
outcome standards. Despite promising results, the reforms have been
widely criticized, including by the educationally disadvantaged families
they most appear to help.
To explain this paradox, this Article first considers the governance
alternatives to bureaucracy that the education reforms adopt. It concludes
that the reforms do not adopt the most commonly cited alternatives to
bureaucracy—marketization, managerialism, or professionalism/craft—
and that none of those models effectively frees public education of
special-interest politics.
This Article next argues that another governance and civic
engagement model, democratic experimentalism, better explains the
reforms and offers an attractive alternative to special-interest politics.
This Article finds, however, that the reforms have not effectively
implemented the “democratic” part of experimentalism, resulting in
backlash from the families the reforms might benefit the most. This
Article concludes by proposing a more fully democratic version of the
reforms designed to improve student outcomes, powerfully engage key
stakeholders, and diminish opposition.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the turn of the century, a public education reform movement has
taken shape in states such as Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Tennessee,1
and in some of the nation’s largest school districts, including Camden,
Charlotte, Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Hartford, Houston, Long Beach,
Los Angeles, New Orleans, Newark, New Haven, New York City,
Oakland, Sacramento, and Washington, D.C.2 Steps taken—emphasizing
1. See, e.g., PATRICK MCGUINN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE STATE OF TEACHER
EVALUATION REFORM 11–35 (2012), www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/report/2012/
11/13/44494/the-state-of-teacher-evaluation-rform/ (evaluating and describing teacher evaluation
reforms in Colorado, Delaware, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Tennessee); THE BROAD PRIZE
FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., UNCOMMON SCHOOLS: TURNING URBAN SCHOOLS INTO SPRINGBOARDS
TO COLLEGE (2014), http://broadfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/1864-uncommon
schoolswhitepaper.pdf (illustrating “successful college preparatory practices of . . . 38 public
charter schools in New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts” serving low-income students); U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP: LOUISIANA REPORT YEAR 2: DECEMBER 2012–DECEMBER
2013, at 13, 14, 17 (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/performance/louisianayear-2.pdf (cataloguing Louisiana’s Race to the Top initiatives, including “great teachers and
leaders,” “data systems to support instruction,” and “turning around the lowest-achieving
schools”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Delaware and Tennessee Win First Race to the Top
Grants (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/delaware-and-tennessee-winfirst-race-top-grants (describing the reform strategy that earned Tennessee the first Race to the
Top grant, including large-scale training of students, actionable data in the hands of educators,
and a statewide educator evaluation system).
2. See, e.g., PAUL T. HILL ET AL., STRIFE AND PROGRESS: PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES FOR
MANAGING URBAN SCHOOLS 11–15 (2012) (detailing steps districts are using to improve schools,
including enhanced school autonomy and accountability, pupil-based funding, and teacher
development); Kristen L. Buras, New Orleans Education Reform: A Guide for Cities or a Warning
for Communities? (Grassroots Lessons Learned, 2005-2012), 4 BERKELEY REV. EDUC. 123, 128–
30 (2013) (describing mass transition of traditional public schools to charter schools in New
Orleans); CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG SCHS., THE ROAD TO REFORM (2010), www.cms.k12.nc.us/
mediaroom/Documents/The%20Road%20to%20Reform.PDF (discussing Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Schools’ academic progress and systemic reform); CHRISTINE CAMPBELL & BETHENY GROSS, CTR.
ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., IMPROVING STUDENT OPPORTUNITIES AND OUTCOMES IN HARTFORD
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student mastery of rigorous “Common Core” standards, holding schools
accountable for results on standardized tests and other metrics, closing or
seriously restructuring failing schools, firing ineffective principals and
teachers, opening charter and other innovative schools, and hiring
educators less committed to traditional teachers’ unions—have sharply
divided Americans.3 A critically acclaimed and pro-reform 2010
documentary, Waiting for Superman, crystalized the debate.4
The film tracks several young students struggling to escape “the
system” the documentary blames for decades of declining results in
American public education.5 It begins with a declaration by Geoffrey
Canada, founder of Harlem Children’s Zone, that, rather than waiting for
Superman to save us from “our system [that] is broken and . . . feels
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 3 (2013), http://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/Pub_EvidenceProject_
Hartford_jul13.pdf.pdf (analyzing Hartford’s “portfolio management” strategy, including
“closing and redesigning chronically low-performing schools, opening new schools, and using
data to guide these decisions”); FRANK G. JACKSON, CITY OF CLEVELAND, CLEVELAND’S PLAN FOR
TRANSFORMING SCHOOLS 6–7 (2012), http://media.cleveland.com/metro/other/ClevelandPlan
Final.pdf (describing Cleveland’s “high-leverage system reforms,” including replacing failing
with high-performing schools and changing the central district’s role from enforcing compliance
with mechanical rules to overseeing continuous improvement); Emma Brown, D.C. to Close 15
Underenrolled Schools, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
education/chancellor-kaya-henderson-names-15-dc-schools-on-closure-list/2013/01/17/e04202f
a-6023-11e2-9940-6fc488f3fecd_story.html (detailing a “fundamental remaking” of public
education in Washington, D.C., with the city “at the leading edge of a national movement toward
charters”); Editorial, School Reform in Newark, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/opinion/school-reform-in-newark-with-a-new-teacherscontract.html?_r=0 (describing school reforms in Newark, New Jersey); Brenda Iasevoli, Why
Did the Los Angeles Superintendent Resign?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/10/why-did-the-los-angeles-superintendentresign/381588/?single_page=true (cataloguing reforms by Los Angeles Unified School District
and improved graduation rates and reading scores); Valerie Strauss, The Problem with Rahm’s
School Reforms in Chicago, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/answer-sheet/post/the-real-problem-with-rahms-school-reforms-in-chicago/2012/09/11/c7
7c3cc4-fba4-11e1-8adc-499661afe377_blog.html (describing school reforms promoted by
Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel).
3. See, e.g., Bill Barrow, Common Core Spawns Widespread Political Fights, REAL CLEAR
EDUC. (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.realcleareducation.com/articles/2014/03/24/common_core_
spawns_widespread_political_fights_916.html (tracing the transformation of the bipartisan
Common Core initiative to lift educational standards “into a political tempest fueling division”
among both Republicans and Democrats); Amanda Ripley, Higher Calling, SLATE (June 17, 2014,
12:01 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/education/2014/06/american_schools_need_
better_teachers_so_let_s_make_it_harder_to_become.html (describing “America’s exhausting
tug-of-war over schools” and distracting “brawls” over Common Core, testing, teacher tenure,
evaluation and firings, and charter schools).
4. WAITING FOR SUPERMAN (Paramount Pictures 2010).
5. Mark Suster, Waiting for Superman: The Story of America’s Broken Education System,
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 12, 2010, 6:13 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/waiting-for-supermanthe-story-of-americas-broken-education-system-2010-10.
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impossible to fix,” parents and the public must reclaim public education
themselves.6 “We know what works,” he says, and we ought to
implement it: “quality teachers, more classroom time, world-class
standards, high expectations, [and] real accountability.”7 The film regards
Canada and other reformers—such as Dave Levin and Mike Feinberg,
founders of the KIPP Academy charter schools; Washington, D.C.’s
then-schools chancellor Michelle Rhee; and teachers committed to
moving even their most challenging students forward8—as modern-day
public education heroes who can deliver on what we know works.
Supporting these claims is spotty but promising evidence of improved
student outcomes.9
Viewers of the film can’t escape the message that, like the film’s
compelling protagonists, poor and minority families nationwide stand to
gain the most from the replacement of unaccountable and failing schools
with more effective ones. On average, for example, black and Latino
students are consistently between two and three years of learning behind
white students10 and are only 20 to 30 percent as likely as their white
peers to score at an advanced level.11 Reformers claim they can close
these gaps—for example, by affording poor children four or five
successive years of “good” as opposed to “average” teachers, which
reasonable estimates suggest would generate learning gains as large as
6. WAITING FOR SUPERMAN, supra note 4 (introduction).
7. Id. (closing credits).
8. Id. (“Teachers are great, a national treasure. Teachers unions are generally speaking a
menace and impediment to reform.” (quoting a Newsweek reporter)).
9. Improved results by the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) under reform Superintendent
Arne Duncan are an early example. From 2001 to 2008, the percentage of CPS students “meeting
or exceeding standards” on the Illinois Standards Achievement Test increased from 18.7 to nearly
55. Press Release, Mayor’s Press Office, Chicago Public Schools ISAT Scores Reach New High
(Nov. 16, 2008), http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/
2008/september_2008/chicago_public_schools.html; see WILLIAM G. OUCHI, THE SECRET OF
TSL: THE REVOLUTIONARY DISCOVERY THAT RAISES SCHOOL PERFORMANCE 237 (2009)
(documenting CPS students’ gains under Duncan and two reform superintendents who succeeded
him); NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, READING 2013 TRIAL URBAN DISTRICT SNAPSHOT
REPORT (2013), https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/subject/publications/dst2013/pdf/2014467
xc4.pdf (showing that from 2003 to 2013, CPS students’ average National Assessment of
Educational Progress (NAEP) reading score increased from 193 to 206); NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, MATHEMATICS 2013 TRIAL URBAN DISTRICT SNAPSHOT REPORT (2013),
https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/subject/publications/dst2013/pdf/2014468xc4.pdf
(documenting 2003–2013 increases in average CPR NAEP math score from 214 to 231). For other
examples of improved student outcomes in reform districts and states, see infra notes 106, 109–
10, 113, 141–50, 172, 179–82 and accompanying text.
10. MCKINSEY & CO., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP IN AMERICA’S
SCHOOLS 9 (2009), http://mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/reports/Education/achievement_
gap_report.pdf.
11. Id. at 11.
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the difference in average achievement between students whose families
do and do not qualify for public assistance.12
Yet, inadvertently, in illustrating Rhee’s fortitude in the face of
fervent opposition to reform, Waiting for Superman also documents a
starkly different response from poor and minority families than the one
the film predicts. The only portrayal of parents responding in an
organized fashion to Rhee’s reforms is a scene of outrage and chaos as a
large group of black parents lambasts Rhee for closing their locally
revered, albeit chronically failing, neighborhood schools.13
Nor has the film’s broader message—that all Americans stand to gain
from improved public schools—fared well. To be sure, defects in K–12
education drag down the nation’s standing in the world and its
economy.14 For example, on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development’s (OECD) most recent Program for International
Student Assessment (PISA), American fifteen-year-olds ranked twentyfirst in science and twenty-sixth in math, with average scores below the
OECD’s thirty-four-nation mean.15 Even schools in America’s wealthiest
communities are falling behind average schools in high-performing
nations.16 On one analysis, the nation’s failure to keep pace with betterperforming nations saps its gross domestic product of $1.3 to $2.3 trillion
annually in 2008 dollars—a 9- to 16-percent drag on the economy, which
is equivalent to a chronic major recession.17 Yet escalating middle-class
12. Eric A. Hanushek, Teacher Deselection, in CREATING A NEW TEACHING PROFESSION
165, 172 (Dan Goldhaber & Jane Hannaway eds., 2009).
13. For another example, a number of June 2014 reports indicated both that a year of
widespread closures of schools in Chicago led to improved student performance among students
moved out of failing schools and that black and Latino families bitterly opposed the closings.
Compare Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Year Later, Much Has Been Learned About School Closings,
CHI. TRIB. (June 14, 2014), articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-06-14/news/ct-chicago-schoolyear-ends-met-20140615_1_welcoming-schools-barbara-byrd-bennett-closings (reporting on
academic benefits to affected students from large-scale 2013–2014 school closings), with PAULINE
LIPMAN ET AL., COLLABORATIVE FOR EQUITY & JUST. EDUC., ROOT SHOCK: PARENTS’
PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL CLOSINGS IN CHICAGO 9 (2014), http://ceje.uic.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/Root-Shock-Report-Compressed.pdf (reporting that surveyed parents
believed school closures negatively affected their children).
14. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N ET AL., BENCHMARKING FOR SUCCESS: ENSURING U.S.
RECEIVE
A
WORLD-CLASS
EDUCATION
16
(2008),
STUDENTS
http://www.achieve.org/files/BenchmarkingforSuccess.pdf (“America’s global position is
slipping not because U.S. schools are getting worse . . . [but] because its educational outcomes
have mostly stagnated while those in other countries have surged.”).
15. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., UNITED STATES – COUNTRY NOTE – RESULTS
FROM PISA 2012, at 2 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/PISA-2012-results-US.pdf.
16. See Mercedes White, Can U.S. Schools Adopt Education Practices of Top-Performing
Nations?, DESERET NEWS (May 24, 2012, 10:00 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
765578482/Can-US-schools-adopt-education-practices-of-top-performing-nations.html.
17. MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 10, at 17.
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revolts against standardized testing, charter schools, and Common Core
standards demonstrate that the reforms have not been widely accepted.18
A similar gap between expectations and reality undermined the
Obama Administration’s efforts to improve public education. Former
Education Secretary Arne Duncan claimed that the disturbing conditions
depicted in Waiting for Superman triggered a “quiet revolution” by
parents, educators, elected officials, and charitable foundations seeking
to transform sclerotic public education bureaucracies into hotbeds of
innovation and institutional learning.19 In fact, however, the reforms
sparked a noisy civil war between reformists and many other education
stakeholders on both the right and the left.20
This state of affairs stems from a misalignment between two opposing
features of the reforms. On one hand are steps to supplant the previously
dominant bureaucratic governance of schools with promising
institutional-learning structures. On the other hand is the reforms’ almost
total failure to replace special-interest politics that have long sustained
old-style bureaucracy. As those who profit from traditional pluralism
tenaciously fight to preserve the status quo, the reforms’ most likely
18. See, e.g., Jessica Bakeman, Anti-Common Core Bandwagon Nears Capacity, POLITICO
(Jan. 23, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/albany/2014/01/8539167/anticommon-core-bandwagon-nears-capacity (tracing the fight against Common Core to “grassroots
level, with angry parents sounding off on social media and public forums about their children’s
struggles with the harder material”); Karla Scoon Reid, Testing Skeptics Aim to Build Support for
Opt-Out Strategy, EDUC. WK. (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/03/
12/24boycotts_ep.h33.html (describing “wave of anti-testing sentiment among parents,” leading
more of them to “refuse to let their children take state-mandated tests”); Patrick Wall, Troubled
by the State Reading Test, Manhattan Principals Decide to Protest, CHALKBEAT (Apr.
10, 2014), http://ny.chalkbeat.org/2014/04/10/troubled-by-the-state-reading-test-manhattanprincipals-decide-to-protest/ (describing protests against Common Core exams at dozens of
schools in “well-heeled neighborhoods” in New York City).
19. See Arne Duncan, The Quiet Revolution: Secretary Arne Duncan’s Remarks at the
National Press Club, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (July 27, 2010), https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/
quiet-revolution-secretary-arne-duncans-remarks-national-press-club (associating Waiting for
Superman with a “revolution” in public education benefiting and quietly supported by families
previously denied access to good schools).
20. See, e.g., Gabriel Arana, Common Core’s Political Fiasco: How It United the Left and
Right Against It, SALON (Sept. 29, 2014, 6:59 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/09/29/
common_cores_political_fiasco_how_a_program_united_the_left_and_right_against_it; Walter
Russell Mead, Blue Civil War: The Battle for California, AM. INT. (Mar. 6, 2013, 7:11 PM),
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/03/06/blue-civil-war-the-battle-for-california
(seeing debate between school reformers and teachers’ unions as sparking a battle between wings
of the Democratic party for control of California politics); Judith Warner, Is Michelle Rhee’s
Revolution Over?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/magazine/
03fob-wwln-t.html (cataloguing electoral defeats of “candidates closely associated with
[education] reform[s]” because of “enmity from teachers, their unions and, surprisingly enough
to outside observers, many public-school parents”).
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beneficiaries—parents and students—have no evident alternative to
interest-group politics for understanding or directly participating in
apparently distant “corporate” and “technocratic” reforms.21 In
reformers’ haste, they have disenfranchised those they sought to
empower and help. This gap has enabled stalwarts of the old system to
convince the reforms’ intended beneficiaries that the reforms undermine
democratic control of public education and public education itself. Even
as reformers have stopped waiting for Superman and are busy replacing
desiccated bureaucracies with governance models of steel, the persistence
of special-interest politics has been their kryptonite, neutralizing the
reforms’ extraordinary potential.
This Article argues that the success of the school governance reforms
being implemented nationwide depends on equally comprehensive shifts
in civic engagement that have not been widely pursued. The solution it
proposes—immersing families and other external stakeholders in the
until-now entirely internal reforms—would transform how the public
interacts with school systems and shapes education policy and provide a
model of civic engagement and public accountability with the potential
to moderate the nation’s broader political gridlock.
Part I of this Article reprises widely accepted accounts of the
conditions under which bureaucracies fail to make and implement
effective policy and of the tight link between bureaucracy and specialinterest politics. Part I then explains why the combination of the two has
been disastrous for K–12 education policy and how the education-reform
movement has tried to reverse those ill effects.
Part II shows that the education reforms are often misunderstood as
instances of three alternatives to bureaucracy: marketization,
managerialism, and professionalism/craft. Exploring these governance
models also exposes a flaw all three share: They offer no effective
substitute for special-interest politics.
Part III argues that a fourth model, “democratic experimentalism,”
offers a more promising alternative, which in theory effectively
transforms—by integrating—governance and politics through a process
of participatory problem-solving.
21. See, e.g., Geoff Decker, Fariña’s Parent Engagement Strategy Starts with Index Cards,
CHALKBEAT (Jan. 9, 2014), http://ny.chalkbeat.org/2014/01/09/farinas-parent-engagementstrategy-starts-with-index-cards (“The way the [D]epartment [of Education] engages with parents
was an easy target for every Democratic candidate [to replace Mayor Bloomberg].”); Yoav
Gonen, De Blasio Swipes at Bloomberg over Education, N.Y. POST (Jan. 30, 2014, 5:40 AM),
http://nypost.com/2014/01/30/de-blasio-swipes-at-bloomberg-over-education (quoting Mayor
Bill de Blasio as saying, “I am not trying to bring an outside model, a corporate model, a privatesector model to [the] public-sector”); Eliza Shapiro, Carmen Fariña to Head D.O.E., POLITICO
(Dec. 30, 2013, 11:45 PM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/city-hall/2013/12/8537832/
carmen-farintildea-head-doe (quoting a critic of education who predicts a conversion “from a
technocratic staff to a deeper educational staff”).
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Part IV shows how experimentalism better describes the recent
education-reform movement’s policies, such as the Common Core
standards, portfolios of instructional options including charter schools,
measurement based on standardized and other assessments of student
success and teacher quality, and collaborative problem-solving. Part IV
then links the backlash the reforms have triggered to their failure to
implement the “democratic” part of democratic experimentalism by
integrating affected families and other external constituencies into the
internal problem-solving that typifies the experimentalist reforms.
Finally, Part V sketches out a version of education reform under which
experimentalist governance becomes truly democratic, neutralizing the
kryptonite politics that thus far have weakened the reforms.
I. K–12 BUREAUCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Although bureaucracy and allied interest-group politics dominated
organizational design and accountability during much of the twentieth
century, the conditions for their success deteriorated substantially in the
last third of that century. Those changes were particularly disruptive to
urban public school bureaucracies. Not surprisingly, therefore, the
beginning of the twenty-first century has seen a significant move away
from the structures that previously dominated large public school
systems, but, as this Part concludes, those changes have been puzzlingly
incomplete.
A. Governance
For decades, critics of ineffective and increasingly sectarian
government have blamed governance by bureaucracy, which is now the
feature the public most associates with and loathes about government and
its agencies.22 This association puts the very capacity of the modern state
to solve public problems at stake in the debate over whether there are
workable alternatives to bureaucracy.
This has not always been so.23 Bureaucracy developed as an antidote
to earlier organizational structures, which were undermined by caste,
22. See CHRISTOPHER K. ANSELL, PRAGMATIST DEMOCRACY: EVOLUTIONARY LEARNING AS
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 3, 65 (2011); JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND
AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 3–4 (1990); Mary Anne Raywid, Rethinking School Governance, in
RESTRUCTURING SCHOOLS: THE NEXT GENERATION OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM 152, 153 (Richard
F. Elmore ed., 1990) [hereinafter ELMORE] (“The second half of the twentieth century . . . has
been a period of increasing public skepticism about major societal institutions and of growing
lack of confidence in large organizations.”).
23. For a collection of essays generally defending bureaucracy, see THE VALUES OF
BUREAUCRACY (Paul du Gay ed., 2005).
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patronage, parochialism, and corruption.24 In its public- and privatesector forms, bureaucracy played a decisive role in every major
twentieth-century milestone, including the triumph of democracy over
authoritarianism across two hot and one cold world wars; the
globalization of communication, transportation, and public health; and
the progressive social movements that ended racial apartheid in the
United States and, in turn, extended equal rights to women, the elderly,
the disabled, and other marginalized groups.25
To accomplish these ends, bureaucracies rely on experts at the top to
design products or services tied to the organizations’ missions and a set
of prescriptive rules or instructions specifying how employees lower in
the hierarchy are to build and market products and provide services.26
Typically, the rules govern not only the materials provided to street-level
employees and the operational steps employees take but also the
processes, rewards, and consequences that supervisors use to ensure that
their subordinates comply with the experts’ instructions.27
Centralization of power and hierarchically enforced rules serve two
main functions. First, they delegate important decisions to individuals
whose expertise enables them to design products and services that align
to the organization’s mission and give clear instructions to nonexperts for
operationalizing those designs.28 Second, they render the organization
accountable, with responsibility and blame running transparently up the
bureaucratic hierarchy.29

24. See, e.g., KEN MORRISON, MARX, DURKHEIM, WEBER: FORMATIONS OF MODERN SOCIAL
THOUGHT 298–300 (1995); Antonino Palumbo & Alan Scott, Bureaucracy, Open Access, and
Social Pluralism: Returning the Common to the Goose, in THE VALUES OF BUREAUCRACY, supra
note 23, at 281, 281–83.
25. See, e.g., CHRISTINA WOLBRECHT, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS: PARTIES,
POSITIONS, AND CHANGE 156–57 (2000); Augustus Jones Jr. & Peter Bishop, Policy Making by
the Lower Federal Courts and the Bureaucracy: The Genesis of a National AIDS Policy, 27 SOC.
SCI. J. 273, 274 (1990); Burton Levy, The Bureaucracy of Race: Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws
and Its Impact on People, Process, and Organization, 2 J. BLACK STUD. 77, 85–88 (1971); Charles
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1016, 1018–19 (2004) (linking bureaucracy and public-law litigation on
behalf of disadvantaged populations).
26. See, e.g., ANSELL, supra note 22, at 76 (“‘Bureaucracy is not a dynamic institution
committed to solving problems and attaining objectives. Rather it is a relatively passive and
conservative system preoccupied with detailed implementation of received policies.’” (quoting
PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW
65 (2001))).
27. See, e.g., THE VALUES OF BUREAUCRACY, supra note 23, at 2–6.
28. See, e.g., RUDI VOLTI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK AND
OCCUPATIONS 83–84 (2d ed. 2012).
29. Id. at 83.
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The problem, however, is that bureaucracy requires reasonably stable
and predictable conditions to operate effectively. Only then can experts
develop mission-based policies and rules that can be applied relatively
uniformly across multiple sites and monitor implementation and take
remedial action as necessary without becoming obsolete in the time it
takes to develop or implement the policies. Today, these conditions often
are not present. Instead, the number, diversity, and complexity of
challenges faced each day across cities, counties, states, and the nation
generate “wickedly” multidimensional problems, making it difficult for
central experts to “keep up.”30
Compounding the problem of diversity is the very success of
bureaucratically administered private companies and public agencies and
courts. The former have led consumers to expect their every, increasingly
varied need and want to be instantly met. The latter have expanded the
number of individuals with the right to insist that their often particularly
challenging needs and wants be treated the same as others. These trends
increase the complexity of designing, delivering, and regulating access to
desired products and services and heighten the need for flexibility.
Public education provides a salient example. New demands on
education fall with special force on school systems charged with readying
ever more diverse and challenging populations for a vast array of globally
competitive careers,31 while navigating a burgeoning set of controversies
about which parents feel empowered to insist that their idiosyncratic
values be honored.32 Even the most basic goals of education are
contested, and “there is no consensus about what priority should be given

30. See, e.g., ANSELL, supra note 22, at 4, 84–103; Hilda Borko et al., Wicked Problems
and Other Thoughts on Issues of Technology and Teacher Learning, 60 J. TCHR. EDUC. 3, 3 (2009)
(defining “wicked” problems in education, which have “complex variables—all of which are
dynamic, contextually bound, and interdependent”); Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber,
Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y SCIENCES 155, 161 (1973); Charles Sabel et
al., Individualized Service Provision in the New Welfare State: Lessons from Special Education
in Finland, 62 SITRA STUD. 10, 17–18, 35–37, 60 (2011).
31. See, e.g., FRANK LEVY & RICHARD J. MURNANE, THE NEW DIVISION OF LABOR: HOW
COMPUTERS ARE CREATING THE NEXT JOB MARKET 149–56 (2004) (discussing shifts in labor
demand in response to advances in technology); Frank Levy & Richard J. Murnane, Why the
Changing American Economy Calls for Twenty-First Century Learning: Answers to Educators’
Questions, 110 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR YOUTH DEV. 53, 54–55 (2006).
32. See, e.g., STEVEN FARKAS & ANN DUFFETT, FDR GRP., MAZE OF MISTRUST: HOW
DISTRICT POLITICS AND CROSS TALK ARE STALLING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PUBLIC EDUCATION 16–
18 (2014), https://www.kettering.org/catalog/product/maze-mistrust-how-district-politics-andcross-talk-are-stalling-efforts-improve (noting the increasing tendency of officials to give schools
and school systems responsibility for resolving controversies and providing services that
previously were the province of families and communities, including exposure to the arts, diet,
“play,” religious holidays, and sex education).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2

376

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

to the various aims.”33 Measurement limitations make it difficult to
ascertain “whether one method of providing school services is
consistently better in terms of output effects . . . than any other method.”34
The answers to these questions vary across states, districts, schools, and
individual families and children.
Given these uncertainties, it is no longer possible for public schools
to meet the needs of their diverse populations of children35 and the
demands of our complex economy and polity simply by asking teachers
to follow instructions codified in textbooks that state or local school
boards select every few years in service of a centrally mandated
curriculum.36 Instead, the bureaucracies that decades of accreted central
mandates and standard operating practices, civil service regulations, and
collective bargaining agreements have left firmly in charge of schools
more often than not prevent modern educators from developing effective
strategies and improving results for their students.37
B. Politics
Modern conditions not only weaken bureaucratic expertise but also
blur the lines of authority that bureaucratic accountability requires. In one
version, bureaucratic accountability begins when the public elects
representatives, who set policy and appoint central administrators to
implement it. The administrators translate policy into tangible rules to
govern the action of street-level employees and guide supervisors who
assure street-level compliance.38 When the system fails, vigilant clients
or regulated entities complain to their elected representatives, or replace
those representatives with more attentive ones, who reassert the public

33. John Pincus, Incentives for Innovation in the Public Schools, in SOCIAL PROGRAM
IMPLEMENTATION 43, 45 (Walter Williams & Richard F. Elmore eds., 1976).
34. Id.
35. ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY 19
(2004) (noting local conditions can make “expert prescriptions seem irrelevant or ineffective”
across diverse communities).
36. See Susan Moore Johnson, Redesigning Teachers’ Work, in ELMORE, supra note 22, at
125, 127 (“Schools [ought to be] human-service organizations where techniques are varied and
responsive to individual requirements, rather than factories where procedures are rationalized and
predictable.”).
37. See, e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supra note 22, at 38–41; see also Raywid, supra note 22, at
170 (“[I]n most contemporary schools, bureaucracy is [still] believed to be the only plausible,
viable form of social organization . . . [complete with] differential status and authority
assignments, fixed roles, clearly divided responsibilities, clearly demarcated measures of
accountability and written rules.”).
38. See, e.g., ANSELL, supra note 22, at 69–71.
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will through the hierarchy.39
In practice, bureaucracy has been a victim of its own success.40 The
more effectively organizations mass-produced and seamlessly delivered
goods and services to individuals who previously had to obtain them
through their own efforts, the more those organizations freed individuals
to attend to their productive and leisure time and diminished their
incentive to police their individually minuscule stake in how large
institutions behaved.41
In place of individual accountability arose special-interest, or
“pluralist,” politics. These politics rely on intermediary organizations and
class-action lawsuits to aggregate the modest interests and mildly
implicated values that many people hold in common in relation to largescale activity, exerting substantial influence while demanding only
modest contributions of members’ time and resources.42 A classic
example is public-sector unions representing teachers, sanitation
workers, police officers, fire fighters, and even social workers and legalaid lawyers.43 Although relations between these unions and bureaucracies
often were adversarial at first, negotiation and cooperation replaced
conflict as a way for the sides to buy peace and to bolster bureaucratic
accountability. The agreements reached became some of the most
important rules by which bureaucracies managed themselves and their
relationships with stakeholders.

39. Id. at 136–37 (“In the traditional logic of democracy, the public makes demands, but
shifts responsibility to elected officials; elected officials, in turn, make demands, but shift
responsibility to the opposition and to the bureaucracy.”).
40. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Bureaucracy Problem, 6 PUB. INT. 3, 5 (1967) (“[T]he
more a bureaucracy is responsive to its clients—whether those clients are organized by
radicals . . . or represented by Congressmen anxious to please constituents—the less it can be
accountable to presidential directives.”).
41. See ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY
223–24 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining the average person can more efficiently pursue primary goals
by “working at his job, earning more money, taking out insurance, joining a club, planning a
vacation, [or] moving to another neighborhood or city” than he can by undertaking political
activity); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1022–34 (1984) (contending that except in rare “constitutional moments,” the public avoids
public engagement, allowing factions to manipulate political life in pursuit of narrow interests).
42. Cf. JEFFREY R. HENIG, THE END OF EXCEPTIONALISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE
CHANGING POLITICS OF SCHOOL REFORM 26 (2013) (identifying many day-to-day decisions by
schools and districts that “are political in their consequences: some groups win and others lose”).
43. As of 2013, the unionization rate of public-sector workers was more than five times
higher than that of private-sector workers and three times higher than the nation’s overall
unionization rate (respectively, 35.3, 6.7, and 11.3 percent). BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS—2013, at 1 (2014), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/union2_01242014.pdf.
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In an important minority of cases, large-scale actors were slow to
adopt bureaucratic governance, ignored the demands of individuals who
were harmed, and were impervious to strife and negotiation. Prisons run
like plantations and largely governed by inmate “trusties” were an
example,44 as were organizations responsible for badly treating minorities
and women,45 rogue police forces,46 raggedly financed public school
systems,47 and chaotic child-welfare agencies.48 In these situations,
“public interest” groups used class-action litigation to aggregate clients’
interests and convince courts to decree the adoption of—or to orchestrate
negotiations in which managers accepted—bureaucratic rules as a way to
“professionalize” their operations.49
As these examples illustrate, the aggregation of otherwise fragmented
interests can effectively keep bureaucracies accountable for their adverse
impact on employees, customers, clients, and others. Aggregation of
interests is especially effective when the interests asserted have
fundamental constitutional status that the bureaucratic institution has
egregiously ignored or when such interests do not substantially compete
with each other and with those the bureaucracy is intended to serve. Even
when different stakeholders’ interests do compete, interest-aggregation
can work tolerably well if each group’s representation is roughly
proportionate to its numbers.
Problems arise, however, when these conditions do not obtain.
Special-interest organizations may themselves threaten constitutionally
44. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 n.6 (1978) (invalidating “trusty” system
of inmate supervision of other inmates in Arkansas prisons).
45. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (requiring
employer to come up with “bona fide occupational” reason for different hiring policies for
similarly situated men and women); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427, 429 (1971)
(invalidating pay and promotion provisions subjecting mainly African-American employees to
low-paying dead-end jobs).
46. Cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379–81 (1976) (reversing lower court ruling in favor
of class action plaintiffs alleging severe misconduct by police officers on grounds that plaintiffs
lacked standing and the decree issued unduly burdened officers’ discretion to perform their
duties).
47. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1266 (Cal. 1971) (invalidating California’s
unequal system of school funding based on local property taxes).
48. See Judith Meltzer et al., Introduction and Overview, in FOR THE WELFARE OF
CHILDREN: LESSONS LEARNED FROM CLASS ACTION LITIGATION vi–vii (Ctr. for the Study of Soc.
Policy ed., 2012), http://www.cssp.org/publications/child-welfare/class-action-reform/For-theWelfare-of-Children_Lessons-Learned-from-Class-Action-Litigation_January-2012.pdf (citing
successful and unsuccessful litigation efforts to reform child-welfare agencies).
49. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1298, 1299 (1976) (discussing remedial “negotiation” prompted by judges in public-law
litigation cases); Sabel & Simon, supra note 25, at 1065–66 (discussing decrees that emerged
from “defendants . . . sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ claims” or to “the new resources that the decree
induces”).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss2/2

14

Liebman and Cruikshank: Governance of Steel and Kryptonite Politics in Contemporary Publi

2017]

CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC EDUCATION REFORM

379

recognized values or interests with no or weak representation of their
own. Strong, stable special-interest organizations are likely to arise only
around a relatively large set of individuals with a small and easily defined
set of common interests and a willingness and capacity to invest in the
group’s pursuit of those interests.50 When the full range of stakeholders
affected by a public agency or private organization do not share the same
interests, the subset of preferences special-interest groups do represent
will disproportionately influence bureaucratic policies at the expense of
preferences that are not as well-represented.51 Distortions also arise when
the represented subset of interests is misaligned with the interests of the
constituencies the bureaucracy is supposed to serve—as when trade
associations representing regulated industries “capture” public agencies
at the expense of the unorganized consumers or dispersed members of the
public whom the agency is supposed to protect.52
Aggravating matters is the problem of the “street-level bureaucrat.”53
As social scientists Michael Lipsky and James Q. Wilson and others have
demonstrated, hierarchical, rule-driven bureaucracies that rely on a large
workforce of field-level employees to carry out their mission in daily
interaction with a varied and far-flung clientele—police forces, public
school systems, veterans’ hospitals, social welfare administrations, State
Department consular services, and many others—face an accountability
dilemma.54 Their claim of public accountability rests squarely on the
ability of central experts to transform general directives from elected
officials representing voters into operable plans and rules.55 But given the
inability of centralized plans and implementing rules to anticipate and
specify appropriate responses in many situations street-level employees
encounter, the agency cannot accomplish its mission unless its street50. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
GROUPS 36 (1965) (“[Small groups] may very well be able to provide themselves with a
collective good simply because of the attraction of the collective good to the individual
members.”).
51. Id.
52. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2, 12–13 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (providing examples of regulatory “capture” by financial, natural resources,
and transportation industries).
53. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
PUBLIC SERVICES xi (1980).
54. Id. at 15 (identifying “certain characteristics of the jobs of street level bureaucrats [that]
make it difficult, if not impossible” to eliminate street-level discretion). Discussing the problem
of the street-level bureaucrat in specific fields are: JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE
BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 84 (1978); THEODORE
R. SIZER, HORACE’S COMPROMISE: THE DILEMMA OF THE AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL 207, 210
(1992); William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1,
36 (1985).
55. See, e.g., ANSELL, supra note 22, at 69–71.
OF
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level workforce constantly exercises discretion to depart from or
supplement the rules as conditions dictate.56 Yet the moment frontline
employees exercise this discretion, they go off the accountability grid,
taking actions that are not publicly authorized; often are at odds with
actions chosen by colleagues in similar situations; and sometimes are
plainly incompetent, ill-advised, or in service of each employee’s
interests, not those of the agency or its clientele.57 Viewed from the
perspective of conscientious street-level employees, bureaucracies excel
at telling them how to treat likes alike but are not very good at helping
them avoid treating unlikes alike. For that part of the job, the street-level
employee is on her own, and she is damned if she does (deviate from
prescribed steps) and damned if she doesn’t (ignore rules that clearly are
mismatched to the situation).58 A frequent result in such cases is perhaps
the worst one: the employee does nothing at all.59
The accountability problem becomes even more acute when a specialinterest group disproportionately influences an agency’s policies on
behalf of frontline workers. In that situation, the likely result of
bargained-for civil service regulations, collective bargaining agreements,
and standard operating procedures is the proliferation of rules
immunizing workers who follow prescribed rules, constraining
supervision, and (through due process regulations) limiting sanctions for
56. See, e.g., LIPSKY, supra note 53, at 15 (linking need for street-level discretion to
situations requiring “responses to the human dimensions”); Steven Maynard-Moody & Michael
Musheno, State Agent or Citizen Agent: Two Narratives of Discretion, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 329, 334 (2000) (“[N]early every aspect of street-level work is defined by rules and
procedures . . . , yet rules and procedures provide only weak constraints on and loose parameters
around street-level judgments.”).
57. See, e.g., JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE:
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 111 (1997) (“[S]ubordinate
noncompliance . . . when rules are contradictory, when client groups are in conflict, or when
policies require interpretation . . . [may be] motivated by policy-oriented reasons, running counter
to official department policy.”); LIPSKY, supra note 53, at 95 (“A visit to the waiting room of a
welfare office in any inner-city neighborhood is likely to convey the impression that the Welfare
Department assumes recipients have nothing else to do with their time.”); WILSON, supra note 54,
at 84 (describing considerations affecting police officers’ decision whether to make an arrest:
“Am I getting near the end of my tour of duty? Will I have to go to court on my day off?”).
58. See, e.g., LIPSKY, supra note 53, at 72–73 (“The organization seeks to treat all clients
equally . . . ; the advocate seeks to secure special treatment for individual clients.”); WILSON,
supra note 54, at 53 (explaining that police officers prefer other assignments over patrol work
because they provide “clearer, less ambiguous objectives” and do not require “hard-to-defend
judgments about what people deserve”).
59. For policing examples, see, for example, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & MICHAEL
MUSHENO, COPS, TEACHERS, COUNSELORS: STORIES FROM THE FRONT LINES OF PUBLIC SERVICE
99–101 (2003) (declining to file charges against small-time drug dealer involved in a shooting
who “wasn’t a bad guy” and was “doing the best he could”); WILSON, supra note 54, at 210 (police
treatment of speeders).
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bad behavior.60 Such steps make it all the more difficult for employees to
exercise discretion in service of the agency’s or its clients’ interests and
for the agency to discipline employees who exercise discretion
incompetently or self-servingly.61 Like the capture of regulatory agencies
by regulated interest groups, the dominance of agency agendas by
special-interest groups representing street-level bureaucrats gives the
targets of bureaucratic accountability control over the terms of their own
regulation.
These distortions frequently arise in urban public education, where
teachers, principals, and other employees are well organized, students
(the main “clientele”) are not, and parent organizations have the same
uneven impact as special-interest politics generally.62 Without question,
the strongest voice in urban public education belongs to unions and other
associations of frontline workers: teachers, principals, and in some places
custodians, bus drivers, and others.63 These organizations have powerful
incentives to protect the interests their respective members hold in
common, chief among which are members’ collective compensation, job
security, workplace conditions, and protection from discipline in regard
to their exercise of discretion on the job. Conversely, these associations
have strong incentives to downplay interests as to which their members
might disagree—including individual compensation, job security,
workplace conditions, and recognition for how well or poorly they
exercise discretion—not to mention the divergent interests of non60. See, e.g., TERRY M. MOE, SPECIAL INTEREST: TEACHERS UNIONS AND AMERICA’S PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 175–79 (2011) (claiming that distortions generated by collective bargaining process
prioritize union interests over student outcomes); Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector
Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369, 1380–81 (2009) (citing Milwaukee Public Schools’ 232-page
collective bargaining agreement with teachers with “more than 2,000 additional supporting
documents” and New York City “contract of more than 200 pages, coupled with side agreements
and state laws, ‘determin[ing] nearly every aspect of what a teacher does, and does not do’”).
61. See Al Shanker Speaks on Unions and Collective Bargaining, 16 PEW F. ON EDUC.
REFORM 34, 35–37 (1997).
62. See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg & Jay P. Greene, Unions and the Public Interest: Is
Collective Bargaining for Teachers Good for Students?, 12 EDUC. NEXT 60, 65 (2012) (“The
normal process of checks and balances among competing interest groups, however, has failed
when it comes to education.”).
63. See Michael Hartney & Patrick Flavin, From the Schoolhouse to the Statehouse:
Teacher Union Political Activism and U.S. State Education Reform Policy, 11 ST. POL. & POL’Y
Q. 251, 251–59 (2011); see also DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS: NEW YORK CITY,
1805–1973, at 214–18 (1974) (providing case study of failure of “space-saving, money-saving
plan” for NYC schools at the hands of partisan groups allied with political machine); Johnny Ray
Youngblood, Under Mayor’s Control, the Schoolkids Are Doing All Right, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Feb. 8, 2009, 9:35 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/mayor-control-schoolkidsarticle-1.390709 (referencing the New York City Board of Education of the 1990s and before as
“tantamount to a jobs program” and a “massive, consolidated hiring hall”).
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member students, parents, and taxpayers. This is not to say that
organizing by public workers to protect their collective interests does
more harm than good. But four attributes of teachers’ and other public
education unions tend to undermine bureaucratic accountability.
First, there is no reason to expect union members’ collective interests
to coincide with those of the schools’ main clientele: children. 64 On the
contrary, shared employee interests are almost always too narrow to drive
educational policy that is effective, especially for poor and minority
students and families.65 Understandable teacher preferences that appear
to conflict with the interests of lower-performing students include shorter
work days and years; lock-step pay dependent on seniority rather than
pedagogical effectiveness or need; and senior teachers’ right to “bump”
into open positions in more desirable schools, whether or not their skills
and dispositions match the educational needs of children there.66
Testing policy is another example. Teachers often mistrust
standardized tests, which they perceive as distractions from their real

64. See Bob Chanin, Gen. Counsel, NEA, Farewell Address at NEA 2009 Representative
Assembly Meeting, YOUTUBE (July 6, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bqn1rvv7Fis
(acknowledging that the nation’s largest teachers’ union and its “affiliates are effective . . . because
we have power” and “not because” of the union’s “vision of a great public school for every child,”
“care about children,” “creative ideas,” or “merit[orious] . . . positions”); see also Geoff Decker
& Patrick Wall, Making His Case, Mulgrew Says New Contract Draws Battle Lines in “War with
the Reformers,” CHALKBEAT (May 8, 2014), http://ny.chalkbeat.org/2014/05/08/making-his-casemulgrew-says-new-contract-draws-battle-lines-in-war-with-the-reformers (describing leaked
recording of union leader explaining to members that he had convinced the state education
department, over objection of local reform officials, to require a convoluted rating rubric for
teachers to “gum up the works,” even though the simpler rubric local officials advocated was
more beneficial to teachers).
65. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 139 (“[W]hile formal bargaining is effective for
specifying narrow work rules, it is impractical for resolving complex problems, defining new
programs, or making ongoing programmatic decisions.”).
66. See, e.g., Emma Brown, D.C. Chancellor Kaya Henderson’s Effort to Lengthen School
Day Faces Union Resistance, WASH. POST (June 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/education/dc-chancellor-kaya-hendersons-effort-to-lengthen-school-day-faces-unionresistance/2014/06/29/0b7e4ea0-fe30-11e3-8176-f2c941cf35f1_story.html (“Henderson set
aside $5.1 million to add an hour of instruction at 42 more schools for the 2014–15 school year,
but at almost all of those schools, teachers either voted against adopting the longer day or union
members prevented the issue from coming up for a vote.”); Bumping in Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
27, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/27/opinion/27wed3.html (“The United States has a
long and shameful history of dumping its least effective, least qualified teachers into the schools
that serve the neediest children . . . [and] basically guarantee[ing] senior teachers the right to
change schools whenever they want . . . .”); Monica Davey, Chicago’s Mayor Challenges
Teachers Union, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/18/us/politics/
rahm-emanuel-angers-teachers-union-over-longer-school-day.html (describing union resistance
to a proposal “to pay [Chicago] teachers 2 percent more to teach 90 minutes longer each day”).
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work and fear will be used to measure their effectiveness.67 To the extent
teachers tolerate tests, they tend to prefer ones that reflect students’
current academic status, not pupils’ longitudinal academic growth,
though status measures are largely a function of wealth while growth
measures better reflect teaching quality.68 This preference reinforces the
result of the combination of seniority-based lockstep pay and bumping
rights: the aggregation of the most effective teachers in middle-class
schools with higher-performing students. Unable to compete for
compensation based on merit or service to the most challenging students,
these teachers compete for better working conditions, bumping into
schools in safer neighborhoods where relatively wealthy and privileged
students begin school already scoring well on status-based tests.69 As
attractive as this set of policies may be for teachers and the small subset
of relatively privileged parents capable of effective organization, it is
disastrous for poor and minority families.70
Second, teachers and school employees are the only broad-gauged
constituency in public school systems able to organize effectively to
protect collective interests. Teachers feel the immediate effects of policy
changes, while taxpayers are at a distance from the changes and do not
necessarily see or understand their impact.71 Students likewise have little
capacity to offset the power of unions, given their youth, transience as
67. See, e.g., Robert Hach, Why I Hate Standardized Tests: A Teacher’s Take on How to
Save Public Education, SALON (Sept. 13, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2014/09/13/
why_i_hate_standardized_tests_a_teachers_take_on_how_to_save_public_education.
68. See, e.g., Amy J. Orr, Black-White Differences in Achievement: The Importance of
Wealth, 76 SOC. EDUC. 281, 281–82 (2003) (identifying wealth as a key contributor to test score
gaps); W. James Popham, Why Standardized Tests Don’t Measure Educational Quality, 56 EDUC.
LEADERSHIP 8, 12 (1999) (arguing that standardized test results focused on student proficiency
levels conflate socioeconomic status and performance).
69. See, e.g., Dan Goldhaber et al., Uneven Playing Field? Assessing the Teacher Quality
Gap Between Advantaged and Disadvantaged Students, 44 EDUC. RESEARCHER 293, 293–94
(2015) (discussing the research and reporting study results linking maldistribution of effective
teachers to labor practices).
70. DANIEL WEISBERG ET AL., THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, THE WIDGET EFFECT: OUR
NATIONAL FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND ACT ON DIFFERENCES IN TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS 18
(2009), http://widgeteffect.org/downloads/TheWidgetEffect.pdf (“[P]oor and minority children,
who have the greatest need for effective teachers, are least likely to get them.”); Richard J.
Murnane & Jennifer L. Steele, What Is the Problem? The Challenge of Providing Effective
Teachers for All Children, 17 FUTURE CHILD. 15, 28–29 (2007) (“New York State schools serving
high concentrations of poor, nonwhite, or low-achieving children were disproportionately staffed
by teachers who were inexperienced, . . . had graduated from non-competitive colleges, or had
failed their licensing examination on the first attempt.”).
71. See, e.g., Kahlenberg & Greene, supra note 62, at 65 (arguing that parents and students
with interests different from teachers’ cannot check power of teachers’ unions, which organize
more effectively given their physical concentration in school buildings and better grasp of school
policy).
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they move through grades and schools, and diffuse interests.
The third problematic attribute of educator unions is that the streetlevel bureaucrats whose common interests they represent are the main
focus of the agencies’ bureaucratic accountability. As a result, the
disproportionate influence unions exercise threatens the agencies’
democratic bona fides by aggravating the unaccountability of street-level
discretion.
Finally, teachers’ unions, like other interest groups, survive only by
coalescing member-contributed resources around “lowest common
denominator” interests shared by all members. Consequently, unions
resist initiatives that weaken solidarity among members or violate
hierarchical or other core bureaucratic principles, even if they would
benefit most members or serve higher values. Unions’ resistance to
teacher evaluations are an example. Although evaluations benefit
students without harming most teachers (who are effective enough that
evaluations do not threaten their jobs), the risk evaluations pose to a small
subset of teachers is enough to garner strong union opposition.72
Similar concerns lead unions to oppose evaluative techniques that
increase reliability, accuracy, and efficiency. For example, although peer
review can enhance the validity and reliability of traditional review by
principals alone, help teachers learn from one another, and expand the
number of available reviewers while limiting the demands placed on
each, unions oppose peer review as harmful to worker solidarity.73
Unions likewise oppose highly reliable student surveys of teacher quality
as contrary to the hierarchical status of students as subordinates.74 In
short, teachers’ unions are effective advocates on issues on which most
teachers’ interests are aligned. They are not nearly as effective at
representing the differentiated needs of their members and have no
mission to represent needs of children that differ from teachers’ collective
interests.
72. See BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., ENSURING FAIR AND RELIABLE MEASURES OF
EFFECTIVE TEACHING: CULMINATING FINDINGS FROM THE MET PROJECT’S THREE-YEAR STUDY
20 (2013), www.metproject.org/downloads/MET_Ensuring_Fair_and_Reliable_Measures_Pract
itioner_Brief.pdf; Lois Weiner, Teacher Unionism Reborn, NEW POL., Winter 2012,
http://newpol.org/content/teacher-unionism-reborn.
73. See, e.g., SUSAN M. JOHNSON ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, TEACHER TO TEACHER:
REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF PEER ASSISTANCE AND REVIEW 9–12, 16 (2010),
https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/05/pdf/par.pdf.
74. Geoff Decker, Student Surveys Seen as Unlikely Evaluations Element, for Now,
CHALKBEAT (Nov. 28, 2012), http://ny.chalkbeat.org/2012/11/28/student-surveys-seen-asunlikely-addition-to-evaluations-for-now (reporting that although “student feedback and teacher
observations combined . . . more closely correlate[] with teacher effectiveness than observations
alone,” unions “staunchly oppose[] incorporating student feedback” because students should not
“make high-stakes decisions about their teachers”).
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Nor do parent organizations impose much accountability on education
bureaucracies, given families’ divergent interests and the uneven
distribution of political influence among them. To be sure, well-educated,
non-working parents sometimes do exercise outsized influence in schooland district-based parent groups.75 But these parents typically represent
the interests of more privileged, initially higher-performing children for
whom public schools are stepping stones to prestigious colleges rather
than the primary venue for learning. For these parents, the ideal situation
is a school dominated by their children’s academic peers, in which
“proficiency” measures entirely correlated to wealth and parent education
are collected just frequently enough to mark the kids’ and schools’
academic superiority and enhance their access to the next similar school
up the line, from pre-K to college. These parents understandably oppose
frequent measures of student learning growth, which do not positively
correlate to privilege and often show that the “best” schools in an area do
less well by their students, potentially diminishing their status in the eyes
of higher schools and colleges. Notably, the interests of these parents tend
to align most fully with those of teachers’ unions, cementing unions’
outsized influence in public education politics.
By contrast, poor and minority parents typically work, often in
multiple jobs, more often raise children singlehandedly rather than as
couples, and may be less educated themselves, with less access to
knowledge about established stairways to college.76 These parents must
delegate to schools the job of guiding and monitoring their children’s
learning. For these parents, the ideal situation is a school in which
children of a broader range of academic attainment are present and in
which educators assess each child at the start and end of each year to
measure longitudinal growth and mid-year to diagnose learning gaps and
generate ongoing solutions.77 Equally important, these parents have less
75. Sabrina Tavernise, Education Gap Grows Between Rich and Poor, Studies Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/education/education-gap-growsbetween-rich-and-poor-studies-show.html (reviewing research attributing “growing gap in
achievement” to the fact “that wealthy parents invest more time and money than ever before in
their children . . . , while lower-income families . . . are increasingly stretched for time and
resources”).
76. See, e.g., Jennifer A. O’Day & Marshall S. Smith, Quality and Equality in American
Education: Systemic Problems, Systemic Solutions, in THE DYNAMICS OF OPPORTUNITY IN
AMERICA 297, 298–300 (Irwin Kirsch & Henry Braun eds., 2016); Tavernise, supra note 75.
77. See Lisa Fleisher & Sarah Armaghan, A Final Report for Schools, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
13, 2013, 10:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-final-report-for-schools-1384398247
(quoting parent discussing her preference for system for grading schools because it gave parents
“some sense of safety . . . because you know that someone has looked at the school”); Yoav
Gonen, Failing Schools Have Less to Fear Under de Blasio, N.Y. POST (Nov. 14, 2013, 2:17
AM), http://nypost.com/2013/11/14/failing-schools-have-less-to-fear-under-de-blasio (quoting
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time and fewer resources to devote to groups mobilized to support their
interests.78 No wonder, then, that “parent” interest groups strongly oppose
frequent testing79 and longitudinal-growth measures of student success,80
though surveys suggest poor and minority parents support these
initiatives.81 The same dynamic explains why such groups do not support
social and academic integration of schools and expend much of their
social capital pursuing class-size reduction, which may make classes
more pleasant for their children but—apart from very large, and therefore
financially untenable, reductions in the earliest grades—has no
statistically reliable connection to improved outcomes.82
C. The Education Reform Response to Bureaucracy and
Special-Interest Politics
A desire to replace bureaucracy and special-interest politics has
motivated waves of proposals to reform K–12 education.83 In response,
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg explaining schools’ focus on student outcome data as
serving “[p]arents [who] don’t have the ability to go and get down in the weeds and go through
all the data”).
78. See sources cited supra note 42.
79. See supra note 18 (citing parent opposition to testing).
80. BETH FERTIG, WHY CAN’T U TEACH ME 2 READ? THREE STUDENTS AND A MAYOR PUT
OUR SCHOOLS TO THE TEST 120 (2009) (documenting resistance by “parents at high-performing
schools” to the use of growth measures to evaluate schools).
81. For example, on New York City’s 2013 parent surveys, amid a huge middle-class
outcry against standardized testing, when asked what improvement they would most like their
school to make, 17 percent of parents chose “[m]ore preparation for state tests” (the second
most popular of ten answer choices), while just 2 percent chose “less preparation for state
tests” (the least popular answer choice). N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., CITYWIDE QUESTION-BYQUESTION SURVEY RESULTS FOR COMMUNITY SCHOOLS 5 (2013), http://schools.nyc.gov/NR/rd
onlyres/7E2F3AD9-7E67-4A40-9280-30D7CBB9A502/0/2013SchoolSurveyCitywide
ResultsforCommunitySchools.pdf (emphasis added).
82. See, e.g., GROVER J. WHITEHURST & MATTHEW M. CHINGOS, BROWN CTR. ON EDUC.
POL’Y AT BROOKINGS, CLASS SIZE: WHAT RESEARCH SAYS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR STATE
POLICY 5–11 (2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0511_class_size
_whitehurst_chingos.pdf; see also CHRISTOPHER JEPSEN & STEVEN RIVKIN, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF
CAL., CLASS SIZE REDUCTION, TEACHER QUALITY, AND ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 4, 23 (2002), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_
602CJR.pdf (finding that California’s 1990s class-size-reduction efforts resulted in an influx of
ill-prepared teachers who disproportionately ended up in schools for poor and minority children
and associating those events with declines in achievement by those children); Miriam Seifter,
Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1300, 1333–53 (2016)
(questioning ability of established interest groups to represent needs of many poor and minority
individuals in administrative rulemaking).
83. See CHUBB & MOE, supra note 22, at 3 (“[E]xisting [bureaucratic] institutions cannot
solve the problem, because they are the problem . . . . [T]he key to better schools is institutional
reform.” (emphasis omitted)); Raywid, supra note 22, at 153 (“[B]ureaucracy has been criticized
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some of the largest school districts across the country and a number of
state education departments have replaced bureaucracies with more
flexible governance structures designed to support newly empowered
field-level educators to improve student outcomes.84 As this Section
develops, however, these changes are puzzlingly incomplete in a number
of respects.
1. Education Reform in General
Partly to reduce the power that central administrators, geographically
deployed supervisors, and citywide and community-based interest groups
exerted over lay school-board members and transient superintendents,
many cities have fundamentally altered school governance by giving the
mayor ultimate authority over school boards, superintendents, and the
bureaucracy.85 This has occurred in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago,
Cleveland, Harrisburg, Hartford, Indianapolis, New Haven, New York
City, Oakland, Philadelphia, Providence, and Washington, D.C., among
other districts.86 In addition to aggregating responsibility and political
accountability in one highly visible executive,87 this arrangement
as inefficient[,] . . . ineffective[,] . . . inhumane, unresponsive to its clients or to the rest of the
public, dominated almost entirely by technological and territorial imperatives, largely out of
control, and blind and impervious to the need for change.”); JEFFREY R. HENIG & WILBUR C. RICH,
MAYORS IN THE MIDDLE: POLITICS, RACE, AND MAYORAL CONTROL OF URBAN SCHOOLS 6 (2004).
84. See Richard F. Elmore, Introduction: On Changing the Structure of Public Schools, in
ELMORE, supra note 22, at 1, 11 (associating school-reform proposals with “changes in the
distribution of power between schools and their clients, or in the governance structure within
which schools operate,” which in turn affect “the way teaching and learning occur” and
“conditions of entry and licensure of teachers and administrators, and school structure, conditions
of work, and decision-making processes within schools”); OUCHI, supra note 9, at 25–28.
85. See, e.g., KENNETH K. WONG & FRANCIS X. SHEN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, MAYORAL
GOVERNANCE AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: HOW MAYOR-LED DISTRICTS ARE IMPROVING
SCHOOL AND STUDENT PERFORMANCE 7–8 (2013), http://americanprogress.org/issues/education/
report/2013/03/22/56934/mayoral-governance-and-student-achievement/.
86. Id. at 7–9.
87. For example, in 2004, New York City Mayor Bloomberg fired two appointees to a panel
with decision-making authority over the schools and engineered the departure of a third after they
opposed his plan to impose test-score-based promotion requirements for third graders. MICHAEL
FULLAN & ALAN BOYLE, BIG-CITY SCHOOL REFORMS: LESSONS FROM NEW YORK, TORONTO, AND
LONDON 28–29 (2014). Bloomberg declared:
This is what mayoral control is all about . . . . In the olden days, we had a board
that was answerable to nobody. And the Legislature said it was just not working,
and they gave the mayor control . . . . They are my representatives, and they are
going to vote for things I believe in.
David M. Herszenhorn, Bloomberg Wins on School Tests After Firing Foes, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
16, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/16/nyregion/bloomberg-wins-on-school-tests-afterfiring-foes.html.
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broadens the range of political constituencies that the responsible official
must satisfy, making it more difficult for any special interest to
dominate.88 This increases the mayor’s ability to take a systematic and
strategic approach to improving student results and to shake up inefficient
and patronage-driven decision-making.89 This change can, however,
engender resentment because it subordinates locally accessible and
school-specific opportunities for civic and political engagement to a
single, infrequent, city-wide, multi-focal mayoral election.90
Another common governance change has been to “empower”
individual school leaders and teachers to make core managerial and
instructional decisions that previously resided with the central
bureaucracy. This decentralization may seem to run counter to mayoral
control, but the motivations are the same. Both limit the power of the
central bureaucracy operating at a distance from the multifaceted
problems of and diverse populations served by public education. Both
also diminish the sway of special-interest allies to orient solutions to their
own needs. Finally, both locate day-to-day authority in the hands of
professionals with the best information about their clients’ particularized
needs.91 In place of compliance with input-based rules adopted centrally
and enforced hierarchically, these regimes use elaborate systems of
outcome measures for schools and educators in conjunction with
“heterarchical” networks of schools, collaborative “inquiry teams” of
educators acting within and across schools, and problem-oriented
“facilitators” to hold educators accountable both “externally” and
“internally.”92
88. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (“Extend the sphere, and you take in a
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists,
it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with
each other.”).
89. See OUCHI, supra note 9, at 19–21, 147, 155–64 (discussing school reforms in New
York and Chicago).
90. See, e.g., Jeffrey Henig et al., Parent and Community Engagement in New York City
and the Sustainability Challenge for Urban Education Reform, in EDUCATION REFORM IN NEW
YORK CITY: AMBITIOUS CHANGE IN THE NATION’S MOST COMPLEX SCHOOL SYSTEM 38 (Jennifer
A. O’Day et al. eds., 2011) (“Much of the mayoral control battle . . . center[ed] on the issue of
whether the chance to vote every four years in general elections in which those without a direct
stake in the schools also participate provides parents with a sufficient opportunity to influence
policies and priorities.”).
91. See OUCHI, supra note 9, at 125–40 (school empowerment in New York); id. at 177–81
(decentralization in Houston); id. at 230–36 (autonomous schools in Chicago).
92. External accountability uses measures and targets set by central actors enforced through
rewards and consequences to evaluate and influence behavior in schools. Internal accountability
operates by force of school professionals’ collective sense of responsibility for improving the
transparent results of their individual and collaborative actions. See, e.g., Stacey Childress et al.,
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These new governance structures transform central education
agencies. What previously were deciders and implementation
micromanagers become assemblers of a “portfolio” of differentiated
schools (often combinations of “traditional public” and charter
schools);93 defenders of school-level flexibility;94 distributors of
resources (typically on a per-pupil basis weighted by the instructional
challenge categories of students present);95 compilers of data and
facilitators of its use to support local improvement efforts;96 and enforcers
of accountability for improvements in student learning as demonstrated
through tests, credit accumulation, rates of promotion to higher grades
and of graduation, and demonstrated readiness for college and careers.97

Managing for Results at the New York City Department of Education, in EDUCATION REFORM IN
NEW YORK CITY, supra note 90, at 87, 92–94 (describing a productive tension between external
and internal accountability and different ways of balancing the two); Andrew Hargreaves &
Michael Fullan, The Power of Professional Capital, JSD, June 2013, at 36, 39 (describing internal
accountability through collaborative inquiry in which “[t]eachers sit together with the
transparency of the data, and all teachers take collective responsibility for all children across
grades”). Compare ERIC NADELSTERN, 10 LESSONS FROM NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS: WHAT
REALLY WORKS TO IMPROVE EDUCATION 19–31 (2013) (extolling external accountability), and
infra notes 127–30, 133–34 and accompanying text (describing NYC’s substantially external
accountability measures), with FULLAN & BOYLE, supra note 87, at 67–68 (praising reforms that
downplay accountability via “prescription and top-down mandates” and foster internal
responsibility), and Mike Schmoker, Tipping Point: From Feckless Reform to Substantive
Educational Improvement, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, http://mikeschmoker.com/tipping-point.html (last
visited May 20, 2017) (preferring internal accountability through “strong professional learning
communities”).
93. HILL ET AL., supra note 2, at 11–12; Paul T. Hill, Leadership and Governance in New
York City School Reform, in EDUCATION REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 90, at 17, 26
[hereinafter Hill, Leadership and Governance]; CAMPBELL & GROSS, supra note 2, at 5.
94. NADELSTERN, supra note 92, at 16 (“[P]rincipals, in consultation with teachers [and]
parents, . . . made the important decisions . . . that [previously] had typically been determined in
the Central Office.”); Hill, Leadership and Governance, supra note 93, at 20 (describing the
“Klein/Bloomberg” approach which “let local productive units (schools) make the consequential
decisions that affect their productivity”).
95. See, e.g., Leanna Stiefel & Amy Ellen Schwartz, Financing K–12 Education in the
Bloomberg Years, 2002–2008, in EDUCATION REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 90, at 55,
61–62 (listing Fair Student Funding determinants, including “need weights” such as poverty and
below-standard achievement and “portfolio weights” such as Career and Technical Education
schools and transfer schools).
96. See infra notes 129, 140–41, 162–66 and accompanying text.
97. See FERTIG, supra note 80, at 50 (“Klein and Bloomberg enacted a controversial plan
to stop promoting elementary children to the next grade if they didn’t pass the statewide tests.”);
Childress et al., supra note 92, at 95 (describing school progress reports measuring “school
environment, student performance, student progress, and additional credit”).
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2. Education Reform Examples
Although contested,98 the results of recent reforms along these lines
in a number of urban U.S. school districts appear promising. This
Subsection provides some examples.
a. Moderate Steps: Houston, Boston, Charlotte-Mecklenberg,
and Denver
An early example of reform is the Houston Independent School
District. Starting in 1992, Houston’s reform-minded school board
increased principal autonomy and management training, implemented
performance bonuses for teachers,99 and established Shared DecisionMaking Committees comprising teachers, parents and community
representatives to advise the principal on issues such as budget,
curriculum, staffing, and school organization.100 In 2005, Houston
adopted a “Board Monitoring System,” requiring regular superintendent
reports on “academic progress, operational effectiveness, public and
employee support, and facility management.”101 The results have been
promising, with significant improvements on state test scores and school
ratings. Between 2005 and 2011, the number of district schools rated
exemplary by the state increased from six to fifty-nine, and the number
of academically unacceptable schools declined from thirty-four to
fifteen.102
A second example is the transformation of the Boston public schools,
beginning when Mayor Raymond Flynn gained control over the district
in 1992 and continuing through Mayor Thomas Menino’s five subsequent
terms.103 Indicative of the changes that were implemented was the
creation of empowered “Pilot Schools” freed from various union work
rules and given more control over budget, staffing, curriculum,
98. See FULLAN & BOYLE, supra note 87, at 57 (characterizing evidence of increased
performance trends in New York City as “debatable”); Did NYC Close the Achievement Gap in a
Decade of Mayoral Control?, DIANE RAVITCH’S BLOG (Nov. 3, 2012), http://dianeravitch.net/
2012/11/03/did-nyc-close-the-achievement-gap-in-a-decade-of-mayoral-control (“Despite a decade
of relentless emphasis on testing, accountability and choice, the achievement gap has barely
budged.”).
99. See OUCHI, supra note 9, at 166–67.
100. Id. at 168.
101. Id. at 166.
102. See id. at 170; Press Release, Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., Ninety-One Percent of HISD
Schools Meet Tougher Texas Standards (July 29, 2011), http://www.houstonisd.org/cms/lib2/
TX01001591/Centricity/Domain/7946/HISDTougherStandards.pdf_PR.pdf.
103. See WONG & SHEN, supra note 85, at 7; Katharine Q. Seelye, Thomas M. Menino, Mayor
Who Led Boston’s Renaissance, Is Dead at 71, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/us/thomas-m-menino-mayor-who-transformed-bostondies-at-71.html.
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governance, and scheduling.104 The district shored up accountability by
evaluating schools against consistent benchmarks every five years.105
From 1999 to 2010, the percentage of Boston tenth graders scoring
proficient or better on the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment
System increased from 19 to 60 percent in English language arts and from
15 to 60 percent in mathematics, though the gains have tapered off more
recently.106
In 2007, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district implemented a
similar turnaround strategy using monetary incentives and a promise of
broad school-based decision-making authority to induce strong leaders
and teachers to work in the district’s most at-risk schools.107
Simultaneously, the district deployed a sophisticated combination of
lagging, outcome-focused, and leading, often qualitative, indicators and
a comprehensive data system to hold schools accountable and provide
educators with diagnostic information about the students, classrooms,
subject matters, and schools needing the most attention.108 The result was
significant improvement in both reading and math outcomes on annual
North Carolina End-of-Grade tests.109 From 2007–2008 to 2011–2012,
students at schools participating in the school-empowerment program
had longitudinal growth rates in math and reading 12 and 13 percent
higher, respectively, than students at non-participating schools.110
According to one close observer of Charlotte-Mecklenburg’s efforts to
improve student outcomes, its reforms succeeded without some of the
deeper structural changes employed elsewhere because of the unified
commitment of the school board and superintendent, in the absence of a
strong union, to giving themselves and school leaders the “flexibility to
104. CTR. FOR COLLABORATIVE EDUC., STRONG RESULTS, HIGH DEMAND: A FOUR-YEAR
STUDY OF BOSTON’S PILOT HIGH SCHOOLS iv (2007), http://cce.org/files/StrongResults_Study_
2007.pdf.
105. Id. at v. In return for this accountability, the district increased educator autonomy by
letting “[t]eachers evaluate baseline data, identify student needs, project student growth targets,
and provide rationales for their decisions . . . [and] seek and plan the most effective instructional
strategies to meet identified student needs and establish an appropriate interval of instructional
time.” CMTY. TRAINING & ASSISTANCE CTR., IT’S MORE THAN MONEY 29 (2013),
http://ctacusa.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/MoreThanMoney.pdf.
106. Compare WONG & SHEN, supra note 85, at 20 (documenting gains for fourth- and
eighth-grade students in both subjects), with id. at 26 (“Boston has not quite kept up its
momentum . . . .”).
107. CMTY. TRAINING & ASSISTANCE CTR., supra note 105, at 14.
108. Id. at 29 (describing district’s trade of accountability for educator autonomy to “evaluate
baseline data, identify student needs, project student growth targets,” “plan the most effective
instructional strategies to meet identified student needs,” and “provide rationales for their
decisions”).
109. See id. at 62–63.
110. Id. at 63.
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incentivize, rank, improve, and remove” principals and teachers.111
In 2009, Denver introduced a more extensive set of “portfolio”
reforms, including enhanced local decision-making flexibility for new
charter schools as well as for principals of traditional public schools,
enhanced school choice for families, compensation and hiring decisions
based on educators’ demonstrated classroom results, a sophisticated
scorecard for holding schools accountable, and closures of both
traditional and charter schools based on scorecard results.112 These
changes were accompanied by improved outcomes, with the number of
schools receiving the highest grade increasing from nine in 2009 to
fifteen in 2012 and with the district’s on-time graduation rate increasing
22 percent between 2006 and 2014.113
Denver’s early results under Colorado’s Innovation Schools initiative
are also promising. Under this program, a school may apply for
Innovation status, which waives bureaucratic state and district mandates
that tend to hamper school-improvement efforts.114 Although most
Denver schools that obtained Innovation status were poorly performing
at first, with student proficiency rates well below the state average, their
students’ longitudinal growth rates in reading, writing, and math
exceeded the state median after the schools obtained Innovation status.115
Teachers’ ratings of their own decision-making ability, capacity,
ownership, empowerment, and ability to innovate—thought to be leading
indicators of student results—have also been higher in Innovation schools
than in traditional schools.116

111. HEATHER ZAVADSKY, SCHOOL TURNAROUNDS: THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF DISTRICTS 79
(2012).
112. Id. at 117–20, 123–29.
113. See Karen Augé, More Denver Public Schools Making the Grade, District Reports,
DENVER POST (Sept. 24, 2012, 9:42 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21620850/more-dpsschools-making-grade-district-reports; Jonah Edelman, What It Takes to Fix American Education,
DAILY BEAST (Nov. 23, 2014, 6:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/
23/what-it-takes-to-fix-american-education.html; Jeremy P. Meyer, Only Handful of Schools
Earn DPS’s Top Ranking, DENVER POST (Sept. 17, 2009, 2:38 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/
2009/09/17/only-handful-of-schools-earn-dpss-top-ranking.
114. See Innovation Schools, COLO. DEP’T EDUC., https://www.cde.state.co.us/choice/
innovationschools (last visited Apr. 11, 2017).
115. SUSAN CONNORS ET AL., UNIV. OF COLO. DENVER, INNOVATION SCHOOLS IN DPS: YEAR
THREE OF AN EVALUATION STUDY 18–19 (2013), http://apluscolorado.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/08/Innovation-Schools-in-DPS-Year-Three-of-an-Evaluation-Study.pdf.
116. Id. at 6.
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b. All-Out Reform: New York City, 2002–2013
In a number of large cities, including Chicago, Los Angeles, New
York, and Washington, D.C., legislation establishing mayoral control117
triggered still more comprehensive changes. These included the
appointment of ambitious, reform-minded superintendents;118 rigorous
learning standards culminating in early adoptions of the Common
Core;119 enhanced autonomy for schools in deciding how to meet
standards;120 stronger accountability for whether they did;121 changes in
leadership or closure of chronically underperforming schools; family
choice among schools, including charter and other new schools
committed to higher performance;122 principal and teacher evaluation and
rewards based substantially on student outcomes;123 and technology
systems rich in diagnostic data and tools for informing the public, parents,
administrators, and teams of educators trained to conduct structured
“inquiry” into causes and cures for weak gains for particular schools,
117. See WONG & SHEN, supra note 85, at 7–8.
118. Sharon Otterman & Jennifer Medina, New York Schools Chancellor Ends 8-Year Run,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/nyregion/10klein.html
(discussing tenure of Joel Klein, who “presided over a radical reorganization of the New York
City school system,” including “increasing parent choice through innovations like charter schools,
weakening traditional union protections like tenure and bringing numbers-based accountability
to schools”); Kate Pickert, Obama’s White House: Education Secretary Arne Duncan,
TIME (Dec. 2, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1863062_
1863058_1867011,00.html (describing Chicago schools chief Arne Duncan as “not shy[ing] away
from controversy . . . [and] clos[ing] failing schools” while strongly advocating “for
charter schools [and] performance pay for teachers”); Amanda Ripley, Rhee Tackles
Classroom Challenge, TIME (Nov. 26, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1862444,00.html (profiling Rhee, who “promised to make Washington the highestperforming urban school district in the nation”).
119. “The Common Core State Standards Initiative is a state-led effort that established a
single set of clear educational standards for kindergarten through 12th grade in English language
arts and mathematics that states voluntarily adopt.” Frequently Asked Questions, COMMON CORE
ST. STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://thompson.k12.co.us/Page/3844 (last visited Apr. 11, 2017).
120. OUCHI, supra note 9, at 233 (describing school autonomy in Chicago); Hill, Leadership
and Governance, supra note 93, at 22 (“[New York City’s chancellor] Klein . . . came down on
the side of autonomy as a precondition for reform.”); Autonomy, FOCUS DC (2010),
http://focusdc.org/autonomy (“DC’s strong public charter school law . . . provides an unusual
amount of autonomy to the District’s public charter schools. . . . [This autonomy extends to]
instruction, expenditures, administration, and personnel.”).
121. See, e.g., FERTIG, supra note 80, at 117–18; NADELSTERN, supra note 92, at 21; OUCHI,
supra note 9, at 92–97; Childress et al., supra note 92, at 97.
122. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
123. ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & KEVIN A. HASSETT, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF NEW YORK
CITY’S PUBLIC SCHOOL REFORMS, 2002–2013, at 4–5 (2013), http://www.sonecon.com/docs/
studies/Report_on_Economic_Benefits_of_NYC_Educational_Reforms-Shapiro-Hassett-FinalDecember2013.pdf.
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classrooms, and categories of or individual children.124 The changes were
accompanied by substantial, though incomplete, improvements in student
outcomes.125
This Subsection focuses on perhaps the most far reaching reforms, in
New York City from 2002 to 2013.126 Exchanging autonomy for
accountability, Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Chancellor Joel Klein
increased the control principals exercised over hiring and firing teachers,
setting the school’s budget and daily schedule of classes and teacher
assignments, choosing the school’s portfolio of professional and youth
development programs, and designing its curriculum. By grading schools
A–F, the reforms held principals accountable for using their autonomy to
help students attain average annual longitudinal gains on state
assessments comparable to or better than the highest levels achieved by
city schools with similar populations in the recent past.127 As “leading
indicators,” principal accountability also included annual parent, teacher,
and student Learning Environment Surveys and expert Quality Reviews
of the rigor with which each school identified its strengths and
weaknesses, implemented a coherent strategy for improving its
operations and outcomes, and adjusted its strategy based on feedback
about results.128 The district closed chronically poor-performing schools
124. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NEW YORK CITY PROGRESS REPORT:
ELEMENTARY/MIDDLE/K-8, at 3–4 (2013), http://schools.nyc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/7B6EEB8BD0E8-432B-9BF6-3E374958EA70/0/EducatorGuide_EMS_20131118.pdf (describing a “quality
review” designed to measure how well a school is organized to support learning, and to gather
statistical data and share information on student learning outcomes).
125. Emma Brown, D.C. Posts Significant Gains on National Test, Outpacing Nearly Every
State, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/dc-postssignificant-gains-on-national-test-outpacing-nearly-every-state/2013/11/07/dccc08c0-475c-11e3
-b6f8-3782ff6cb769_story.html; see also infra notes 141–150 and accompanying text (citing
improvements in New York City).
126. Between 2006 and 2009, the lead author of this Article helped design and implement a
number of the reforms discussed in this Subsection as head of the New York City Department of
Education’s Division of Accountability and Achievement Resources.
127. New York City schools were evaluated using a “peer rating” system, under which each
school’s outcomes were compared to those at the forty other schools in the system most like it,
judged by students’ incoming test scores and demographic make-up. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
supra note 124, at 3–4 (describing peer-grouping methodology); see sources cited supra note 122.
Three-fourths of a school’s grade for a series of metrics was based on how close schools came to
matching or surpassing the top-achieving school in their cohort over the prior three years; if a
school surpassed that level, its performance became the benchmark for schools in future years.
The remaining quarter of the grade was based on a comparison of the school’s outcomes to those
achieved over the past three years by all schools of its type (e.g., elementary schools) across the
city. Accountability That Improves: An Interview with Jim Liebman, DISTRICT MGMT. J., Spring
2014, at 4, 5 [hereinafter Accountability That Improves].
128. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2016–2017 QUALITY REVIEW RUBRIC (2017),
http://schools.nyc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/8C11A001-7E78-469D-996F-B0C3703CEA81/0/
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at which leading and lagging indicators were negative, replaced them
with large numbers of charter and other new schools,129 and increased
family choice among middle and high schools.130 Additionally,
Bloomberg and Klein increased teacher salaries by 41 percent while
working to recruit larger numbers of qualified teachers through Teach For
America and a local Teaching Fellows Program131—with the result that
the number of uncertified teachers (who accounted for about half of all
teachers hired between 1995 and 2002) dropped to zero by 2006, while
entering teachers’ SAT and qualification exam scores dramatically
increased.132 Shortly thereafter, the district began evaluating teachers
based on student longitudinal gains on state tests.
New York also worked to build capacity and foster internal
accountability among educators at the school level.133 An important early
step was the founding of a Leadership Academy to “recruit[] and
prepare[] aspiring public school leaders to become principals in highneed NYC schools,” where they were expected to take advantage of their
expanded autonomy by accelerating student learning growth.134 By 2012,
201314QualityReviewRubric.pdf.
129. SHAPIRO & HASSETT, supra note 123, at 4–5 (noting 2002–2013 increase in charter
school enrollment from 1,800 to 60,000).
130. Id. at 4 (“The Bloomberg reforms also expanded school choice to all public school
students and public high schools . . . . By 2008, incoming high school freshmen could choose
from more than 700 schools.”); Sean P. Corcoran & Henry M. Levin, School Choice and
Competition in the New York City Schools, in EDUCATION REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note
90, at 199, 204 (describing choices available to middle school families).
131. See Goertz et al., Recruiting, Evaluating, and Retaining Teachers, in EDUCATION
REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 90, at 157, 166 (“The Teaching Fellows Program is highly
selective, often attracting early career changers.”); SHAPIRO & HASSETT, supra note 123, at 2, 4
(“Real funding . . . rose from $15.4 billion in 2002 to $24 billion in 2013 . . . support[ing] 41
percent hikes in average teacher compensation.”).
132. See, e.g., FULLAN & BOYLE, supra note 87, at 41–42; Paul T. Hill, Bloomberg’s
Education Plan Is Working: Don't Ditch It, ATLANTIC (Oct. 22, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/10/bloombergs-education-plan-is-workingdont-ditch-it/280704 (finding “measures of teacher quality including math and verbal SAT scores,
scores on teacher qualification exams, and attendance at competitive colleges, have increased
dramatically since 2002”).
133. See Childress et al., supra note 92, at 92 (“Accountability isn’t entirely or even mainly
about incentives. It’s about capacity building, which to me means adult learning based on self and
team evaluation of what’s working and what’s not, and knowledge management, meaning
spreading what works from one student or school to another.” (quoting Liebman)).
134. FULLAN & BOYLE, supra note 87, at 42–43; see Philissa Cramer & Rachel Cromidas, In
a Change, City Is Steering Aspiring Principals off the Fast Track, CHALKBEAT (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://ny.chalkbeat.org/2012/11/15/in-a-change-city-is-steering-aspiring-principals-off-the-fasttrack (quoting former district official, Nadelstern, “The Leadership Academy said that until the
[university-based education] schools produced reform-minded leaders capable of running
challenging urban institutions then the district would step in and attempt to do the job
themselves”).
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the Academy’s Aspiring Principals Program had trained 17 percent of the
City’s approximately 1,700 principals.135
A key set of skills the Leadership Academy imparted to principals-intraining was how educators could use the expanding array of data
generated by the district’s new accountability system and other tools to
improve operations and outcomes. One tool was a menu of no-stakes
diagnostic assessments educators could administer periodically to track
students’ progress and identify points where students were struggling.136
Schools were also encouraged to develop their own assessments.137
Another new tool was the Achievement Reporting and Innovation System
(ARIS), which collected evaluative and diagnostic data that were
instantly available to educators, disaggregated down to the school,
classroom, and individual student level. The system offered educators
instructional materials and strategies developed locally and nationally.138
To help educators effectively use this information and build internal
accountability, the district created a cadre of facilitators and
comprehensive manuals139 to support “inquiry teams” in each of the
system’s schools. Comprising the principal, teachers, a “data manager,”
and other school personnel, inquiry teams implemented a flexibly
structured process for (1) using available data to identify a “target
population” of struggling students and the points at which the instruction
they received broke down; (2) generating diagnostic information through
“low inference” observation of the subjects’ classwork and behavioral
responses to instruction and using those data and other research to
hypothesize causes of instructional failure and implement solutions; (3)
setting short-term improvement goals and measuring progress toward
them with brief, low-impact assessments; (4) spreading the use of
successful strategies to teachers in the same and other schools; (5)
identifying school-wide structural changes needed to support the new
strategy; and (6) repeating the diagnostic process and revising initially
adopted strategies if they continued to fail at least some of the focal

135. FULLAN & BOYLE, supra note 87, at 43.
136. Periodic Assessments, N.Y.C. DEP’T EDUC., http://schools.nyc.gov/Accountability/
resources/assessments/default.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
137. See Periodic Assessment Options, N.Y.C. DEP’T EDUC., http://schools.nyc.gov/
Accountability/resources/assessments/PAOptions.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
138. See BILL TUCKER, EDUC. SECTOR REPORTS, PUTTING DATA INTO PRACTICE: LESSONS
FROM NEW YORK CITY 1–2 (2010), http://www.oxydiane.net/IMG/pdf_Putting_Data_Into_
Practice_RELEASE.pdf.
139. See, e.g., N.Y.C. DEPT. OF EDUC., CHILDREN FIRST INTENSIVE INQUIRY TEAM
HANDBOOK 3 (2008) [hereinafter INQUIRY TEAM HANDBOOK], http://is239.schoolwires.com/
cms/lib/NY18000436/Centricity/ModuleInstance/590/Inquiry_Team_Handbook.pdf.
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children.140
As independent studies using sophisticated methodologies have
found,141 the Bloomberg–Klein reforms in New York City schools
between 2003 and at least 2010 (when most of the studies terminated)
were strongly associated with substantially improved student outcomes.
High-school graduation rates—which had remained stagnant for decades
by the City’s own measures at around 50 percent—climbed to 70 percent
by 2010.142 New York State later began calculating graduation rates using
a more demanding methodology, and it too registered substantial gains in
New York City.143 The federal government’s still stricter calculation
(which it reported only between 2002 and 2005) showed still greater
gains.144 During this period, the graduation rates of black and Latino
students increased at twice the rate of white and Asian students.145 A
major cause of the increase was the city’s closure of 140 large failing high
schools with graduation rates perennially well below 50 percent and their

140. See, e.g., id. at 69–73 (listing data an inquiry team may use); FULLAN & BOYLE, supra
note 87, at 40 (describing inquiry as “analyz[ing] all the performance data available to find gaps
in their learning”); NELL SCHARF PANERO & JOAN E. TALBERT, STRATEGIC INQUIRY: STARTING
SMALL FOR BIG RESULTS IN EDUCATION 13 (2013) (describing the teams, targets, tasks, and
training associated with inquiry teams). On the contribution of inquiry to internal accountability,
see, for example, id. at 15 (“[E]stablishing . . . a team that is collectively responsible for improving
outcomes for a specific shared group of students in the school engenders shared accountability.”).
141. See, e.g., JAMES J. KEMPLE, RESEARCH ALL. FOR N.Y.C. SCH., THE CONDITION OF NEW
YORK CITY HIGH SCHOOLS: EXAMINING TRENDS AND LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE 3 (2013);
WONG & SHEN, supra note 85, at 46; Hill, Leadership and Governance, supra note 93, at 26
(comprehensively surveying studies); see also ROBERT BALFANZ ET AL., CIVIC ENTERS., BUILDING
A GRAD NATION: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGE IN ENDING THE HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUT EPIDEMIC 13
(2014),
http://new.every1graduates.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/BGN_2014_Report.pdf
(crediting recent increases in high school graduation rate nationally, in part to reforms that “began
in New York City [which] replace[d] dropout factories with new, smaller high schools specifically
designed for students from high-poverty neighborhoods”).
142. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., NYC GRADUATION RATES CLASS OF 2010 (2006 COHORT)
(2011), http://schools.nyc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/678EA9CF-69C0-4CFD-87EF-7E0F670059C2/0/
GRADRATE2010_SHORT_%20HIGHLIGHTS_WEB.pdf; see JAMES KEMPLE, HIGH SCHOOL
CLOSURES IN NEW YORK CITY: IMPACTS ON STUDENTS’ ACADEMIC OUTCOMES, ATTENDANCE,
AND MOBILITY 49 (2015), http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/scmsAdmin/media/users/sg158/PDFs/hs_
closures/HighSchoolClosuresinNewYorkCity_ResearchAllianceforNYCSChools_pdf.pdf
(crediting the Bloomberg–Klein “set of interlocking systemic reforms that were implemented at
an unprecedented pace and scale” with large increases in the graduation and college enrollment
rates “[a]fter decades of stagna[tion]”).
143. SHAPIRO & HASSETT, supra note 123, at 8.
144. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., INVESTING IN INNOVATION FUND SCALE-UP GRANT 33–34
(2010), https://www2.ed.gov/programs/innovation/2010/unfunded/narratives/u396a100063.
145. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., WHAT’S NEXT FOR SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW YORK
CITY 8 (2013), http://observgo.uquebec.ca/observgo/fichiers/33202_redditiondecomptes.pdf.
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replacement with new small high schools with above-average graduate
rates.146
Large gains in rates of students performing at or above “proficiency”
levels on state tests also occurred. Although New York City has
substantially higher rates of low-income and minority students (67 and
69 percent, respectively) than the state at large (43 and 42 percent,
respectively) and as of 2003 had proficiency rates 11.9 percent lower than
the rest of the state in fourth-grade reading and 11.4 percent in fourthgrade math, by 2010 it had effectively closed the proficiency gap with the
rest of the state.147 During the same period, the proficiency gap between
the rest of the state and its other large cities—Buffalo, Rochester,
Syracuse, and Yonkers—stagnated.148 A rigorous study designed to
isolate test score gains attributable to the Bloomberg–Klein reforms from
those predicted by preexisting trends and separate simultaneous
initiatives concluded that, between 2002–2003 and 2008–2009, the
reforms were associated with, respectively, 17- and 15-percent increases
in fourth- and eighth-grade reading scores, and 16- and 20-percent
increases in fourth- and eighth-grade math scores, beyond what would
have occurred had the reforms not been implemented.149 Improvement on
146. REBECCA UNTERMAN, MRDC, HEADED TO COLLEGE: THE EFFECTS OF NEW YORK
CITY’S SMALL HIGH SCHOOLS OF CHOICE ON POSTSECONDARY ENROLLMENT 3–4 (2014),
http://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/Headed_to_College_PB.pdf (finding that, for school
years 2005–2006 through 2008–2009, enrollment as a ninth grader in one of the new small high
schools increased average on-time high school graduation rates for all students by 9.4 percentage
points, for black males by 12.2 percentage points, and for special education students by 13.4
percentage points; they also increased graduates’ rates of enrollment in postsecondary institutions
by 8.4 percentage points); Frequently Asked Questions About MRDC’s Study of Small Public High
Schools in New York City, MDRC, https://www.mdrc.org/publication/frequently-askedquestions-about-mdrc-s-study-small-public-high-schools-new-york-city (last updated October
2014) (noting that New York City’s small schools of choice program was designed to replace
failing high schools).
147. See James J. Kemple, Children First and Student Outcomes: 2003–2010, in EDUCATION
REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 90, at 255, 270; SHAPIRO & HASSETT, supra note 123, at
7. In 2010, New York State recalibrated the scores required to establish proficiency, causing
significant decreases in proficiency rates statewide. James Liebman & Jonah E. Rockoff, Moving
Mountains in New York City: Joel Klein’s Legacy by the Numbers, EDUC. WK. (Nov. 30, 2010),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/11/30/14liebman.h30.html. In 2013, New York State
increased the rigor of state examinations to coincide with the adoption of the more demanding
Common Core State Standards, again causing decreases in statewide proficiency rates. Javier C.
Hernandez & Robert Gebeloff, Test Scores Sink as New York Adopts Tougher Benchmarks, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/nyregion/under-new-standardsstudents-see-sharp-decline-in-test-scores.html. In both cases, however, the proficiency declines
in New York City were far less pronounced than in the state’s other large cities. See SHAPIRO &
HASSETT, supra note 123, at 7; Liebman & Rockoff, supra.
148. Liebman & Rockoff, supra note 147.
149. Kemple, supra note 147.
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the federal National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) was
patchier but still evident. In the decade after 2003, New York City’s
average fourth-grade math scores on NAEP increased ten points (226 to
236) compared to an increase of seven points nationally (234 to 241), and
nine points (224 to 235) for a subset of large urban school districts for
which local results are broken out from state results. The corresponding
gains in reading scores were six points (210 to 216) compared to an
increase of five points nationally (216 to 221), and eight points (204 to
212) for the urban assessment districts.150
c. Collaborative Reform: Baltimore
The reforms discussed above all seek to motivate educators to improve
student outcomes and support them in taking self-conscious steps to learn
why instruction that succeeds for some children fails for others and adjust
strategies accordingly. Although those reforms differ in the balance they
strike between motivation and support and between external and internal
accountability,151 they mainly fall toward the motivation and externalaccountability ends of the spectrums. In contrast, reforms in Baltimore
fell toward the support and internal-accountability poles.152
After Martin O’Malley was elected mayor of Baltimore in 1999, he
implemented a program known as CitiStat153 to use data from everyday
experience to improve the delivery of city services.154 Every two weeks,
O’Malley or a deputy mayor would meet with leaders of each agency,
peppering them with questions about their data on and responses to key
public problems the agency faced—what available data revealed about
levels of success in addressing problems, what better data could be
collected, what comparisons of service-delivery outcomes in different
150. TUDA District Profile, NATION’S REPORT CARD http://www.nationsreportcard.gov/
reading_math_tuda_2013/#/tuda-profiles (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
151. See Childress et al., supra note 92 (distinguishing external and internal accountability).
152. See ALLEN GROSSMAN ET AL., PUB. EDUC. LEADERSHIP PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV.,
BALTIMORE CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS: IMPLEMENTING BOUNDED AUTONOMY 12 (2011).
153. Tina Rosenberg, Armed with Data, Fighting More Than Crime, N.Y. TIMES (May 2,
2012, 7:00 AM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/armed-with-data-fightingmore-than-crime. CitiStat was inspired by CompStat, a 1990s NYPD program in which
“[p]recinct commanders appear before the N.Y.P.D. leadership every few weeks to be questioned
about their performance. If the numbers are not good, the commander must explain why—and
have a specific plan for improvement. The next meeting begins with questions about how well
those commitments were kept.” Id.; see ANSELL, supra note 22, at 104–25 (describing early
versions of CompStat as a collaborative learning process).
154. Rosenberg, supra note 153 (noting CitiStat’s application to issues ranging from
potholes to homelessness and domestic violence); see TERESITA PEREZ & REECE RUSHING, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE CITISTAT MODEL: HOW DATA-DRIVEN GOVERNMENT CAN INCREASE
EFFICIENCY & EFFECTIVENESS 6 (2007), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
issues/2007/04/pdf/citistat_report.pdf.
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parts of the city or different subdivisions of the agency revealed about the
problems’ causes and solutions, and the agency’s plan and timeline for
implementing improvement strategies.155 Follow-up meetings focused on
whether the agency had implemented its plans and met tentative targets,
how it was altering its course in the face of uneven success, how the
mayor and city leadership could support and enhance the plans, and what
agencies facing similar problems (e.g., garbage and snow removal) could
learn from one another.156 By the end of each meeting day, CitiStat
analysts had a list of mutual commitments from the city and agency and
information that would be presented at the next meeting.157
The mayor who succeeded O’Malley continued this methodology158
and prioritized data-driven accountability for Baltimore’s school system
by hiring New York City’s Deputy Schools Chancellor Andres Alonso as
the Baltimore districts’ CEO in 2007.159 Alonso’s first step in Baltimore
was to grant schools and their principals greater instructional and
operational autonomy than they previously had exercised.160 He
facilitated the transfer of power from the central district to schools by
cutting central staff and implementing a funding formula “that allocated
money to schools based on their students’ needs.”161
In return for empowering schools and their leaders, Alonso held them
accountable for the student outcomes their choices generated.162 To do
so, Alonso’s Office of Achievement and Accountability created a twopart School Accountability Framework (SAF)163: a quantitative School
Progress Report that analyzed the academic progress made by each
school’s students and a qualitative School Effectiveness Review (SER)
155. Rosenberg, supra note 153.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Welcome to Mayor’s Office of CitiStat, BALT. CITY, http://citistat.baltimorecity.gov
(last visited Apr. 11, 2017).
159. See Sabrina Tavernise, A Mission to Transform Baltimore’s Beaten Schools, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/education/02balti.
160. Erica L. Green & Luke Broadwater, City Schools Chief Alonso Resigns, BALT. SUN
(May 6, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-05-06/news/bs-md-ci-alonso-resigns20130506_1_tisha-edwards-school-construction-money-school-board.
161. Id.; Lesli A. Maxwell, Andrés A. Alonso, Baltimore Schools CEO, to Resign, EDUC.
WK. (May 6, 2013), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/District_Dossier/2013/05/andres_a_
alonso_baltimore_scho.html; Tavernise, supra note 159 (describing Alonso’s “sweeping
reorganization of the [Baltimore] school system, closing [of] failing schools, slashing [of] the
central office staff by a third and replacing three-quarters of all school principals” with strong
initial results).
162. Interview with Dr. Andres Alonso, Former Superintendent, Balt. Pub. Sch., in New
York, N.Y. (Mar. 7, 2014).
163. SARAH YATSKO, CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., BALTIMORE AND THE PORTFOLIO
DISTRICT STRATEGY 24 (2012), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED532896.pdf.
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performed by trained reviewers.164 Described as a “frank professional
dialog,”165 the SER resembled a CitiStat meeting. The school’s outcomes
on its most recent SAF, the underlying data, and strategic and operational
documents were provided to the SER team ahead of its visit, with further
evidence gathered on-site.166 School leadership, staff, students, and
families participated in focus groups with the reviewers, and the SER
team shared verbal conclusions with the school leader at the end of the
visit and before writing a formal report.167 Alonso also conducted
periodic meetings with the principal of each school, reviewing the
school’s recent SAF and SER results, enrollment data reflecting its
attractiveness to families, strategies for dealing with weak spots the data
revealed, evidence of the responsive strategies’ effects, and reactions by
the school and its leadership to evidence of the strategies’ success or
failure.168 To build educators’ capacity to use this information to develop
student- and school-specific improvement plans, Alonso established
mentoring structures for new teachers and problem-solving networks of
teachers and principals across different schools.169 Finally, based on
comparative outcome and demand data, SER results for all Baltimore
schools, and his own intensive observation of each principal’s ability and
of each school’s disposition to improve, Alonso made annual decisions
about who should lead schools, which schools should be closed, and
which new schools should be created.170 Although Alonso’s tenure was
not without setbacks,171 “graduation rates skyrocketed,” “test scores saw
historic growth,” and enrollment and attendance steadily increased.172

164. BALT. CITY PUB. SCH., SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PROTOCOL: 2011–2012, at
1 (2012), http://www.baltimorecityschools.org/cms/lib/MD01001351/Centricity/Domain/6823/
20120518-SERprotocol.pdf.
165. Id. at 3.
166. Id. (“Evidence collection begins with a review of all relevant documents provided to
the SER team. While on site, evidence collection continues through additional document
reviews . . . .”).
167. Id.
168. Interview with Dr. Andres Alonso, supra note 162.
169. Id.
170. Green & Broadwater, supra note 160.
171. 2 Baltimore City Schools Confirmed to Have Cheated on State Tests, CBS BALT. (June
23, 2011, 11:09 PM), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2011/06/23/2-baltimore-city-schoolsconfirmed-to-have-cheated-on-state-test/. After students’ wrong answers were erased and
replaced at two Baltimore schools, Alonso adopted aggressive security protocols and independent
monitoring. Id.; see Lesli A. Maxwell, Atlanta’s Cheating Aftermath: What Other Districts Are
Doing, EDUC. WK.: DIST. DOSSIER BLOG (Apr. 4, 2013, 12:44 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/
edweek/District_Dossier/2013/04/atlantas_cheating_aftermath_wh.html.
172. Green & Broadwater, supra note 160.
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d. Federal Policy Under the Obama Administration
The reform movement also altered national education policy.
President Obama entered office eight years into the implementation of
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).173 Although NCLB’s
conditioning of federal funds on states’ creation of standards for and
annual assessment of reading and math proficiency174 exposed pervasive
achievement gaps between middle-class and other schools,175 its design
harmfully reinforced inflexible constraints on the nations’ schools. In
particular, the Act set rigid targets for schools and triggers for
intervention that penalized schools with substantial numbers of poor and
minority students and gave educators little help in identifying and
overcoming learning obstacles.176
Despairing of congressional action to fix NCLB, the Obama
administration used billions of dollars in competitive grants177 and
waivers from NCLB requirements to motivate and empower states to
experiment with more rigorous learning standards, teacher evaluation,
and steps to revitalize or close low-performing schools.178 Indicating the
potential impact of such steps are learning gains in Tennessee and
Washington, D.C., two of the earliest and most avid users of the grants
and waivers to elevate standards, evaluate and improve teachers, adopt
diagnostic school metrics, and restructure chronically failing schools or
replace them with charter or other schools.179 From 2003 to 2013,

173. See Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and the New Education Federalism,
103 CALIF. L. REV. 565, 595 (2015).
174. No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Requirements for Schools, GREATSCHOOLS.ORG,
http://www.greatschools.org/definitions/nclb/nclb.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
175. See Kurzweil, supra note 173, at 595.
176. See Raywid, supra note 22, at 183 (“It is not surprising . . . that the [NCLB’s] sharply
tightened controls . . . are now yielding complaints that schools are overregulated and burdened
with stultifying homogenization.”); Kurzweil, supra note 173, at 597–99.
177. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115;
Overview Information; Race to the Top Fund; Notice Inviting Applications for New Awards for
Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 221 (Nov. 18, 2009).
178. See Kurzweil, supra note 173, at 605–08.
179. D.C. OFFICE OF THE STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 1
(2015),
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/state-reported-sharing/
dcexsumm.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 1; ESEA Flexibility, U.S. DEP’T
EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2016); see EDWARD CROWE, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RACE TO THE TOP AND TEACHER
PREPARATION: ANALYZING STATE STRATEGIES FOR ENSURING REAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND
FOSTERING PROGRAM INNOVATION 10–12 (2011), https://www.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2011/03/pdf/teacher_preparation.pdf; JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., RAISE
YOUR HAND TEX., TEXAS INNOVATION SCHOOLS: A PATHWAY TO SUCCESS FOR AUTONOMOUS
SCHOOLS IN TEXAS 16 (2015), http://www.raiseyourhandtexas.org/wp-content/uploads/
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Tennessee’s mathematics and reading NAEP scores increased twelve and
eight points, respectively—well above changes nationwide.180 In the year
after the implementation of its federally motivated reforms, Tennessee’s
students experienced their largest single-year achievement gain in
history.181 D.C. did even better, achieving the largest gain in NAEP
scores ever recorded—twenty-four and seventeen points, respectively, in
math and reading, compared to gains of seven and four points
nationally.182 Building on these steps, Congress finally replaced NCLB
with the Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, adopting arrangements
even more conducive to state and local flexibility and experimentation.183
3. Two Puzzles
The above analysis reveals two puzzles. The first is a mismatch
between the reforms’ seeming success in improving student outcomes
and the controversy they have engendered. Although jurisdictions that
have implemented comprehensive reforms often exceed the national
average in terms of student achievement,184 their reforms have
encountered serious resistance from both the public at large and the
populations the reforms benefit the most.185
2015/04/Texas-Innovation-Schools_ResearchReport.pdf (discussing Tennessee’s innovative
steps to revitalize poor performing schools).
180. NATION’S
REPORT
CARD,
WHAT
STATES
ARE
MAKING
GAINS?,
http://nationsreportcard.gov/reading_math_2013/#/state-gains (last visited Nov. 6, 2016); Kevin
Willis, Tennessee Has Biggest Improvement in High School Graduation Rate in Nation, WKU
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 25, 2013), http://wkyufm.org/post/tennessee-has-biggest-improvement-highschool-graduation-rate-nation.
181. Arne Duncan, The Tennessee Story, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23, 2012, 1:00 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arne-duncan/the-tennessee-story_b_1695467.html.
182. NATION’S REPORT CARD, supra note 180; see Emma Brown, D.C. High School
Graduation Rate Ticks up, but Wide Achievement Gap Remains, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/dc-graduation-rate-ticks-up-but-wide-achievementgaps-remain/2013/12/20/2acc752a-69c5-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html. Again, in 2015,
D.C. “outpace[ed] the nation in [NAEP] score gains” and “had greater gains than [other] large
cities.” PEGGY G. CARR, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, COMMISSIONER’S REPORT: 2015
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS (NAEP) GRADES 4 AND 8 MATHEMATICS AND
READING (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/WhatsNew/commissioner/remarks2015/ 10_28_2015.asp.
183. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV.
953, 987–92 (2016) (describing state flexibility under ESSA to experiment with new ways to
motivate and facilitate improved student results subject to federal comparative oversight of
states); Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://www.ed.gov/essa (last
visited May 20, 2017) (comparing ESSA to Obama administration grant and waiver programs).
184. See, e.g., NATALIA E. PANE, CHILD TRENDS HISPANIC INST., MATH SCORES ADD UP FOR
HISPANIC STUDENTS 3 (2014), http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/201459MathScoresAddUpReport.pdf (identifying seven U.S. school districts achieving “remarkable”
or “notable” score gains for Hispanic fourth and eighth graders, all but one of which (Austin) are
“reform” districts: Boston, D.C., Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Chicago, Houston, and Los Angeles).
185. See supra notes 13, 20 and accompanying text.
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The second is a gap in the reforms themselves. Sections I.A and I.B
above link the problems with the nation’s schools to a combination of
inward-focused bureaucratic governance and outward-facing specialinterest politics. Yet the reforms seem to have focused only on replacing
bureaucracy, leaving intact interest-group politics as the medium through
which much of the resistance to the reforms has been transmitted. Before
this Article considers whether the latter gap explains the former
mismatch, the next Part examines the logic of the governance changes the
reforms undertake and their implications for special-interest politics and
alternatives.
II. THE INABILITY OF PROMINENT ALTERNATIVES TO BUREAUCRACY TO
EXPLAIN OR SUSTAIN THE REFORMS
Bureaucracy’s limitations in public education and other sectors have
engendered a number of alternative approaches to governance, including
three prominent ones considered in this Part: marketization,
managerialism, and professionalism/craft. As one would expect of efforts
to realign a sector as broad as U.S. public education, the reforms are likely
influenced by all three alternatives; this Article concludes, however, that
these alternative governance models do not principally drive the reforms,
nor does any provide an effective model of civic engagement to replace
special-interest politics.
A. Marketization
Marketization replaces direct action by the government with artificial
markets for distributing public goods, such as schools or constraints on
pollution.186 The goal is to enlist consumer demand and preferences to
govern access to services or regulate harms.187 In lieu of centralized, onesize-fits-all solutions that cannot account for diverse conditions or needs,
marketization uses the government’s distribution of vouchers to allow
diverse demands to induce autonomous and decentralized actors to
provide an appropriate range of products and services.188 By limiting the
government to administratively modest tasks, marketization also aims to
diminish bureaucratic ills associated with big government and excessive
discretion by field staff.189
186. Geoff Whitty & Sally Power, Marketization and Privatization in Mass Education
Systems, 93 INT’L J. EDUC. DEV. 94 (2000).
187. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 57–60 (2011) describing school and housing vouchers and
cap-and-trade regimes as common examples).
188. See James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 260–61 (1991) (book
review).
189. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 187, at 57.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss2/2

40

Liebman and Cruikshank: Governance of Steel and Kryptonite Politics in Contemporary Publi

2017]

CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC EDUCATION REFORM

405

Marketization strives for less rather than new forms of politics. By
substituting private choices for government action, marketization limits
the control that aggregated special interests can exert through influence
over government officials. Undermining its value, however, this
substitution of choice for traditional avenues of voice diminishes
democratic control over public goods, while leaving crucial decisions as
to the artificially prescribed value, distribution, and constraints on the use
of vouchers to officials buffeted by special-interest politics.190 Both
limitations may explain the failure of many voucher programs to achieve
their objectives.191
Marketization has influenced two common proposals for altering
public education: vouchers and charter schools.192 Under a voucher
system, parents receive a government-issued certificate they can apply
toward tuition at either a private or public school.193 Parents bear tuition
burdens beyond the voucher amount. A pure marketization system would
replace all public schools with a private voucher system—a move with
no realistic prospects because most families value public schools, and
maintaining full-blown voucher and public education systems is
prohibitively expensive.194 Although at least seventeen states have
authorized the limited use of vouchers by mostly disadvantaged
families,195 the strategy has not figured prominently in any of the modern
reforms discussed above, which aim to improve, not displace, public
schools.
In any event, marketization is unlikely to correct the ills of
bureaucracy in the education context. Pure marketization, the division of
existing subsidies for public schools into roughly equal bits for
distribution to all families—as middle-class families would demand in
return for giving up public schools—would drastically aggravate the
existing stratification of schools by wealth, social capital, and results.196
190. See Liebman, supra note 188, at 313; Sabel & Simon, supra note 187, at 74–75.
191. See Liebman, supra note 188, at 282, 284; Sabel & Simon, supra note 187, at 74–75.
192. Cf. FULLAN & BOYLE, supra note 87, at 37–38 (criticizing New York City reforms as
premised on “pure market-based ideology”).
193. Becky
Vevea,
What
Is
a
School
Voucher?,
GREAT SCHOOLS,
http://www.greatschools.org/gk/articles/school-vouchers/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
194. See Liebman, supra note 188, at 278, 280–86.
195. Vouchers Don’t Work: Evidence from Milwaukee, DIANE RAVITCH’S BLOG (Mar. 29,
2013), http://dianeravitch.net/2013/03/29/vouchers-dont-work-evidence-from-milwaukee.
196. See Raywid, supra note 22, at 197 (noting the “intensifying ethnic and socioeconomic
segregation in schools” as “middle class and affluent parents often select open schools . . . , while
working class parents gravitate toward back-to-basics and fundamental schools”); PAUL T. HILL
& MARY BETH CELIO, FIXING URBAN SCHOOLS 52 (1998) (“Privileged groups would seek to form
exclusive enclaves, and school leaders would compete for easy-to-educate and high-prestige
clienteles . . . . Working-class families and hard-to-educate groups would be left with school
providers who . . . could not compete for the more desirable students.”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

41

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2

406

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

This likely explains why most voucher programs limit the option to lowincome households.197 Those programs have, at best, a mixed record of
improving student outcomes and driving up average school quality. In
Milwaukee, for example, private school enrollment has increased, but the
financial boon to such schools has “allowed some schools to persist
despite . . . lackluster academic programs and subpar educational
facilities.”198 A recent five-year study found that non-voucher students
performed just as well as their voucher student counterparts in many
subjects.199 Results in Cleveland were even less promising, as voucher
students performed less well than their public school peers in math.200
Marketization’s influence on the new reforms is primarily through
charter schools, which receive public monies and are subject to many of
the same laws and regulations as traditional public schools but have
greater freedom in areas of personnel, curriculum, and scheduling.201
From the perspective of families, charter schools are schools of choice,
justified on the theory that the competition over students they create will
cause traditional public schools to improve in order to maintain their
clientele. Unlike schools receiving vouchers, however, charter schools
cannot choose their students and instead must accept all those who apply
or use lotteries when they are oversubscribed.202 Additionally, although
charter schools are free of the more stifling aspects of bureaucratic
oversight, officials in some states do diligently hold them accountable
through rigorous outcome-based standards for issuing, revoking, and
197. See Rajashri Chakabarti & Joydeep Roy, The Economics of Parental Choice, in
ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 336, 340 (Dominic J. Brewer & Patrick J. McEwan eds., 2010) (noting
that whether voucher programs resulted in economic stratification largely depended on which
families received vouchers and other aspects of programmatic design).
198. See Erin Richards & Kevin Crowe, Vouchers a Boon for Private Schools in Milwaukee,
Racine Counties, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 4, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/news/
education/vouchers-a-boon-for-private-schools-in-milwaukee-racine-counties-rr9pa6l206122011.html.
199. PATRICK J. WOLF, THE COMPREHENSIVE LONGITUDINAL EVALUATION OF THE
MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM: SUMMARY OF FINAL REPORTS 12 (2012)
http://www.uaedreform.org/downloads/2012/02/report-36-the-comprehensive-longitudinalevaluation-of-the-milwaukee-parental-choice-program.pdf (finding little evidence that
participation in the voucher program produced better student outcomes than those of similar
students in the Milwaukee Public Schools).
200. Clive R. Belfield, The Evidence on Education Vouchers: An Application to the
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program 17 (Nat’l Ctr. for the Study of Privatization in
Educ., Working Paper No. 112, 2006), http://ncspe.tc.columbia.edu/working-papers/OP112.pdf.
201. Facts About Charters, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHOOLS,
http://www.publiccharters.org/get-the-facts/public-charter-schools/faqs/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2017).
202. See, e.g., Developing Admissions and Enrollment Policies for your Charter School,
CAL. CHARTER SCH. ASS’N, http://www.ccsa.org/Admissions-and-Enrollment-PracticesKnowledge-Brief.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
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refusing to renew their public charters. These states typically are among
the minority of jurisdictions where charter schools routinely outperform
traditional public schools.203
The imperfect freedom of charters to operate and the association
between high-performing charter schools and greater levels of
government oversight undermine any tight link between marketization as
embodied by charter schools and the new reforms and their successes. So
do the limited role charters actually play in many reform districts (and the
large role they play in many non-reform districts)204 and the incongruity
between marketization and most other aspects of the reforms, including
government-imposed standards and assessments and complex public
systems of school and teacher evaluation and collaborative inquiry.
B. Managerialism
Like marketization, managerialism believes that individuals closer to
unpredictable conditions on the ground make better decisions than distant
central administrators.205 Recognizing, however, that it is difficult to use
203. See Elaine Liu, Note, Solving the Puzzle of Charter Schools: A New Framework for
Understanding and Improving Charter School Legislation and Performance, 2015 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 273, 279, 318–19 (demonstrating a strong correlation between the minority of charter
schools nationally that tend to outperform traditional public schools in math and reading and their
location in states with legislation subjecting charter schools to careful scrutiny and to withdrawal
of their charters based on adverse evidence of their quality and student outcomes); see also CTR.
FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN 16
STATES, at 1–8 (2009), http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE_CHOICE_CREDO.pdf
(linking stronger charter school outcomes to state oversight focused on school quality and student
outcomes); NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., MEASURING CHARTER PERFORMANCE: A REVIEW
OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT STUDIES 4 (2010) [hereinafter MEASURING CHARTER
PERFORMANCE], http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/NAPCS_Achvmnt
Stdy_D8.pdf_20110330T165151.pdf (reviewing studies demonstrating greater achievement
gains by certain charter schools compared to traditional public schools).
204. The percent of students in charter schools in reform districts such as Baltimore, Boston,
Chicago, Denver, Houston, and New York City is below 20 percent, although it is much higher
in other reform venues including Cleveland, Newark, New Orleans, and Washington, D.C.
Overall, non-reform districts such as Detroit, Flint, Gary, Kansas City, and San Antonio are more
consistently represented among high-charter districts than reform districts. See NAT’L ALL. FOR
PUB. CHARTER SCH., A GROWING MOVEMENT: AMERICA’S LARGEST CHARTER SCHOOL
COMMUNITIES app. A, at 7–9 (2014), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/
12/2014_Enrollment_Share_FINAL.pdf.
205. Raywid, supra note 22, at 158 (“[Managerialism] assumes that today’s major problems
in education stem from the highly centralized control to which schools have become subject, and
the consequent distancing of decision making from the level of application.”); Linda Kaboolian,
The New Public Management: Challenging Boundaries of the Management vs. Administration
Debate, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 189, 190 (1998) (“[Managerialism seeks to] maximize productive
and allocative efficiencies that are hampered by . . . public agencies unresponsive to the demands
of citizens.”).
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artificial markets to empower consumers to drive policy decisions,
managerialism instead tries to mimic a single feature of markets: the
sorting of managers based on how successfully they meet financial or
operational targets.206 Rather than dissolving public institutions,
managerialism limits central administrators’ responsibilities to (1) setting
simple quantitative outcome targets for local managers who have broad
discretion over how to meet them, and (2) rewarding managers who
succeed and removing those who fail.207
Managerialism also shares marketization’s assumption that modern
problems and solutions are too complex to identify clearly. Rather than
trying to get inside the black box of effective or ineffective actions,
managerialism lets results on simple measures do the decisional work. As
with marketization, therefore, know-how remains tacit, though
managerialism locates it in talented managers’ instincts, not in the
market’s invisible hand.208 Also like marketization, managerialism
proposes no alternative to special-interest politics and instead tries to
reduce the range of centralized decisions that special interests are able to
influence.209
NCLB evidenced managerialism’s influence on school policy on the
eve of the reform movement.210 The law subjected students and schools
to difficult-to-achieve targets211 and penalized failure with onerous
requirements that led districts to fire principals who failed to meet their
marks.212 Three problems, among others, undermined NCLB’s

206. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 692 (2003).
207. See ANSELL, supra note 22, at 135 (“‘[Managerialism] requires that elected officials
hold managers responsible for results—and implies that voters will then be able to better hold
officials responsible for the outcomes of public programs.’” (quoting Donald F. Kettl, The Global
Revolution in Public Management: Driving Themes, Missing Links, 16 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 446, 456 (1997))); id. at 695, 717 (giving examples of management-based systems in
industries other than education).
208. Even if skilled managers know how to replicate their success, managerialism gives them
little or no incentive to share their knowledge. See Kaboolian, supra note 205, at 190 (associating
managerialism with the view “that public managers are motivated by self-interest and act
opportunistically”).
209. Gernod Gruening, Origin and Theoretical Basis of New Public Management, 4 INT’L
PUB. MGMT. J. 2, 16 (2001) (noting that managerialism tries to separate politics from governance).
210. Qualification for Teachers and Professionals, 20 U.S.C. § 6319 (repealed 2015).
211. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text (laying out NCLB goals).
212. For example, school administrators in Atlanta and Norfolk have fired principals who
failed to make targets. See HEATHER ZAVADKSY, BRINGING SCHOOL REFORM TO SCALE: FIVE
AWARD-WINNING URBAN DISTRICTS 233 (2009); Rachel Aviv, Wrong Answer, NEW YORKER
(July 21, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/07/21/wrong-answer.
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effectiveness.213 First, the law measured static proficiency levels, rather
than longitudinal improvement, effectively holding schools accountable
for how economically advantaged their students were, not for how much
students learned.214 Second, average proficiency measures incentivized
educators to focus on students just above or below the proficiency line
and to ignore the many other students so far below or above that status
that they were unlikely to affect average proficiency levels.215 Third,
NCLB’s overall target—getting all children in the nation to proficiency
by 2014—turned out to be wildly unrealistic, leaving jurisdictions and
educators committed to meeting the targets with two choices: “dummy
down” the standards, as many States did,216 or cheat, as educators in
Atlanta famously did.217
The New York City reforms’ reliance on systems for rating schools
and teachers and imposing consequences also had managerialist
connotations.218 On closer inspection, however, non-managerialist
features dominated, including the use of leading or diagnostic indicators
derived from qualitative reviews and student surveys about their schools
and teachers, in addition to the lagging, quantitative indicators on which
managerialism exclusively relies; disaggregation of both types of
information down to the level of individual students, which serves no
managerialist function; and inquiry teams’ use of all available
information to hypothesize and test causes and solutions for instructional
failure.219 In decidedly non-managerialist fashion, these strategies use
tests scores and a variety of qualitative information about schools and
educators to facilitate the explicit learning and transfer of knowledge that
marketization and managerialism eschew as discredited echoes of
bureaucracies’ faith in learned experts.220 Rather than lining up all school
213. See, e.g., Jim Hull, Measuring Student Growth: A Guide to Informed Decision Making,
CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC. (Nov. 9, 2007), http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/MainMenu/Policies/Measuring-student-growth-At-a-glance/Measuring-student-growth-A-guide-toinformed-decision-making.html; see also JOEL KLEIN, LESSONS OF HOPE: HOW TO FIX OUR
SCHOOLS 255 (2014) (criticizing NCLB’s focus on static proficiency rates, not student growth);
Ledyard McFadden, New York’s Quest for Excellence, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Oct. 2008, at 62, 63
(similar).
214. See sources cited supra note 213.
215. See Hull, supra note 213.
216. Michele McNeil, Arne Duncan Vows Push on Range of Education Priorities, EDUC.
WK. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/04/23/29secretary.h33.html
(quoting Secretary Duncan’s claim that nineteen states “dumm[ied] down” standards in response
to poor NCLB results).
217. See Aviv, supra note 212.
218. See supra notes 127–32 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Childress et al., supra note 92, at 12–13; McFadden, supra note 213, at 62–
64. See generally Jal D. Mehta et al., Schooling as a Knowledge Profession, EDUC. WK. (Mar. 28,
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and classroom managers from best to worst and imposing consequences
accordingly, the New York reforms use performance indicators mainly to
motivate and facilitate a search for transferrable local expertise and
secondarily to identify the few schools and educators so chronically
incapable of learning to improve and so harmful to children that they do
not belong in the system.221
Finally, managerialism’s failure to provide an alternative to specialinterest politics and its reliance instead on diminishing the range of issues
that bureaucrats control leave targets vulnerable for another reason. As
long as central administrators retain the power to set goals and hold
principals and teachers accountable for failing to meet them, the likeliest
outcome is that the interest groups with the greatest influence over school
bureaucracies—those representing the very same principals and
teachers—will succeed in disrupting the process.222
C. Professionalism/Craft
Professionalism relies on highly trained and credentialed field-level
professionals to exercise their best judgment and hold each other
accountable through shared norms.223 True professionalism occurs when
shared norms have coalesced into a clear body of academic knowledge
and codified behavioral standards, as in medicine and law. When the lore
is less susceptible to codification—as with ballet dancing and furniture
making, as well as teaching—the guides to behavior are those of a “craft,”
based more on techniques learned by observing experts and intuitive
quality judgments by the “collegium” of practitioners than on academic
curricula and written standards.224

2011), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/03/30/26mehta_ep.h30.html (arguing that
schools need to transition from bureaucratic structures developed many years ago into modern
learning and improvement organizations more suited to the current needs of children and the
broader society).
221. See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 213, at 216–19; Accountability That Improves, supra note
127, at 6; Childress et al., supra note 92, at 13.
222. See Jennifer L. Hochschild, Comments on James S. Liebman and Charles F. Sabel, A
Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 327, 329 (2003)
(discussing pressure by teachers’ unions and other interest groups to lowball or disrupt
enforcement targets); Kaboolian, supra note 205, at 191 (claiming it is impossible “to keep
[managerialist reforms] apart from politics,” given the likelihood of “negotiation of outcome
goals, output measures, and resources”).
223. See, e.g., Brian Rowan, Applying Conceptions of Teaching to Organizational Reform,
in ELMORE, supra note 22, at 31, 32 (“Advocates of teacher professionalism . . . [seek] workplaces
that give teachers greater authority and power within the educational system and high levels of
professional autonomy.”).
224. See Hochschild, supra note 222, at 214.
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Like marketization and managerialism, professionalism and craft aim
to maximize the autonomy of street-level actors with access to local
information. Instead of external influences such as markets and outcome
targets, however, it is the professional’s or craft practitioner’s instincts
and lore about how to pursue general objectives that discipline local
action—as when welfare agency social workers pursue the “best
interests” of children or police officers “keep the peace” in unruly
neighborhoods.225 Professionalism and craft assume that the infinite
variety of circumstances demanding quick decisions by street-level
bureaucrats make it impossible to identify right answers or set behavioral
rules or targets. Because every case is unique, outcomes cannot be
compared, knowledge remains tacit, and the best central managers can do
is give broad decision-making discretion to street-level actors with a
“knack” for getting the right answer.226 Accountability operates through
the approbation or opprobrium of other skillful practitioners, and training
occurs through the neophyte’s absorption of the knack at the master’s
elbow.227
In theory, professionalism and craft offer two palliatives for specialinterest politics. They discourage central administrators from making
rules or setting targets, leaving little for interest groups to influence, and
they rely on expertise to warrant deference from the public in lieu of
interest-group oversight. In practice, however, the associations, guilds,
and unions that professionals and craft practitioners form may operate as
interest groups that subordinate quality norms to the shared interests of
their membership.228 To the extent practitioner interest groups freeze out
central monitors and competing interest groups via the anti-regulatory
and deference logics noted above, the result may be a particularly virulent
form of monopolistic interest-group influence.
The late Ted Sizer and the Coalition of Essential Schools brought craft
notions into the public education conversation starting in the 1970s.229
Illustrating their influence are a small set of schools developed by a
225. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 54, at 9 (illustrating craft approaches to ordermaintenance policing); Simon, supra note 54, at 16–17 (discussing craft influences on
government social workers).
226. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
227. See James Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined:
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 183, 214 (2003) (describing craft accountability through communities of practice and
training through apprenticeship).
228. See, e.g., infra notes 242–47 and accompanying text.
229. See generally SIZER, supra note 54 (discussing the urgent need for more educator
autonomy in public schools); About CES, COALITION OF ESSENTIAL SCHOOLS,
http://essentialschools.org/about-ces/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (promoting “powerful
processional learning communities focused on student achievement”).
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collegium of teachers in East Harlem in New York City under the
guidance of Sizer disciple Deborah Meier.230 By the 1990s, the success
of those schools in creating a cadre of teachers dedicated to the success
of poor and minority students led Anthony Alvarado, superintendent of
New York City’s nearby District 2, to organize a comparable “learning
community” among principals and teachers “that connected . . . the
classroom, the school and the district.”231 The result was a committed
core of educators and evidence of improvement in the middle-class
schools comprising half the district.232 After several years, however,
Alvarado sensed that improved results did not extend to poor and
minority children.233 Worrying that “we weren’t pushing hard enough on
what students were actually learning and whether we were reaching the
hardest-to-teach,” Alvarado adopted performance standards and
assessments to make transparent what previously had been tacit, and they
confirmed his fears about the differential success of the craft-driven
strategies.234 The only way of knowing whether students were actually
learning, he concluded, was “by getting agreement on what kids should
know and be able to do and starting to assess their learning in some
systemic way.”235 Informed by data from the new assessments, educator
teams revised curricula and programs previously adopted on craft
instinct, generating better results for disadvantaged children and
establishing a model for the later reforms on which this Article focuses.236
In general, progressive educators and teachers’ unions have advocated
replacing the new reforms—as well as bureaucratic prescriptions and
managerialist targets—with teachers’ discretion to choose strategies
consistent with their vision of a well-rounded, intellectually and
emotionally fulfilling education.237 Often these proposals revolve around
230. See DEBORAH MEIER, THE POWER OF THEIR IDEAS 25, 29, 48, 57, 153 (1995); Liebman
& Sabel, supra note 227, at 215–16 (describing Meier’s work in New York City).
231. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 227, at 217, 220–21.
232. Id. at 214, 224.
233. Id. at 239.
234. RICHARD F. ELMORE & DEANNA BURNEY, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT IN COMMUNITY
DISTRICT #2, NEW YORK CITY 13 (1998); see RICHARD F. ELMORE & DEANNA BURNEY, SCHOOL
VARIATION AND SYSTEMIC INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVEMENT IN COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT #2,
NEW YORK CITY 3 (1997).
235. RICHARD F. ELMORE, INVESTING IN TEACHER LEARNING: STAFF DEVELOPMENT AND
INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVEMENT IN COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT #2, NEW YORK CITY 24 (1997)
(quoting Anthony Alvarado).
236. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 227, at 224–26 (discussing evidence of improved student
outcomes in the second phase of District 2’s reforms and those reforms’ influence on later
initiatives).
237. See, e.g., Samuel A. Culbert, Give Teachers Autonomy, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE
(Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/03/27/how-to-raise-the-status-ofteachers/give-teachers-autonomy (“The way to make stars out of teachers is to let teachers be
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the unstructured “collaborative communities of practice” that were the
hallmark of Meier’s East Harlem schools and the first phase of
Alvarado’s initiatives. In this view, teaching is not “an individual
practice”238 but “a reciprocal relationship that spells out mutual
obligations” to observe, qualitatively assess, learn, and share experiences
with others toward a common goal of improving the teaching craft and
student outcomes.239
Clearly, the latter proposals resemble features of the new reforms that
distinguish them from managerialism, such as qualitative review, inquiry
teams, and sympathy for internal accountability. Both assume that
students and teachers “are by nature social, interactive learners” and
should be freed from rigid bureaucratic rules and inflexible managerialist
targets to learn organically from one another.240 But as adherents of recent
professionalism and craft proposals have argued, increased teacher
discretion to respond to the train of unique situations faced is also
anathema to what are viewed as stifling problem-solving structures and
qualitative rubrics—not to mention externally generated motivational
targets, consequences, and comparative data—that are central to the new
reforms. In this regard, as with marketization and managerialism, a key
disagreement between professionalism/craft and the new reforms is the
formers’ belief that knowledge is inevitably and preferably tacit, and that
efforts to make it explicit—whether by amassing bureaucratic expertise
at the center or by promoting structured learning at the periphery—
interferes dangerously with the freedom of discerning families, talented
managers, and gifted educators.
Although alluring, professionalism’s vision of services intuitively
crafted to meet the unique needs of each child241 is unlikely to improve
teaching and outcomes for disadvantaged children. Left to their own
devices, street-level bureaucrats often exercise discretion in two
counterproductive ways: (1) lowering expectations to minimize evidence

stars, to let them be as innovative as they can be, to let them find the path that works best for them
and their students.”).
238. Thomas J. Sergiovanni, Collaborative Cultures & Communities of Practice,
PRINCIPAL LEADERSHIP 49 (2004), http://learningon.theloop.school.nz/moodle/pluginfile.php/
193291/mod_folder/content/0/Article%20-%20Collaborative%20Cultures%20and%20Commun
ities%20of%20Practice.pdf.
239. Id.
240. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 227, at 214, 244 (linking craft and reform views,
respectively, to the early and later views of John Dewey).
241. See DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL
SYSTEM 169–94 (2010) (describing the author’s favorite teacher to illustrate the craft ideal).
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of failure, while dissuading peers who set their sights higher;242 and (2)
implementing personal or middle-class assumptions and values that do
not match the needs of disadvantaged communities.243 Both tendencies
surfaced in the first phase of Alvarado’s District 2 innovations, which
benefited middle-class more than other children until combined in the
second phase with the performance standards and structured
improvement processes that craft resists.244 No less worrisome are
professionalism’s and craft’s reliance on the inscrutable, difficult-toscale intuitions of gifted teachers, who in any event are in chronically
short supply, and its objection on solidarity grounds to differential pay,
leaving gifted teachers to compensate themselves by gravitating to
schools with easy-to-manage students.245 Finally, the current ability of
teachers’ unions to serve as the chief proponents of professionalism,246
while continuing to hold sway over education bureaucracies through
collective-bargaining agreements brimming with limitations on educator
discretion, bodes poorly for a craft-oriented solution to the problem of
special-interest politics.247
D. Defects Common to the Contending Alternatives
Although each proposed alternative successfully addresses some of
bureaucracy’s failures, none satisfactorily explains the ongoing education
reforms. Those reforms have not sought the full-scale dismantling of
public education that pure marketization requires. Their engagement of
administrators and educators in structured, self-conscious inquiry into the
processes that lead to better student outcomes contrasts sharply with
managerialism’s and craft’s key assumption that optimal solutions cannot
be made transparent, and their use of hard quantitative measures of
242. See Rowan, supra note 223, at 45 (discussing research suggesting that craft approaches
can generate “social controls on workers that define a fair day’s work,” “discourage initiative,”
and lead teachers acting collectively to lower standards).
243. For discussions of how professionalism generated demands by disadvantaged
communities for protections against arbitrary and biased actions by government social workers
and police officers, triggering the due process revolution of the late 1960s and 1970s, see WILSON,
supra note 54, at 274–77; Simon, supra note 54, at 22.
244. See generally ANTHONY S. BRYK ET AL., ORGANIZING SCHOOLS FOR IMPROVEMENT:
LESSONS FROM CHICAGO 57 (2010) (finding that schools that improved via professionalism tended
to have a preexisting capacity and willingness to improve).
245. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Nina Bascia, Teacher Unions and Teacher Professionalism in the U.S.:
Reconsidering a Familiar Dichotomy, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TEACHERS AND
TEACHING: PART ONE 437, 441 (Bruce J. Biddle et al. eds., 1997).
247. See, e.g., Diane Ravitch, Why Teacher Unions Are Good for Teachers—and the Public,
AM. EDUCATOR (Winter 2006–07), https://www.aft.org/newspubs/periodicals/ae/winter0607/
ravitch.cfm (offering a craft-inflected argument for union-sponsored limits on educator discretion
to protect “teachers’ rights” against “arbitrary and unwise” decisions by principals).
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student success to motivate and fuel that inquiry offends craft’s resistance
to constraints on educator intuition and artistry.
Nor, as we have seen, do any of the alternatives provide a viable model
for systematically improving educational outcomes. To be sure, each
alternative alters power relations within public institutions by dissolving
them entirely or shifting decision-making from the center to one or
another category of street-level actors. And each draws on new
competencies or expertise—setting the parameters for artificial markets,
establishing targets, or exercising local discretion to resolve myriad
unique problems. But when it comes to improving how children
explicitly and self-consciously learn, all three alternatives—oddly, given
the context—assume that overt and self-conscious learning by adults and
their institutions is impossible, and that administrative and instructional
know-how must remain tacit and mysterious.
The three models likewise offer no alternative to special-interest
politics as the primary form of public accountability and civic
engagement.248 Each attempts to address the pernicious influence of
special interests on large-scale bureaucracies by changing how much
politics (and government) we should permit or where politics should
reside within policymaking structures, but none tries to change how
politics, at whatever level, are conducted. Each thus assumes that pluralist
politics are natural, immutable, and inevitable and accepts pluralism’s
distancing of people from the day-to-day operation of their institutions
via the separation of politics from governance: Advocacy by the people
precedes decision-making by elected officials, which in turn precedes
implementation by administrators doubly distant from the public.249
Further, marketization, managerialism, and professionalism/craft
suppress civic engagement by reducing the ability of the public to
influence decision-makers. There are serious costs to treating less
democracy—i.e., fewer opportunities for individuals to participate
together in self-governance—as the solution to distortions of the
democratic process. Stakeholders in any public regime, but particularly
those like students, parents, and teachers with a strong stake in effective
education, have vast amounts of information that is crucial to the success
of the enterprise and yet not easily absorbed by decentralized markets,
instinctive managers, or intuitive teachers. This is particularly true of the
information held by the critical subset of parents with the least market
power, political savvy, and interaction with schools, whose children often
struggle the most. No less importantly, even parents with market and
political power crave close involvement in their own child’s day-to-day
248. See ANSELL, supra note 22, at 17 (“Organizational transformation of public agencies
cannot easily occur without a fundamental change in the relationship between agencies and
democratic publics.”).
249. See id. at 136–37.
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instruction and in the ongoing governance of their child’s school, which
likewise is not satisfied by an initial ability to choose the school or by the
knowledge that it is managed by a talented principal and staffed by gifted
teachers. These parents will demand outlets for that independent interest
in democratic participation and, when no other outlets are available, will
default to interest-group politics dominated by organized groups whose
interests only partly overlap with students’.250
In the next two Parts, this Article considers whether there is an
alternative to bureaucracy that firmly grounds the new education reforms
and offers a concomitant reformation of special-interest politics.
III. DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM AS AN ANTIDOTE TO
BUREAUCRACY AND SPECIAL-INTEREST POLITICS
The remainder of this Article argues that a different governance
model—democratic experimentalism (DE)—offers a firmer foundation
for ongoing public education reforms and replaces special-interest
politics with deeper stakeholder engagement and public accountability.
This Part explores the model both in theory and in practice in areas other
than U.S. public education. The next Parts explore the extent to which the
new education reforms do and do not—and how they could more
effectively—track this model’s governance and political innovations.
A. Promise, in Theory
In contrast to bureaucracy’s reliance on fixed organizational designs,
roles, and goals, DE employs flexible governance structures supporting
iterative improvement processes that respond to problems and variable
circumstances as they arise.251 In contrast to the belief shared by
marketization, managerialism, and craft that know-how and mechanisms
for its production are inevitably tacit and intuitive, DE’s flexible
structures for collecting and processing information to diagnose the cause
of problems, develop and test solutions, and measure success strive to
make learning ever more transparent and transferable. Successful reforms
are “characterized by a process of mutual adaptation” through which
“project goals and methods [a]re modified to suit the needs and interests
of the local staff and in which that staff change[s] to meet the
requirements of the project.”252 Adaptation in response to progressively
250. See, e.g., infra notes 381–85 and accompanying text.
251. Pincus, supra note 33, at 60 (“If goals are in some sense undefinable, it is inappropriate
to adopt the standard rationalist approach of [centrally] defining goals, then seeking means
appropriate to achieve them efficiently. . . . [I]t may be wiser to try out systematic innovations
and assess their consequences . . . .”).
252. Milbrey McLaughlin, Implementation as Mutual Adaptation: Change in Classroom
Organization, in SOCIAL PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 33, at 167, 169.
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better understood or evolving conditions is the goal of the process, not
evidence that prior practice failed.253
Additionally, unlike other alternatives to bureaucracy, DE does not
simply change the amount or locus of politics but replaces special-interest
politics with mechanisms for previously disenfranchised and disgruntled
stakeholders to participate productively and sustainably in shaping and
implementing policy.
1. Governance
DE combines local units and central staff into a self-sustaining
learning process. Local units include government employees and adjacent
stakeholders who together possess insight into the circumstances
surrounding a problem and its implications for the organization and its
public. The central unit sets broad goals and compiles and analyzes data
created by local units to inform local processes. By incorporating local
agents and stakeholders, DE responds to the diversity of conditions that
bureaucracy’s fixed solutions often ignore.254 Stakeholder participation
in making and implementing decisions, and the center’s comparative
benchmarking of solutions that different local units adopt, steer local
action toward legitimate goals and workable solutions in ways that
bureaucracy, managerialism, and professionalism/craft cannot.255
DE practitioners continuously react to new data, adjusting or
abandoning ineffective practices. Stylized, when a local unit encounters
an unwanted deviation from the expected (a “problem”), it asks a team of
stakeholders to address it, laying aside conflicting values and interests,
focusing only on team members’ shared stake in a solution, and
measuring success based on how substantially the problem recedes.256
Depending upon how frequently similar problems arise, the center may
periodically review a sample of solutions; deploy facilitators to support
local problem-solving and informally spread learning to other sites; or
(among many other permutations) identify a recurring problem and ask
each unit to develop a locally customized plan to address it, which the
center may share with others, often comparing all plans’ terms and
253. Id. at 178–80 (“[A]daptation, rather than standardization, is a more realistic and fruitful
objective for policymakers and practitioners hoping to bring about significant change in local
educational practice . . . [and] not an undesirable aberration.”).
254. See Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J.
313, 331 (1997) (“The complexity of problems and solutions—where problems are substantially
the product of multiple causes and connected with other problems, crossing conventional policy
domains and processes—implies that the appropriate strategy requires coordination across those
domains.”).
255. See id. at 331–32.
256. Id. at 331.
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effects.257 Team members develop initial hypotheses about the problem’s
cause and solution; specify success criteria; test the solution; and reassess
the surrounding facts, causal theories, solutions, and success measures as
evidence accumulates—repeating the process as needed.258
DE expects stakeholders to develop, learn, and in that way amass and
document explicit knowledge over the course of addressing a problem;
provides them with structured opportunities to do so; and confers
recognition, including promotion, based on their problem-solving
skills.259 This “adult learning” also may expose previously hidden
obstacles, possibilities, combinations, and variations that help solve a
problem while leading participants to develop new interests and values.260
This shared process of discovery may in turn reduce conflict among
stakeholders and between them and the agency.261
Unlike in bureaucracies, the central unit does not supervise day-today administration. Rather, it sets general directions and goals for local
deliberation; provides incentives, default structures, and facilitation for
local planning and problem-solving; establishes measurements and
collects data to compare the progress of local units; uses outcomes and
the plans and strategies that achieved them to benchmark acceptable
future progress and guide the transfer of models and expertise from one
site to the next; and supports the adoption and customization of successful
models by less successful units.262 Instead of enforcing compliance with
uniform procedures, the center provides “the infrastructure and services
that support frontline” planning, problem-solving, and innovation.263
Central action thus is a “means to create innovation (by building in
257. Id. at 331–32.
258. David P. Weikart & Barnard A. Banet, Planned Variation from the Perspective of a
Model Sponsor, in SOCIAL PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 33, at 125, 145 (“Educational
programs must be a synthesis of theory and practice and must continually be reshaped by
developers and participants alike if they are to remain effective.”); see also Sabel & Simon, supra
note 187, at 78 (noting that experimentalist institutions aim “to achieve local adaptation and
aggregate learning by combining discretion with duties to report and explain, and by pooling
information”).
259. See infra notes 288–89 and accompanying text (illustrating the process described in text
with examples from Toyota’s practices).
260. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 227, at 302–03.
261. Cf. James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-Out” School Desegregation
Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1634 (1990).
262. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 25, at 1029, 1032 (discussing an experimentalist
approach some courts have used to improve the quality of services provided in mental health
institutions). “The decrees emphasize broad goals and leave the defendants substantial latitude to
determine how to achieve them; mandate precise measurement and reporting with respect to
achievement; and institutionalize ongoing mechanisms of reassessment, discipline, and
participation.” Id. at 1032.
263. Sabel & Simon, supra note 187, at 90.
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mechanisms that stimulate creativity and diversity), to maintain
flexibility, and to correct itself.”264 Authority and influence ebb and flow
between local and central units and among local units in reaction to
“external changes, new priorities, or internal imbalances.”265
In these ways, experimentalism links central and local units to
maximize the problem-solving capabilities of each. While local units
adapt solutions to their particular conditions, the central unit manages
links between them that alert each to the other’s innovations and develops
common metrics for comparing local results and ensuring that each site
serves all members of its population.266 Together, local and central
experimentalist units produce solutions that are expertly crafted, locally
tailored, and consistent with public ideals.
2. Politics
DE also offers an alternative to the special-interest politics that plague
public education and other bureaucratic structures. As with
managerialism and professionalism/craft, DE moves many important
decisions from the central to the local level, deterring special interests
from dominating decisions. Unlike those models, however, DE does not
limit the range of issues subject to political control—freezing out
important stakeholders with information on how best to implement and
improve policy. Rather, DE treats local collaborative problem-solving as
a way for informed stakeholders—especially consumers of public
services—to share decision-making authority with the local unit of
government and share responsibility with the central unit for holding
field-level actors accountable.267
Second, DE extends democratic control to a much broader range of
important decision points than special-interest regimes. The latter focus
political activity primarily on policy initiation through elections and the
bargaining over of legislation and administrative rules and plans.268
Policy implementation is treated as a matter for ministerial followthrough under bureaucratic supervision.269 Today, however, uncertainty
surrounding problems and unpredictable interactions between solutions
and local environments require constant adjustment during
implementation that often is more decisive of results than policy as

264. Jane L. David, Restructuring in Progress: Lessons from Pioneering Districts, in
ELMORE, supra note 22, at 209, 228.
265. Id.
266. See Cohen & Sabel, supra note 254, at 326.
267. Id.
268. See ANSELL, supra note 22, at 3.
269. See id.
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initially conceived.270 Additionally, because bureaucracies struggle to
keep field staff from using their control over implementation to advance
their own interests, pluralist regimes exert little supervisory, or
democratic, control over this most crucial stage of the process.271 This is
particularly so when, as in public education, groups representing field
staff are the most powerful special interests. DE, by contrast, recognizes
that policy is made at both the design and implementation phases and
subjects both to democratic accountability.272 Initial policymaking—the
setting of the general direction for local experimentation—occurs at the
central level under traditional democratic constraints.273 Next, highly
participatory and deliberative stakeholder groups initiate local policy by
identifying a solution hypothesis, then use the close observation of the
policy’s implementation as a basis for adjusting the solution—all under
central benchmarking oversight.274
Finally, DE rejects the premise of pluralist politics that individual
interests and values are fixed and that politics is simply the measure of
their relative power.275 Under DE, the “discipline of the problem” creates
an ethical situation in which participants reconsider and modify their
interests and values—they learn—in the process of cooperating with
others to solve a mutually defined problem and measure success by how
well they do so.276 Participants discover that their predilections and
proposals have much to contribute to the solution but cannot entirely
comprise it—and that an effective combination of strategies requires
contextualization and refinement of previously fixed desires and
principles. A similar process occurs as DE reevaluates policies by
benchmarking local solutions against each other. DE’s implementation
focus has the same effect. Under old politics, political participation and
deliberation typically take place in the abstract, generating a single preimplementation decision to allocate inputs in service of contending
interests or values. In contrast, under DE, participation and deliberation
occur amid ongoing implementation, as a succession of unanticipated
conditions put the initial solution to the test, prompting adjustment and
further testing. DE’s refusal to regard any initial policy as final

270. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 187, at 56. (“In the realm of uncertainty, policy aims
cannot be extensively defined in advance of implementation; they have to be discovered in the
course of problem solving.”).
271. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
272. See ANSELL, supra note 22, at 131–34.
273. See id.
274. See id. at 172–74.
275. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC & ITS PROBLEMS 203 (1927) (“[V]iews generated [in response
to individuals’] special situations [can] be frozen into absolute standards and masquerade as
eternal truths.”).
276. See Liebman, supra note 261, at 1608–09 (discussing ethical situations).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss2/2

56

Liebman and Cruikshank: Governance of Steel and Kryptonite Politics in Contemporary Publi

2017]

CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC EDUCATION REFORM

421

encourages continual reexamination in light of lived experience,
diminishing the influence of initially stronger or more outspoken views.
B. Concerns, in Theory
Although DE avoids many of the defects of bureaucracy and
alternative governance models, it has risks of its own. First, the access
DE gives to previously disenfranchised constituents comes with
deliberative-problem-solving responsibilities that may outstrip
constituents’ capacity in settings that put a premium on time
commitment, education, communication skills, organizational expertise,
access to experts, and knowledge of how to identify possible causes and
solutions. Imagine, for example, a collaborative effort to use student test
scores to improve teachers’ instruction. Even many teachers lack the
technical expertise needed to understand what test scores can and cannot
tell them about how to improve instruction, very few parents have that
knowledge, and still fewer teachers and parents know how to “produce
evidence-based tailored instruction plans responsive to individual
[needs].”277 The problem-solving process might include steps to improve
participants’ capacity, but if there is a threshold below which meaningful
participation is unlikely, individuals lacking resources could end up even
less enfranchised than they are under traditional politics, where they at
least have formal access to voting and interest-group representation.278
Relying on the center to provide the necessary resources when the result
may be reforms that weaken the center’s authority may create conflicts
of interest that diminish the quality of its support or the authenticity of
decisions reached.
Second, the reach of the participatory rights DE assumes is unclear.
Basing those rights on stakeholders’ close identification with distinct
concerns may simply recreate interest-group politics, invite free riding,
or generate “solutions” with harmful externalities for people not at the
table.279 On the other hand, extending participation rights more broadly
might frustrate networks’ ability to produce “rational or optimal results”
277. Martha Minow, School Reform Outside of Laboratory Conditions, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 333, 336 (2003) (“[M]ost teachers lack the knowledge and understanding to
perform the new role [experimentalism] imagine[s] for them . . . [and few parents and community
advocates know how] to assess, monitor, and improve [schools].”).
278. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the
Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 561–62 (2008) (claiming that experimentalist
public participation is too costly for all but well-funded organizations).
279. Helen Hershkoff & Benedict Kingsbury, Crisis, Community and Courts in Network
Governance: A Response to Liebman and Sabel’s Approach to Reform of Public Education, 28
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 319, 321–22 (2003) (predicting that allowing any group to
participate may “encourage[] secession from groups in order to form fractionated entities that
receive the instant privileges of participation”).
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by motivating too much deliberation and too little action.280 Moving in
the opposite direction and limiting participatory rights could make
networks “more exclusive and less transparent than the public/private
hybrids that characterize so much of local decision-making.”281 Finding
the right balance among these options could prove difficult.
Additionally, examples of successful public experimentation and
problem-solving may be too few and too preliminary to convince a
critical mass of individuals to embrace the new politics. In Professor
Mark Tushnet’s view, evidence that experimentalist interactions are
“more possible than . . . in the past”282 is more a consequence of
marketization and managerialism (weakening bureaucracies and creating
flexible structures and sophisticated accountability systems) and
professionalism (generating shared-learning opportunities) than of
experimentalism. Thus, whether or not experimentalism is persuasive in
theory, Tushnet doubts it will find traction among actors seeking tangible
results.283
Finally, experimentalist governance entails constant reevaluation and
midstream correction. The public could easily perceive this focus on
transparent results and continuous improvement as instability and
admissions of failure, rather than as the fruitful transformation of
evidence of imperfect outcomes into an opportunity for growth and
improvement.284
To answer these concerns, the next Section offers examples of DE’s
actual operation outside the area of U.S. public education that counter
these objections. The following Part extends the analysis to U.S. public
education.

280. Id. at 323 (“[T]oo much talk can produce inaction; individual speakers may impose a
heckler’s veto over even the best practices.”).
281. Id. at 322.
282. Mark Tushnet, A New Constitutionalism for Liberals?, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 357, 358 (2003).
283. Id. at 360 (“Experimental constitutionalism will get traction when an appropriate
political coalition sees how its members’ interests will be advanced by the widespread acceptance
of experimentalist constitutionalism . . . .”).
284. See, e.g., CLARA HEMPHILL & KIM NAUER, CTR. FOR N.Y.C. AFFAIRS, MANAGING BY
THE NUMBERS: EMPOWERMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW YORK CITY’S SCHOOLS 55 (2010),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53ee4f0be4b015b9c3690d84/t/5410b0bee4b04642ac686a
d8/1410379966798/ManagingByTheNumbers_EmpowermentandAccountabilityinNYCSchools.
pdf (quoting a NYC school principal who agreed that iterative changes made schools “better off
than they were” but experienced “trepidation” when asking “how many iterations of change” a
system could “endure”).
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C. Promise, in Practice
Several examples demonstrate DE’s potential to solve entrenched
problems without capitulating to special interests. Each example
combines stakeholder participation in problem-solving with an iterative,
data-driven process, and each addresses concerns discussed above. The
examples are roughly arranged based on the size, scope, and
identifiability of the relevant stakeholder populations—a factor that may
make public education a particularly challenging context for DE.
1. Toyota
Toyota’s innovative approach to improving its production process is
an important early example of DE in action. With its commitment to
“continuous improvement”285—designing work “so problems are evident
when and where they occur” and persistently looking for “better ways to
do work”286—Toyota out-competed American car manufacturers despite
lacking resources previously thought to be necessary.287 Among other
steps, Toyota famously trained assembly-line workers to identify flaws at
their own or the nearest upstream step in the production sequence; halt
the production line immediately to allow rapid corrections to be made;
and use a version of structured “inquiry”—“continual, disciplined,
accelerated discovery” of causes and solutions—to make necessary
corrections themselves before the problem corrupted the entire assembly
process.288 By empowering line workers as central stakeholders in the
company’s success and key participants in its collaborative problemsolving processes, Toyota revolutionized not only the internal operations
of automobile makers but also the concept of industrial democracy,
replacing adversarial interest-group bargaining with experimentalist
problem-solving politics.289
285. Quality, TOYOTA, http://www.toyota.com/quality (last visited May 27, 2015)
(“[S]triving for continuous improvement . . . [is] a philosophy that we stand by.”); see MIKE
ROTHER, TOYOTA KATA: MANAGING PEOPLE FOR IMPROVEMENT, ADAPTIVENESS, AND SUPERIOR
RESULTS 5–7 (2010).
286. STEVEN J. SPEAR, THE HIGH VELOCITY EDGE: HOW MARKET LEADERS LEVERAGE
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE TO BEAT THE COMPETITION 159, 162 (2009).
287. Yuri Kageyama, Toyota World’s Top Selling Car Maker for 2nd Year, ASSOCIATED
PRESS: BIG STORY (Jan. 23, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/toyota-worlds-top-selling-carmaker-2nd-year.
288. See SPEAR, supra note 286, at 158; Quality, supra note 285 (“Every team member has
the authority and the responsibility to stop the line if a component or assembly doesn’t meet our
quality standards.”); supra notes 92, 139–40 and accompanying text (discussing structured
inquiry).
289. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 881–82 (1994);
A Tribute to Al Shanker, 16 PEW F. ON EDUC. REFORM 33, 33–34 (1997) (reprinting views
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Toyota shows a way forward for DE in practice, given its success
transforming blue-collar workers, whom most companies had relegated
to rote rule following, into flexible and effective problem-solvers. The
company’s extension of its problem-solving “publics” to include
suppliers and even customers (whose demand and feedback drive its
“lean production” system) provides additional bases for optimism about
DE.290
In other ways, however, Toyota arguably presents a more favorable
environment for engaging stakeholders in problem-solving politics than
do public school systems. Participation by employee–stakeholders is
mandatory and well-compensated, and participation by suppliers is
incentivized by Toyota’s market power; collective engagement in
problem-solving is part of participants’ job description or contractual
obligation. In these ways, Toyota does not invite seamless analogy to
urban school districts seeking to engage not only thousands of teachers
and hundreds of suppliers of curricula, professional development, and
after-school programs, but also tens of thousands of families whose
dispersion, disconnection from schools, and lack of problem-solving
capacity are often the central problem to be solved. Still, the Toyota
example shows how field staff previously thought to lack problemsolving and decision-making capacity and commitment to the
organization can effectively learn to make and change company practices
and policies for the better.
2. Drug Courts
Drug treatment courts illustrate how DE can be successfully
implemented in public-sector contexts. These courts are an alternative to
the traditional criminal justice system and have reduced recidivism by
drug-addicted offenders convicted of low-level, non-violent crimes.291
Drug courts use an iterative, data-oriented process to engage an array of
stakeholders in decision-making and results monitoring.292 Individuals
charged with drug-related offenses accept responsibility for charged
crimes in exchange for enrollment in court-supervised drug-treatment
programs and exemption from criminal penalties if they successfully
expressed by famed union leader Albert Shanker on lessons the Toyota model offers to teachers’
unions).
290. See SPEAR, supra note 286, at 39–41 (describing incorporation of suppliers and role of
customer demand in Toyota system).
291. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-53, ADULT DRUG COURTS: STUDIES
SHOW COURTS REDUCE RECIDIVISM, BUT DOJ COULD ENHANCE FUTURE PERFORMANCE MEASURE
REVISION EFFORTS 8 (2011).
292. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 832 (2000).
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complete the program.293 Actors with a stake in an individual’s success—
the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, family members, drug treatment
personnel, and the offender herself—jointly construct a treatment plan
and monitor relapse events and responsive behaviors for evidence of
triggers and effective ameliorative strategies.294 In return for federal
funding, treatment courts report effective practices to the Department of
Justice, which identifies funded courts’ future goals based on what is
known to be possible.295 Drug courts track which treatment programs
succeed and fail, funneling offenders away from ineffective programs and
gradually improving treatment options for drug users.296 Together, these
practices subject drug-related crime to a process of “[d]irectly
deliberative problem solving,” incorporating the outcomes of many
experiments into an ever-improving solution set.297
Drug courts allay additional concerns about DE’s applicability. Large
numbers of often poorly motivated, low-capacity participants suffering
from a dizzying array of troubles develop problem-solving skills—as do
judges, lawyers, and treatment professionals—through involvement in
the experimentalist project, without requiring Toyota’s intensive, preparticipation training. Additionally, the progression of many dispersed
and unconnected participants does not result in a loss of institutional
knowledge, because the courts, treatment teams and programs, and the
federal government track best practices and feed information back to
“local units.” Nonetheless, as in the Toyota example, there are incentives
for the actors to participate—judges, lawyers, and treatment providers
because that is their job; clients and their families given the criminal
justice system’s vast coercive power—that are not available to public
school systems.
3. Environmental Protection
In the environmental context, DE brings together disparate actors
seeking a “productive yet acceptably sustainable” balance of resource use
and environmental protection.298 Recognizing the impossibility of
achieving the right balance solely through centralized management or
regulation, reformers fuse “the broad experience of professional
practitioners [with] the contextual intelligence that only citizens
293. Id.
294. See id. at 833–34, 844–46.
295. See id. at 844–45.
296. See id. at 839. But cf. id. at 865–67 (noting weaknesses in structured monitoring of
treatment centers).
297. See id. at 878.
298. Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, in BOSTON REVIEW 3, 6
(Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2000).
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possess.”299 The resulting process is an “exchange between local units,”
often engaging with private actors and “higher level authorities” within,
for example, state environmental-protection departments, the EPA, and
the Fish and Wildlife Service.300
At the outset, central regulators set broad environmental goals such as
declines in the release of toxic chemicals, incidence of unsafe conditions
at nuclear power plants, pollution in specified watersheds, or
encroachments on habitats.301 Central actors then measure progress
toward those goals by actors at the factory, habitat, or other local level,
while giving those actors the autonomy to decide for themselves in the
first instance how much harm reduction is reasonable under their
circumstances and how to reach that target through use reduction,
conservation, or other similar plans they are required to create.302 In
return for increased autonomy, local actors report their “performance,
plans, and metrics” to the central authority: “how they are doing, how
they plan to improve, and what standards they use to assess
performance.”303 Based on strong results achieved under identifiable
circumstances, the central authority sets and informs local actors of new
standards of performance (more specific than before but with leeway
remaining) and generally accepted methods of practice and
assessment.304 Local units continue working toward the centrally
identified goals using broadly defined acceptable performance methods
and reporting results, creating feedback loops that replace an assumption
of “central, panoramic knowledge” with constant updating based on local
experiences.305
These regimes encourage broadly disparate actors with an interest in
the outcome to participate in generating, implementing, and monitoring
plans and targets. Firms may participate because of regulatory mandates
or market incentives affected by access to resources the plans address.
Government agencies, environmentalists, farmers, first peoples, and
recreational users of affected areas have their own concerns about how
the same resources are conserved and deployed.306 Although cooperation
between such groups is initially unlikely, there is evidence that shared
interest in the outcome and worries about decisions being left to
299. Id.
300. Id. at 6–7.
301. Id. at 5–7.
302. Id. at 7–8 (describing monitoring regime penalizing failures to plan and report).
303. Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, BOS. REV. F. (Oct. 1, 1999),
http://bostonreview.net/forum/charles-sabel-archon-fung-bradley-karkkainen-beyond-backyardenvironmentalism.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Sabel et al., supra note 298, at 5–7.
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willing and effective

4. Chicago Community Policing
The preceding three case studies (to a diminishing degree) involve
limited categories of stakeholders with strong incentives to participate in
the experimentalist regime. As DE projects expand to encompass a
broader population of individuals and a broader array of motivations,
ensuring meaningful participation of affected groups becomes more
challenging.
Steps in Chicago to incorporate community input into policing reveal
DE’s potential for implementation across larger and more dispersed
populations. In 1993, the Chicago Police initiated the Chicago
Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), a prominent feature of which was
regular “Beat Community Meetings,” in which neighborhood residents
met with locally based police officers to identify chronic crime problems
facing the neighborhood and attempt to alleviate them through joint
problem-solving.308 From November 1996 to August 1997, Professor
Archon Fung observed the dynamics of the monthly meetings in Traxton,
a neighborhood characterized by a division between the predominantly
white and middle-class West Traxton and the predominantly black and
poor East Traxton.309 Before the introduction of the beat meetings, West
Traxton inhabitants did their best to preserve the nature of Traxton as two
distinct communities separated by physical barriers designed “to keep out
what they perceive[d] to be the chaos and crime of the surrounding urban
environment.”310
Fung bifurcates the Traxton beat meetings he observed into a first
period of “laissez faire” meetings and a second phase of “structured
deliberation” meetings.311 During the earlier period, the civilian meeting
leader allowed participants to determine the direction of the discussion
ad hoc.312 Through “coordinated and persistent efforts,” the relatively
privileged West Traxton residents dominated the conversation, raising
and demanding answers on questions of comparative insignificance—
traffic violations, unlicensed street vendors, loitering.313 East Traxton
307. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 861, 878–79 (2006).
308. What Is CAPS?, CHI. POLICE, http://home.chicagopolice.org/get-involved-withcaps/how-caps-works/what-is-caps (last visited May 20, 2017).
309. FUNG, supra note 35, at 174–76.
310. Id.
311. See id. at 179–95.
312. See id. at 185–87.
313. Id. at 182–83.
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residents, less practiced in similar assemblages, waited until the end of
meetings to voice their often more serious concerns—shootings,
unsolved murders, overbearing police conduct—but rarely challenged
police explanations or “advance[d] their problem-solving efforts beyond
the mode of complaint, question, and informational response.”314
Whereas West Traxton residents often worked out ameliorative strategies
with police and followed up with their own or officers’ police progress
reports at subsequent meetings, east-side residents rarely got beyond
“informational” interactions.315 As a result, the types of problems that
police later pursued tended to be annoyances rather than underlying
systemic issues—West, rather than East, Traxton concerns.316
Midway through Fung’s observations, however, the Traxton meetings
changed.317 A more experienced volunteer meeting leader took over
and—following suggested CAPS protocols—restructured the
conversation as a self-conscious exercise to identify and tackle the single
most serious challenge facing the entire neighborhood.318 Based on
complaints east-siders had voiced at earlier meetings, a West Traxton
resident identified an East Traxton crack den as the most serious problem,
prompting other west-siders to join in addressing what quite evidently
was a more serious issue than those that previously dominated the
meetings.319 The shift toward “structured deliberation” triggered more
participation from previously underrepresented community members and
highlighted group priorities rather than concerns driven by the most
assertive and adroit participants.320 Over time, Traxton residents from
both areas became more adept at problem identification, prioritization,
and solving, forming committees to “negotiate agreements with
troublesome landlords, to testify in housing and criminal court, and to
conduct ‘beat walks’ to show resident solidarity and publicly [assess] area
problems.”321 East- and west-side neighbors began to work together,
augmenting and cultivating the east-side residents’ political capacities.322
Structured interactions equalized participation and leveled the political

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

See id. at 185.
Id. at 185–87.
Id.
Id. at 187–88.
Id.
Id. at 188–90, 193.
See id. at 193–95.
ARCHON FUNG, STREET LEVEL DEMOCRACY: PRAGMATIC POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
CHICAGO SCHOOLS AND POLICING 14 (1999), http://www.archonfung.net/papers/sld99.pdf.
322. FUNG, supra note 35, at 196–97 (“During the second, more successful period of
observation, however, we saw East Traxton residents together with police and other residents
utilize several mechanisms of participatory deliberation.”).
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playing field in the meetings.323
To be sure, the Traxton experience has not been wholly pervasive. A
report on the ten-year anniversary of CAPS gave some beat meetings
poor marks for public involvement and found attendance to be skewed
toward older and more educated participants.324 Still, the example
suggests how skilled facilitation and carefully structured deliberation can
overcome inequalities in deliberative capacity among diverse
stakeholders with a range of problems.
5. Special Education in Finland
Special education in Finland exemplifies stakeholder mobilization on
a national scale in the context of public education. Systemic changes to
schooling at central and local levels have contributed to exceptional
academic outcomes for Finnish students compared to their counterparts
in other countries, especially among the lowest-scoring quintile of
students.325 Although these results are often explained by cultural
factors—including a deep respect for learning and for student and teacher
autonomy—those same cultural factors have not generated comparable
results in other Nordic countries, suggesting that education policy is
largely responsible.326
Finland is notable for carefully structured and monitored educational
experiences that are unusually tailored to the learning needs of individual
students.327 Starting at age two-and-a-half, Finnish children undergo
frequent diagnostic assessment using tools co-designed by teachers and
universities to facilitate the early detection of learning difficulties and
development of individualized intervention plans.328 Roughly 30 percent
of Finnish school children receive special education services of this sort,
either in the short term or intensively over a longer term.329
Teams known as student welfare groups (SWGs), which include
school principals, psychologists, nurses, special education teachers, and
representatives from the municipal administration, provide special
323. See id. at 194–96.
324. WESLEY G. SKOGAN & LYNN STEINER, CHI. CMTY. POLICING EVALUATION CONSORTIUM,
CAPS AT TEN: AN EVALUATION OF CHICAGO’S ALTERNATIVE POLICING STRATEGY iii, 154 (2004),
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/i/cpd/clearpath/Caps10.pdf.
325. OECD, PISA 2012 RESULTS IN FOCUS, 14 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/
pisa-2012-results-overview.pdf (citing Finland as proof that “high average performance and
equity are not mutually exclusive”).
326. Sabel et al., supra note 298, at 3–4 (concluding that “no feature of Finnish culture—
neither love of learning nor respect for teachers—can explain current performance”).
327. Id. at 7.
328. Id. at 5–6.
329. Id. at 6.
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education services directly to students.330 Teachers, who experience their
students’ learning styles and outcomes every day, consult with experts to
update students’ study plans.331 The SWGs review teachers’ work to
benchmark plans and practices against each other and ensure that
individual education plans for each student incorporate effective
practices.332
The National Board of Education (NBE) creates and annually
evaluates a core curriculum for Finnish public schools and funds training
for all and especially special education teachers, principals, and SWG
members.333 Informally, NBE converts lessons learned from interactions
with schools into proposed changes to national education law,
transferring information from local units to the central government and,
through changes in national policy, to other schools.334
In an important respect, however, the iterative process crucial to DE
does not reach its full potential through the Finnish educational system.
Although the government monitors student outcomes for regional and
social differences, it does not track and compare results of individual
schools.335 It thus has no systematic way to spot and generalize especially
promising practices in individual schools into practices other schools and
municipalities can adapt for their own use.336
D. Concerns
These examples demonstrate DE’s potential and highlight some
concerns. Although DE demands more in the way of stakeholder
participation than casting a ballot or paying interest-group dues, these
examples show that iterative problem-solving can be used to build the
capacity of even inexperienced participants—addicted offenders, lowincome residents of crime-ridden neighborhoods, parents of specialneeds children—to steer government action toward beneficial solutions.
In particular, the Traxton and Finland examples reveal how DE structures
can mobilize hard-to-reach stakeholders and align them with team
members who can help them use tools and available data to generate
solutions.
Although not fully tested, the concern that DE is compromised by its
reliance on participants who only temporarily engage does not appear to
be borne out in practice. In the drug court example, though offenders
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 52.
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either succeed, advancing out of the system or fail and go to prison, the
learning associated with each case is absorbed not only by offenders
themselves but also by repeat players: courts, lawyers, and social service
providers.337 Similarly, in the Finland example, children and parents
constantly shift, but SWG members—principals, teachers, nurses, etc.—
build capacity to effect change school-wide, which Finland could extend
system-wide by adding structures for identifying better-performing
schools. Nor has the instability inherent in the constant updating of
environmental goals and presumptive procedures based on the results of
myriad local plans neutralized the effectiveness of the environmental
regimes described above.
Still, none of the examples completely resolves concerns about
facilitating meaningful participation and addressing disparate levels of
stakeholder capacity in large urban school districts where constituents are
harder to reach, less ready to participate, or simply intransigent for fear
of undermining their stake in the old regime. Unlike at Toyota, most
stakeholders in urban school districts are not captive participants for
whom “continuous improvement” is an essential part of their job training
and workday, and they have no history of stakeholder-driven
improvements to warrant faith in the process. Nor, unlike in the drug
courts and environmental case studies, are most school district
stakeholders drawn in by a court order, a “cause,” or an immediate and
palpable impact on their property or livelihood.
A final concern is the complexity and scope of the problems to be
solved. To be sure, the case studies above address issues of great
importance and difficulty. Still, production errors in car manufacturing,
antisocial behavior tied to drug addiction, and even urban crime may have
fewer key dimensions and better defined and accepted improvement
goals and strategies than the problems facing U.S. public education. 338
IV. DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM IN—AND NOT IN—PUBLIC
EDUCATION TODAY
This Part argues that the new education reforms adopt DE governance
but disregard its new forms of politics. Instead, by endeavoring to
practice no politics at all, the reformers have left educators, parents, and
other stakeholders with no collective way to interact with the reforms
337. See supra Subsection III.C.2.
338. See Wendy Kopp, Do American Schools Need to Change? Depends What You Compare
Them to, ATLANTIC (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/10/doamerican-schools-need-to-change-depends-what-you-compare-them-to/280768/ (contrasting two
best-selling education authors: “[Diane Ravitch] dismisses international tests like PISA and
compares the U.S. to its own education track record . . . [concluding there isn’t] much cause for
alarm . . . [;] [t]o [Amanda] Ripley, international standards are the relevant ones in a globalized
information economy,” leaving much for Americans to fear).
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except through a particularly virulent form of traditional interest-group
politics. In other words, implementation of new forms of governance
against the backdrop of old forms of civic engagement has generated
fierce and counterproductive conflict. To be sure, many objections to the
reforms are from special interests whose influence the reforms diminish.
But the reforms also face powerful objections from the populations they
aim to serve, confirming that something is seriously amiss politically, and
that the reforms are not simultaneously democratic and experimentalist.
A. Experimentalist Governance and the Promise of the New
Education Reforms
DE is the alternative to bureaucratic governance that best explains the
new education reforms and their promising results. A common feature of
the reforms—often ordered by a mayor vested with responsibility
previously exercised by an elected school board—is the empowerment of
school leaders and educators to make instructional and management
decisions previously assigned to powerful central bureaucrats under the
loose supervision of the board and a short-term superintendent.339 Like
other experimentalist arrangements, that is, the new education reforms
aim to free field staff—here, principals and teachers—from bureaucratic
constraints and empower them to address the diverse local conditions
that, although invisible to central experts, inevitably frame the most
urgent problems and effective solutions.340 To motivate and inform
educators’ use of their heightened authority to accelerate student learning
across all populations, districts compare similarly situated schools based
on students’ rates of course-credit accumulation, longitudinal growth in
standardized test outcomes, graduation, and college attendance and use
consumer surveys and qualitative review of schools’ environmental
features and management processes thought to drive improved
outcomes.341
Supported by central-office supervisors retooled as facilitators,
collaborative-inquiry teams within and across schools use the same
information and shorter-term diagnostic assessments to identify patterns
and causes of strong or weak learning outcomes and to devise plans for
struggling students, teachers, and schools that become the basis for
further inquiry, adjustment, and sharing among schools.342 Results also
inform decisions to close chronically underperforming schools,
339. See, e.g., supra notes 84, 91–92, 104, 160–62 and accompanying text.
340. For examples of the reforms’ exchange of local autonomy for accountability in
Baltimore, Boston, Charlotte, Denver, and New York, see supra notes 104–05, 107–08, 112, 127–
28, 162.
341. See, e.g., supra notes 127, 136, 139 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss2/2

68

Liebman and Cruikshank: Governance of Steel and Kryptonite Politics in Contemporary Publi

2017]

CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC EDUCATION REFORM

433

proliferate promising new school models, and expand family choice
among schools.343 Overall, the district’s role changes from command and
control to motivation, facilitation, and portfolio management, and schools
and educators move from rule following to accountable experimentation
and innovation. Although outcomes vary, the reforms as a whole have
improved teacher quality, raised test scores, and increased graduation and
college-going and success rates.344
True, other alternatives to bureaucracy can explain the reforms’
reliance on consumer choice and allowance of grossly underperforming
schools to close (marketization),345 use of consequential, centrally
defined targets to hold local units accountable (managerialism),346 and
emphasis on collaboration among empowered practitioners
(professionalism/craft).347 Only experimentalism, however, can explain
the confluence of all these features,348 some of which are anathema to
other models.349 Most crucially, experimentalism alone validates four
simultaneous beliefs about the knowledge needed to solve collective
problems—beliefs that the reforms manifest in their penchant for
quantitative and qualitative assessment and data, structured team-based
inquiry, and feedback loops:
x Institutions can, and to succeed must, make knowledge explicit—
a belief experimentalism shares only with bureaucracy.
x All individuals affected by a problem have knowledge crucial to
its solution—a belief experimentalism shares only with
marketization.
x All individuals can effectively participate in using their own and
others’ knowledge to respond to a problem’s impact on their
individual and collective needs and values—a belief
experimentalism shares with no other model.
x Proliferating local experimentation and structuring it to make its
steps and results visible, actionable, and accountable to teams of
343. See supra notes 129, 146 and accompanying text.
344. See, e.g., supra notes 106, 110, 113, 142–46, 172 and accompanying text (referencing
outcomes in Baltimore, Boston, Charlotte, Denver, and New York City).
345. See, e.g., Choices & Enrollment: High School, N.Y.C. DEP’T EDUC. (describing high
school choice in New York City); supra notes 112, 129 (citing school choice in Denver and
closure of failing schools in New York City).
346. See supra notes 112, 127, 218–22 and accompanying text (describing managerialist
tendencies of reforms in Denver and New York City).
347. See supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text (describing professionalism-based
reforms).
348. See supra notes 112, 129 (choice, school closure), 127 (consequential targets), 139
(collaborative inquiry) and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 196–97, 218–22, 240–47 and accompanying text (discussing ways the
new reforms depart from marketization, managerialism, and professionalism/craft).
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local problem-solvers, central observers, and other sites facing
analogous problems are the best way to maximize knowledge—
also unique to experimentalism.350
There also is evidence—causally inconclusive, to be sure—linking the
reforms’ experimentalist features to their qualified success.351
Particularly clear is the association between those results and the reforms’
use of transparent and consequential student outcomes to motivate and
facilitate improvement. For example, two rigorous, quasi-experimental
studies of New York City’s consequential school accountability system
found “positive, statistically significant, and economically meaningful
impacts on student achievement” over the course of the next school year
in schools that had received failing grades for student achievement in
math or English the prior year.352 Although both studies focused on lowperforming schools, other evidence links the reforms to student gains in
reading and math across the entire system.353
If consequential accountability alone drove the new reforms,
marketization or managerialism might as easily explain these results, but
evidence suggests otherwise. For example, mayoral control—a
managerialist feature of certain reforms—only sometimes correlates with
success, and the predominance of experimentalist governance structures
may explain the difference.354 Professors Kenneth K. Wong and Francis
X. Shen’s careful study of city-versus-state results in eleven mayoralcontrol districts contrasts impressive and sustained student learning gains
in New York City in the 2000s with Boston’s more modest gains, which
soon lost “momentum.”355 These results mirror the two districts’
divergent investment in diagnostic uses of data, which was greater in New
York than in Boston. Indeed, reforms in four of the five mayor-controlled
districts that substantially closed the achievement gap with the rest of
their states are strongly associated with experimentalist strategies, unlike
the four districts with more modest results and the two districts where

350. For a discussion of each model’s treatment of knowledge, see supra text accompanying
notes 188 (marketization), 208 (managerialism), and 223 (professionalism/craft).
351. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
352. Marcus Winters, Grading New York: An Evaluation of New York City’s Progress Report
Program, MANHATTAN INST. CIVIC REP., Nov. 2008, at 1, 7; Jonah Rockoff & Lesley J. Turner,
Short Run Impacts of Accountability on School Quality 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14565, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14564.pdf.
353. See sources cited supra note 141.
354. See WONG & SHEN, supra note 85, at 7–8, 22, 25–26 (studying eleven mayoral control
districts, five of which substantially narrowed the achievement gap between themselves and the
rest of the state, four of which showed some progress, and two of which saw the gap widen).
355. Id. at 7–8.
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city–state achievement gaps widened.356 Testing the hypothesis that
inquiry teams contributed to its success closing the achievement gap with
the rest of the state, New York City found that, across nearly all
achievement levels, students on whom inquiry teams focused their
improvement efforts outperformed other students who began the year at
the same performance level in both reading and math.357
Similarly, educational researcher Heather Zavadsky’s study of urban
school districts that were awarded the Broad Prize for impressive student
learning gains and reductions in achievement gaps358 links those results
to what this Article identifies as experimentalist structures.359 For
example, she attributes narrowing district-to-state achievement gaps and
other beat-the-odds outcomes in the 91-percent black and Hispanic
Aldine Independent School District north of Houston to its deployment
of a “one-stop” data management system to “identify strengths and
weaknesses”; development, monitoring, and frequent adjustment of
action plans addressed to students’ and schools’ “specific needs or
objectives”; and specification of goals and actors responsible for reaching
them.360 She associates similarly impressive results in “urban suburban”
Garden Grove Unified School District in California—75 percent of
whose mainly immigrant Hispanic students speak English as a second
language—with the use of real-time data to spot struggling schools,
teachers, and students and of teacher collaboration within and across
grades to review data and plan improvements to bring results back on
track.361 Likewise, educational researcher Michael Fullan and journalist
Alan Boyle credit impressive results in Ontario, Canada to its use of data
to provide early warning of schools and students needing more support
and to capacity-building and problem-solving through structured
educator collaboration and information sharing.362
356. See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text. Among substantially improving
mayoral-control districts, Baltimore, Chicago, New Haven, and New York, but not Philadelphia,
adopted experimentalist reforms; modestly improving districts Boston and Hartford adopted thin
versions of the reforms, while Harrisburg and Providence did not adopt the reforms; gap-widening
district Cleveland adopted experimentalist reforms only after the study period; and Yonkers did
not adopt them. See WONG & SHEN, supra note 85, at 1, 9–10.
357. NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF EDUC., INQUIRY TEAM STUDY (2009) (finding that on average
one year of inquiry helped target students close 11 percent of the gap in math and 6 percent of the
gap in reading between their starting point and the next highest proficiency level under New York
State’s four-level tracking system) (on file with authors).
358. ZAVADSKY, supra note 212, at xix.
359. See id. at 8.
360. Id. at 15, 23–25, 42–43, 46.
361. Id. at 131–32, 138–40, 148, 157.
362. FULLAN & BOYLE, supra note 87, at 68, 71, 78. Supporting these conclusions are six
characteristics of Arizona elementary and middle schools where students performed substantially
better on third-grade reading and eighth-grade math tests than students at their demographic peer
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Scientifically comparing the impact of different reforms comprising
distinct combinations of partly intersecting treatments is notoriously
difficult. Nonetheless, the evidence tends to link student learning gains
and experimentalist education reforms based on iterative problemsolving motivated by transparent accountability and driven by
collaborative educator teams’ structured analysis of information to spread
effective, adjust partly effective, and abandon ineffective policies.
B. The Absence of Experimentalist Politics and Risk of the
Reforms’ Demise
This Article has attributed contemporary systemic problems with
public education in the United States to bureaucracy and special-interest
politics. Reformers have had some success responding to bureaucratic
failings through changes in governance structures. As this Section
demonstrates, the same cannot be said for changes in pluralist politics.
1. A New Vision of Education Politics
The problem begins with the standard account of educational politics,
which has no place for DE. Using the figure below, political scientist
Jeffrey Henig has explained education politics in New York City as a
matrix that divides political engagement into two types (individualistic
versus collective) and two focuses (policy implementation versus policy
formation).363 Individualistic policy implementation (Cell A)
encompasses direct interactions between school district and families to
effectuate school policy, as when families use district procedures to
exercise choice among schools.364 Individualistic policy formulation
(Cell B) covers collaborative interactions between teacher and family
over the instruction of particular children, as in parent–teacher
conferences.365 Collective policy implementation (Cell C) includes PTAs

schools and students statewide: Under the direction of (1) strong principals, who (2) stuck with
the program, the schools (3) set clear goals, (4) used an array of formative assessments, and (5)
structured collaboration among educators (6) to identify instructional and programmatic
weaknesses and engage in iterative cycles of instruction, assessment, evaluation, and intervention
to identify, test, and improve solutions. MARY JO WAITS ET AL., CTR. FOR THE FUTURE OF ARIZ,
WHY SOME SCHOOLS WITH LATINO CHILDREN BEAT THE ODDS ... AND OTHERS DON’T 7, 25, 28, 31,
33 (2006), http://www.beattheoddsinstitute.org/pdf/FAZ502_LatinEd_final.pdf; see also id. at 48
(concluding that these results are not attributable to the intuitive, “word of mouth” collaboration
among master practitioners that professionalism and craft favor and urging schools to
institutionalize explicit transfers of information).
363. Henig et al., supra note 90, at 5.
364. Id.
365. Id.
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and School Leadership Teams.366 Finally, noting New York’s adoption
of mayoral control, Henig divides the fourth category, collective policy
formulation, in two: classic interest-group politics, which Henig calls
“advocacy, strong democracy” and prefers (Cell D), and “mayoral
election,” which Henig criticizes for submerging educational politics in a
sea of non-education concerns (Cell E).367
Education Politics
Implementation

Policy Formulation

Individualistic

A. Information, service,
complaints, choice

B. Child-centered collaboration

Collective

C. Supportive partnerships

D. Advocacy, strong democracy
E. Mayoral election

As is described in Part III above, DE erases the lines separating all the
cells. It understands policy formulation as a function primarily of
carefully observed and repeatedly adjusted implementation.368
Furthermore, it treats the identification and attempts to solve each
individual problem as a contextualized experiment in clarifying the
collective problem and solution through a process of coordinated action
and collective accountability.369 Experimentalism thus occupies the vast
center of Henig’s matrix.370
Idealized and transported to the education context, DE imagines an
“ethical situation”371 in which groups of parents and educators
temporarily shed interests and ideological commitments and engage with
each other and with school leaders in a collaborative process of
identifying and improving solutions to an instructional or related problem
of importance to all.372 Conflict is minimized and multiple perspectives
are leveraged in a process disciplined by agreement to limit discourse to
that problem and to premise judgment on a single metric: whether
proposals clarify the problem and contribute to its solution.
366. Id. at 6.
367. Id. at 5–6; see also FULLAN & BOYLE, supra note 87, at 44–45, 71, 101 (limiting the
conception of school politics to pluralist political structures, e.g., school leadership teams,
community education councils, and collective bargaining); Keith Robinson & Angel L. Harris,
Parental Involvement Is Overrated, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Apr. 12, 2014, 2:32 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/12/parental-involvement-is-overrated (limiting the
conception of parental involvement to parent–teacher conferences, PTA meetings, and voicing
agreement or opposition at public meetings).
368. See supra Section III.A.
369. See supra Section III.A.
370. See supra Section III.A.
371. See supra Section III.A; infra Part V.
372. See supra Section III.A.
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2. The Sobering Reality of Education Politics
This version of DE engagement bears little resemblance to politics
occurring on a wide scale in education today, especially in reform states
and districts. Rather than dampening conflicts, the reforms have inflamed
them. Far from engaging in warm collaborations on improvements in the
collective good, the stakeholders in whose names the reforms have
occurred feel frozen out of “corporate,” “disruptive,” and “technocratic”
strategies they don’t understand or trust.373 In reformers’ haste to release
schools from the stranglehold of special-interest politics, they have
refused to engage the body politic at all.374 As a mother and member of a
community education board said in the midst of New York City’s
reforms, “I think [reformers] have done a good job getting rid of the bad
political stuff . . . . It’s just that they’ve gotten rid of everything else,
too.”375
Over time, a “governance structure” seen as “eliminat[ing]
community influence on legitimate matters of concern” and any
“effective way for parents to address systemic issues” backfired.376 The
goal was perhaps admirable: to cut off all avenues for pluralist—or any
substitute—politics in hopes that more choice among schools, better
service, and rising test scores would satisfy consumers. As Michelle Rhee
confessed after being forced out as schools chancellor in Washington,
D.C., “I . . . thought, ‘Well, OK, if we put our heads down and do the
work, after two years we’ll have great results, and everybody would be

373. Ta-Nehisi Coates, Michael Bloomberg Is Not a Scientist, Man, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/michael-bloomberg-is-nota-scientist-man/279455/ (labeling Mayor Bloomberg’s “technocratic” approach to “school
reform” an “ affront to democracy”); Joe Flood, Bloomberg’s Blind Spot: Technocrat Mayor
Overstocks Laboratory of Ideas, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 23, 2010), http://nymag.com/
news/intelligencer/70313; Stuart Whatley, Disrupt Yourself (And Do Us All a Favor), L.A. REV.
BOOKS (Mar. 28, 2014), https://lareviewofbooks.org/essay/disrupt-us-favor (criticizing selfproclaimed “disruptive” reforms as “neoliberal” efforts to enable managerialist elites to control
schools); Diann Woodard, The Corporate Takeover of Public Education, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug.
6, 2013, 2:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diann-woodard/the-corporate-takeover_
b_3397091.html; see sources cited supra note 25.
374. HEMPHILL & NAUER, supra note 284, at 40.
375. Id.
376. Id.; see id. at 41 (“‘It renders everyone powerless except the people in charge. . . . No
parent group, no assemblyman can influence anything.’” (quoting Diane Ravitch)); Natalie
Gomez-Velez, Public School Governance and Democracy: Does Public Participation Matter?,
53 VILL. L. REV. 297, 348 (2008) (describing Bloomberg’s view as “because he is accountable,
he is empowered to make decisions unilaterally under a minimalist conception of democratic
legitimacy”); sources cited supra note 25.
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happy.’”377 But the reality is different: improved results take time and are
viewed with skepticism by a public scarred by decades of failed schools,
false promises, and black-box solutions. Even if—as sociologist William
Julius Wilson wrote in defense of Rhee—her impatience to free students
“locked in a lousy school system” was “the ultimate display of respect
for African-American residents in Washington, showing exactly how far
[its leaders were] willing to go [to] improve urban education,”378 the
impression left was one of disengagement, elitism, and disrespect.379
Emblematic of the reforms’ political failure is their typical approach
to closing schools, which have left minority communities feeling not only
confused and excluded but also robbed of precious, if tarnished,
neighborhood institutions.380 As sensible as it is to shutter schools where
poor and minority children’s “test scores, attendance, graduation rates,
and readiness for college” have for years fallen below anyone’s minimum
standard,381 doing so has sparked fierce opposition not only from unions
and community boards that stand to lose members and patronage, but also
from the students and parents the schools directly harm.382 Absent
377. Dakarai I. Aarons, Rhee Reflects on Her Stormy Tenure in D.C., EDUC. WK. (Sept. 17,
2010), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/09/17/04rhee_ep.h30.html (quoting Michelle
Rhee); see KLEIN, supra note 213, at 254.
378. William Julius Wilson, Letter to the Editor, How a School Chief Tried to Turn a
District Around, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/opinion/l24
herbert.html.
379. See Bob Herbert, Neglecting the Base, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/21/opinion/21herbert.html (describing Rhee’s reforms as
disrespectful to the black community); see also Warner, supra note 20 (“[P]eople . . . don’t like
to get the message that their communities are on the wrong track . . . [from] stern-faced do-gooders
telling them how to think and what to do.”).
380. Trymaine Lee, Amid Mass School Closings, a Slow Death for Some Chicago Schools,
MSNBC (Dec. 27, 2013, 7:56 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/dont-call-it-school-choice.
381. Philissa Cramer & Rachel Cromidas, Among 24 Schools City Says It Could Close, Some
Familiar Names, CHALKBEAT (Nov. 26, 2012), http://ny.chalkbeat.org/2012/11/26/city-says-it-isconsidering-closing-24-high-schools-this-year; see id. (profiling Walter Dyett High School on
Chicago’s south side where only 6.5 percent of eleventh graders meet or exceed state standards
in reading, math, and science); see also Beth Fertig, In One NYC School, A Snapshot of
Bloomberg’s Education Legacy, NPR (Dec. 18, 2013, 2:39 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/
12/18/255259953/in-one-nyc-school-a-snapshot-of-bloombergs-education-legacy (reporting that
during New York City reforms, Mayor Bloomberg closed nearly 200 schools); Sharon Otterman,
Large High Schools in The City Are Taking Hard Falls, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/nyregion/26closings.html (comparing high schools closed
by Bloomberg administration, which often had four-year graduation rates below 40 percent, to 60
percent rate citywide and 75 percent rate at new small schools with which Bloomberg replaced
the closed schools).
382. See, e.g., Philissa Cramer, Brouhaha in Brooklyn: Live-Blogging the PEP’s School
Closure Vote, CHALKBEAT (Jan. 26, 2010), http://ny.chalkbeat.org/2010/01/26/brouhaha-inbrooklyn-live-blogging-the-peps-school-closure-vote (chronicling a night of protests closing
down streets for hours, nine hours of testimony from elected officials, parents, teachers, and
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effective engagement in decisions to close existing and design
replacement schools, parents and students see the closures as theft of their
social capital, destroying institutions that for decades have been the
neighborhoods’ “only [source of] stability,” jobs, and even their
names.383 No wonder, then, that affected communities often perceive
decisions to close schools as new manifestations of neglect and racism.384
Ironically, by excluding the reforms’ intended beneficiaries from their
design and implementation, while leaving the special-interest politics the
reforms aimed to sideline as the only political game in town, reformers
have driven their most likely allies into their opponents’ embrace.
Although fueled by the anger of largely unorganized families and
students, the resulting protests have typically taken classically interestgroup forms and been effectively exploited by established special
interests.
These responses to the reforms’ calculated political neglect have put
the entire reform enterprise at risk, driving reform mayors, district
superintendents, and state education commissioners out of office and
triggering the defeat of reform referenda in California, Connecticut,
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, New Jersey, Los Angeles, New York City, and
Washington, D.C., among others.385 Even concerted efforts to soft-pedal
students, and, finally, a vote to close all nineteen schools discussed); Anna Phillips, Hundreds
Turn out to Protest Plans to Close Jamaica High School, CHALKBEAT (Dec. 17, 2009),
http://ny.chalkbeat.org/2009/12/17/hundreds-turn-out-to-protest-plans-to-close-jamaica-highschool (“Hundreds of angry students, parents, and teachers packed Jamaica’s auditorium last night
to protest the Department of Education’s plan to close the school.”); Claudio Sanchez, Layoffs at
Ailing D.C. Schools Spark Union Outrage, NPR (Oct. 16, 2009, 12:12 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113791976 (“At last week’s rally, lots of
students and parents showed up to support teachers and their union . . . .”).
383. Lee, supra note 380.
384. See, e.g., Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah & John Byrne, Fewer Than 5 CPS Schools Expected
to Be Spared, CHI. TRIB. (May 21, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-21/news/ctmet-school-closing-march-0521-20130521_1_closings-list-schools-chief-barbara-byrd-bennettpresident-david-vitale (“[Chicago Teachers Union-led] demonstrators . . . circle[d] City Hall,
chanting ‘Hey Rahm, let’s face it, these closings are racist . . . .’”); Emma Brown, Activists Sue to
Stop D.C. School Closures, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/education/activists-file-lawsuit-to-stop-dc-school-closures/2013/03/29/3310ab5a-988a11e2-b68f-dc5c4b47e519_story.html (“Activists . . . filed a lawsuit . . . arguing that the closures
disproportionately affect poor, minority and disabled students.”); Jennifer Medina, N.Y. Senate
Renews Mayor’s Power to Run Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/08/07/nyregion/07control.html (“‘The elephant in the room: race and class,’ said Senator
Bill Perkins of Manhattan [discussing school closures].”).
385. See, e.g., Josh Eidelson, Michelle Rhee Revolution Faces Massive Threat—and New
Accusations, SALON (Nov. 4, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/11/04/how_
bipartisan_antics_could_save_the_next_michelle_rhee_from_humiliation (describing nationwide backlash against reforms); Scott Elliott, Here’s What Tony Bennett Thinks of His Critics,
CHALKBEAT (Apr. 4, 2014), http://in.chalkbeat.org/2014/04/04/heres-what-tony-bennett-thinks-
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reform initiatives, as in Denver, or to conciliate interest-group opponents,
as in New York State, have engendered turbulence that has put the
reforms at risk notwithstanding evidence that they are working.386
Worse even than the debilitating political opposition such political
neglect has engendered387 are harms the reforms have exacted on
themselves by shutting off pathways for community input. The reforms’
secret sauce is their ability to mobilize localized information revealing
the conditions for which strategies must account if they are to succeed.388
If the reforms ignore what parents and communities know, the sauce
becomes a thin, unsatisfactory gruel.
Nor have these problems been mitigated by a new crop of advocacy
groups the reforms have germinated, with names like Families for
Excellent Schools, Parent Revolution, Stand for Children, and
StudentsFirst.389 In the main, these groups either focus on mobilizing
families to interact more effectively with educators in support of their
own children (Henig’s Cell B),390 or rely on new forms of old interestof-his-critics (discussing resignation of Indiana’s reform-minded schools commissioner); Herbert,
supra note 379 (claiming black community responded to school reforms under Washington Mayor
Adrian Fenty and schools Chancellor Rhee “by voting overwhelmingly for Mr. Fenty’s opponent,
Vincent Gray,” who defeated Fenty); Iavesoli, supra note 2 (chronicling Los Angeles reform
superintendent John Deasy’s resignation following controversies over using “data through an
equity lens,” teacher evaluation, and restructuring of struggling schools); Linda Conner Lambeck
& Brian Lockhart, Vallas to Resign to Run for Illinois Lt. Gov., NEWSTIMES (Nov. 8, 2013,
10:33 PM), http://www.newstimes.com/local/article/Vallas-to-resign-to-run-for-Illinois-lt-gov4969174.php (discussing resignation of Bridgeport schools superintendent); Kathleen McGrory
& Jeffrey S. Solochek, Tony Bennett Resigns as Florida Education Commissioner, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013, 8:53 AM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/education/k12/floridaeducation-commissioner-tony-bennett-expected-to-resign-today/2134254; Mark Pazniokas,
Stefan Pryor to Leave Education Post After One Term, CT. MIRROR (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://ctmirror.org/2014/08/18/stefan-pryor-to-leave-education-post-after-one-term (attributing
resignation of Connecticut school commissioner to opposition to his reform policies); Diane
Ravitch, Luna Laws in Idaho Go Down to Stunning Defeat, DIANE RAVITCH’S BLOG (Nov. 7,
2012), http://dianeravitch.net/2012/11/07/luna-laws-go-down-to-defeat (describing referendum
defeat of teacher evaluation initiatives); Elaine Weiss, Voters Gave Corporate Education
“Reform” a Big Defeat on Election Day, MOYERS & CO. (Nov. 14, 2013), http://billmoyers.com/
2013/11/14/voters-gave-corporate-education-reform-a-big-defeat-on-election-day (describing
defeat of Bridgeport education reform referendum); Kate Zernike, Cami Anderson, Picked by
Christie, Is out as Newark Schools Superintendent, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/nyregion/newark-schools-superintendent-is-steppingdown.html.
386. See supra Section I.C.
387. Warner, supra note 20.
388. See supra Part III & Section IV.A.
389. Katie Ash, Newer Advocacy Groups Find Foot Soldiers in Parents, EDUC. WK. (Dec.
23, 2013), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2013/12/23/15parents.h33.html.
390. See Henig et al., supra note 90, at 5; see, e.g., Stand University for Parents, STAND FOR
CHILD., http://stand.org/national/action/stand-up/about (last visited Mar. 19, 2017) (discussing
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group politics to beat existing special interests at their own game (Henig’s
Cell D).391 StudentsFirst, Michelle Rhee’s creation after she left the D.C.
school system, is illustrative.392 Although StudentsFirst rejects the
interest-group label,393 it acts like one, having formed related section
501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), and 527 organizations and a political action
committee and spending millions of dollars—much of it from donors
known for their large contributions to presidential campaigns—to train
parents to lobby for favored reforms, bus parents to rallies, and fund
candidates in local and state elections.394
Among reform-oriented advocacy organizations, only Parent
Revolution and the “parent trigger” laws it works to enforce suggest a
new politics. First enacted in California in 2010 and in force in several
states, parent trigger laws allow parents who collect sufficient numbers
of signatures to force the restructuring or closure of low-performing
schools.395 In theory, therefore, the laws could give parents—and Parent
organization’s Stand UP program for guiding parents in forming relationships with schools,
understanding student data and grades, and helping children learn at home).
391. See, e.g., Ash, supra note 389 (describing Families for Excellent Schools’ recruitment
and training of parents to lobby for charter school expansion in New York and Connecticut);
Stephen Sawchuk, Relationship Between Advocacy Groups, Unions Uneasy, EDUC. WK. (May 21,
2012), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2012/05/23/32adv-union_ep.h31.html (describing
Stand for Children’s shift from advocacy for increased educational spending to using section
501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations, PACs, and “super PACs” in “aggressive entry into state
politics” on behalf of school reforms); see also supra notes 363–67 (discussing Henig’s categories
of education politics).
392. Joy Resmovits, Michelle Rhee’s Backers Include Obama Bundler Billionaire, Big
Romney Backer, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2012, 5:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/02/24/michelle-rhees-backers-in_n_1300146.html.
393. See Ash, supra note 389.
394. See id. (describing StudentsFirst lobbying efforts); Steven Mazie, StudentsFirst Gives
NY Ed Commissioner a Friendly Audience for Common Core Forum, WASH. POST: ANSWER
SHEET (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2013/12/11/
studentsfirst-gives-ny-ed-commissioner-a-friendly-audience-for-common-core-forum/
(describing “carefully scripted” StudentsFirstNY lobbying by parents and teachers bused in for
event); Resmovits, supra note 392; Stephen Sawchuk, StudentsFirst Raises $7.6 Million in 2010–
11, EDUC. WK. (June 25, 2012, 4:48 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/teacherbeat/2012/
06/studentsfirst_raises_76_millio.html (detailing StudentsFirst’s successful initial fundraising
and creation of affiliated organizations for educational, lobbying, and partisan political purposes);
DEP’T OF TREASURY IRS, STUDENTSFIRST RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX:
IRS FORM 990, at 1–2, http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/273/273659685/
273659685_201207_990O.pdf (reporting $3,289,994 in spending on electoral activity in 2011
and 2012).
395. Josh Cunningham, Parent Trigger Laws in the States, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/state-parent-trigger-laws.aspx
(summarizing parent-trigger laws, including California’s, which requires districts to implement
one of four turnaround models parents choose if 51 percent of them sign a petition demanding
change at a school defined as low-performing). For contrary views on parent trigger laws, compare
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Revolution has worked to help them secure—a potentially
experimentalist foothold in district decision-making on struggling
schools.396 Thus far, however, the laws have mainly triggered ruthless
pluralist politics. In Compton, California, for example, parents’ efforts,
with Parent Revolution support, to replace McKinley Elementary with a
charter school generated strife with the teachers’ union and a district
lawsuit that threw out the petition for lack of verification that the
signatories (in a community with many undocumented immigrants) were
parents.397 As a rule, therefore, the new reform-minded advocacy efforts
have aggravated, rather than replaced, special-interest politics.398
As these political setbacks and recriminations reveal, promising
reforms that are experimentalist from a governance perspective fall short
of democratic experimentalism from a political perspective. By
insulating governance from politics—separating stakeholders from
decision-makers and leaving no route for engagement except traditional
interest-group channels—reformers threaten the gains their governance
innovations have already achieved and might otherwise multiply in the
future. As the next Part develops, however, this bifurcation is not
inevitable.
V. A MORE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALIST REGIME FOR
PUBLIC EDUCATION
Thus far, this Article has described the damage that centralized
bureaucracies and pluralist politics inflict on U.S. public education;
shown that accepted alternatives to centralization—markets,
managerialism, and professionalism/craft—enhance local flexibility only
by sacrificing the actionable knowledge that bureaucracies can
sometimes crystallize and leave special-interest politics intact; praised
democratic experimentalism for using structured exercises of local
ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, PARENT TRIGGER: NO SILVER BULLET 1, 3, 6 (2012),
http://annenberginstitute.org/pdf/ParentTriggerPolicyBrief.pdf, with JOSEPH L. BAST ET AL.,
HEARTLAND INST., THE PARENT TRIGGER: A MODEL FOR TRANSFORMING EDUCATION 1–2, 5, 13
(2010), http://heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland_migration/files/pdfs/28202.pdf.
396. See BAST ET AL., supra note 395, at 1–2.
397. See David Feith, Triggering School Reform—and Union Dirty Tricks, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
24, 2012, 7:41 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020391830457724
3054128401994; Jim Newton, Compton Parents Trigger Reform, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/15/opinion/la-oe-0215-newton-20110215; Julie Woestehoff,
Update on Parent Trigger, PARENTS ACROSS AM. (May 18, 2013), http://parentsacrossamerica.
org/update-parent-trigger/.
398. See Errol Louis, A Teachable Moment for Reform, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 23, 2010,
4:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/teachable-moment-reform-charter-schoolsupporters-learn-setback-polls-article-1.442989 (urging education-reform groups to jettison
counterproductive confrontation and “rethink how, when and why they make the case for change
to parents, the public and the press”); Sawchuk, supra note 391 (noting increased friction with
unions generated by new reform-oriented advocacy groups).
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flexibility to generate more actionable knowledge than bureaucracy,
while unleashing new forms of democratic politics that broadly engage
stakeholders and harness their knowledge in local experimentation; and
criticized recent public education reforms for limiting their otherwise
promising experimentalism to a technocratic and self-defeating version
that pretends to have no politics at all. After acknowledging the
difficulties that stakeholder engagement presents in the context of public
education, this Part uses contemporary examples to show what a more
democratic version of experimentalist education reforms can look like.
A. The Challenge of Stakeholder Engagement in Public Education
Implementing new politics in education presents challenges absent
from other domains. Compared to other contexts, there are more
stakeholders who are harder to reach and less prepared to engage.
Many examples of well-functioning DE involve a limited and easily
identifiable public predisposed to engage in problem-solving. In drug
courts, for example, judges, lawyers, and treatment providers participate
as part of their jobs, and defendants have a strong incentive to seek
treatment instead of incarceration.399 The economic, residential,
recreational, and values-based interests at stake in environmental
protection create similar motivations rooted in participants’ immediate
quality of life.400 Even in community policing, where strategies affect
entire neighborhoods and not every potentially important participant is
strongly and naturally drawn into the problem-solving “situation,” the
neighborhood in question limits the range of participants whom the
experimentalist agency might try to engage, and assures that the few
people who participate are decent proxies for the many who don’t.401
Drawing stakeholders into problem-solving in Kí12 education is not
as straightforward, in part because the range of stakeholders is much
broader, including students, parents, teachers, administrators, district
personnel, community residents, taxpayers, and the wider public, all with
different interests.402 In addition, many stakeholders are disillusioned by
years of broken promises and top-heavy reforms. Parents are, of course,
especially important potential problem-solvers, yet given their singleminded concern for their own child’s sui generis needs, those who
participate may not be close proxies for those who demur. And unlike
participants in the drug-court, environmental, and community-policing
contexts, parents—perhaps especially those whose children are most in
need—may not be sufficiently well-informed about what is at stake for
them in the problem-solving process to motivate their participation. As
399.
400.
401.
402.

See supra Subsection III.C.2.
See supra Subsection III.C.3.
See supra Subsection III.C.4.
See BAST ET AL., supra note 395, at 2–3.
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teachers and other school employees are more capable of representing
each other and more motivated to participate, the result is structural
inequities in how effectively problem-solving addresses their needs
compared to those of families.
Capacity—time, resources, and skills—is also necessary for effective
participation in the steps that experimentalist problem-solving entails,
including problem and solution identification and prioritization, causal
analysis, performance measurement, meeting facilitation, and various
forms of verbal interaction and deliberation. Many education
stakeholders—again, especially parents—may initially lack the necessary
capacity and time to develop these skills.403 Here, too, structural
inequities arise—as when middle-class parents come to dominate
traditional channels for participating in schools, like the PTA.404
For these and other reasons, the education context has few existing
models of authentic structures through which stakeholders can
meaningfully engage in governance. Far more common, including among
education reformers, are check-the-box exercises in informing
constituents of decisions already made.405 For example, the legally
mandated steps New York City education officials took to engage
communities before closing their schools struck most stakeholders as
hollow—obligatory gripe sessions after which officials proceeded as they
had always intended.406 As a recent study of community engagement in a
sampling of schools districts nationwide concluded, school “[d]istrict
leaders . . . embrace the term ‘public engagement’ [but] most define it as
advancing . . . their own agendas, and their experiences with it . . . are
often negative.” 407
Finally, the resources required to revamp external relations through
expanded and enriched participation are in especially short supply in
school systems simultaneously transitioning to experimentalist internal
governance. It is daunting enough to make the changes in organization,
operations, and mindset needed to replace bureaucratic and craft cultures
with team-based inquiry, measurement, facilitation, and multi-directional
information flows. Extending parallel changes to tens or hundreds of
thousands of families in myriad neighborhoods significantly increases the
403. See Minow, supra note 277, at 336: Ash, supra note 389.
404. See Debra Monroe, When Elite Parents Dominate Volunteers, Children Lose, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/a-balancedschool-needs-a-balance-of-volunteers.
405. See FARKAS & DUFFETT, supra note 32, at 8; NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, WHO
INFLUENCES DECISIONMAKING ABOUT SCHOOL CURRICULUM: WHAT DO PRINCIPALS SAY? (1995),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs95/95780.pdf (suggesting principals perceive themselves and teachers as
having the most decision-making power, with little power in parents).
406. See supra notes 376–84 and accompanying text.
407. FARKAS & DUFFETT, supra note 32, at 8.
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trouble the switch to democratic experimentalism entails.408
B. Authentic Experimentalist Engagement in Public Education
Although imposing, the obstacles to a more democratic
experimentalism in public education are not insurmountable. At each
governance layer, school systems can effectively enable stakeholders—
in proportion to their desire, capacity, and time—to put their information,
ideas, and criticism to work to improve schools and student results.
Recognizing that there is no one model of new politics suited to each
constituency, school, or district, this Section assembles an illustrative
sampling of structures districts and schools can create to promote
authentic, independent, broadly participatory problem-solving.
To succeed, the new politics must be authentic. They must give
educators, parents, and others real responsibility and authority to solve
problems that directly affect them. And they must provide schools and
districts with effective ways to use stakeholders’ knowledge about their
own, their children’s, and their neighbors’ conditions and experiences to
improve student results. The new politics entails a social contract.
Stakeholders, both external (e.g., parents) and internal (e.g., teachers),
agree to participate meaningfully in reforms, implement collective
decisions and success metrics with fidelity to common goals, and provide
honest feedback about how well or poorly strategies and metrics work to
resolve unsatisfactory learning conditions and outcomes. In exchange,
school officials must give stakeholders meaningful ways to define and
solve problems commensurate with their desire and ability to participate;
to enhance those abilities; to criticize and trigger changes in plans,
implementation, results, measures of success, and objectives; and to learn
about changes made or why they weren’t made. Adherence to this social
contract creates an ethical situation in which a common commitment to
solving agreed-upon problems—and to measuring actions and results and
being accountable for adjusting actions and objectives based on
demonstrated success—neutralizes otherwise confounding differences in
interests, values, and beliefs.409
The remainder of this Part describes structures districts and schools
can create—and that some are already using—to achieve more

408. Consider the New York City system’s more than 1 million children speaking over 180
different languages, 850,000 families, 1700 schools, 90,000 instructional staff, and 135,000
employees. Language Access Plan, N.Y.C. DEP’T EDUC., http://schools.nyc.gov/RulesPolicies/
languagepolicy.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2017); Statistical Summaries, N.Y.C. DEP’T EDUC.,
http://schools.nyc.gov/AboutUs/schools/data/stats/default.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
409. See supra Section III.A.
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participatory politics.410 Throughout, the analysis acknowledges, and
suggests how to take the many incremental steps required before many
stakeholders can participate meaningfully in and trust the process.
1. Educators
As is described above, recent education reforms often call upon
principals, teachers, and support staff to use inquiry and other forms of
planning, measurement, and adjustment to resolve difficulties students
and teachers encounter in the classroom.411 Friction remains,412 however,
particularly as a result of high-stakes teacher evaluation and other
managerialist influences that have crept into the reforms, and because
districts and schools have not built sufficient time into educators’
schedules to enable them to engage in meaningful problem-solving
without neglecting other responsibilities. Appropriately allocating time
and other resources and giving educators agency to use the new structures
to further their own professional development and advancement are
crucial to effective engagement, as the examples below demonstrate.
In the award-winning Aldine Independent School District near
Houston, Texas, district leaders began reforms by inviting teachers to
develop the grade-by-grade standards to which they would teach, as well
as the curriculum and the scope and sequence of lessons the district would
use to meet the standards.413 Although the process took several years, the
district recognized “the importance of teachers’ involvement in the
curriculum-development process because ‘they will be the ones to use it
every day.’”414 The district asks each school to develop goals for
students’ mastery of the standards and plans for meeting the goals.415
Recognizing that even well-designed curricula and plans will not work
for every student, the district authorizes teams of educators to revise both
410. Supplementing this Article’s focus on how districts and schools can engage teacher and
external stakeholders is a recent report describing how state education departments and districts
may “leverage local learning” in schools. Betheny Gross, What Works? Evidence-Based
Policymaking Under ESSA, SEA FUTURE, Nov. 2016, at 25, 32–33.
411. See supra notes 92, 139–40 and accompanying text.
412. See FARKAS & DUFFETT, supra note 32, at 6 (“School leaders, teachers, and other
educators frequently see themselves—and public schooling more generally—as besieged and
repeatedly second-guessed. . . . Th[is] dynamic colors educators’ responses to innovations and
calls for reform, and it undermines relationships within and outside the schools that are needed to
advance progress.”); Allie Bidwell, Most Teachers Are Not Engaged in Their Jobs, Gallup Finds,
U.S. NEWS (Apr. 9, 2014, 3:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/04/09/mostteachers-are-not-engaged-in-their-jobs-gallup-finds (“[Teachers] don’t believe their opinions
count.”).
413. ZAVADSKY, supra note 212, at 15, 28.
414. Id. at 29–30.
415. Id. at 28.
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as warranted by student needs.416 It supports the process by building time
into daily schedules for regular collaboration among teachers,417 inviting
schools to target professional development to problem areas,418 and
looking for patterns of centrally solvable problems. “When weaknesses
are found, . . . initiatives and interventions are selected through a systemic
‘root cause analysis.’ Stakeholders from all levels of the system are
involved in this process and work together by backward mapping through
the data to pinpoint deficiencies.”419 To retain and build talent and
capacity among its educators, the district uses mentorship programs and
hires and promotes teachers and principals from within the district.420
In 2009, with the Metro Nashville Public Schools (MNPS) on the
brink of takeover by the State of Tennessee, newly appointed schools
director Jesse Register developed Principal Leadership Institutes (PLIs)
to enable school leaders to learn from one another while creating a
common culture of excellence.421 By the second year, MNPS principals
themselves led most of the PLI groups.422 The PLIs formalized training
on how to improve teacher practices and retain those that performed
well423 and emphasized principals’ and teachers’ effective use of data to
identify weaknesses and drive improved instruction.424 Reinforcing the
latter impulse, the district hired instructional coaches to assist teachers in
understanding and using the data.425 After principals returned to their
schools, they continued to rely on the PLIs for collaborative learning and
to develop support networks among peers.426 In 2012, the district used
the findings of the prior PLIs to develop a five-year strategic plan
empowering principals and giving them clearer direction on how to use
their new skills to achieve positive student outcomes.427 Together with an
allied initiative extending collaborative problem-solving to families
through engagement in schools with social services organizations, PLIs
416. Id. at 28–29.
417. Id. at 35.
418. Id. at 36 (“Schools create their own professional development plans based on their
student performance and classroom walkthrough data.”).
419. Id. at 45.
420. Id. at 33.
421. ALETHEA FRAZIER RAYNOR ET AL., ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM AT BROWN
UNIV., LEADING BY EXAMPLE: PRINCIPAL LEADERSHIP INSTITUTES AS A DRIVER FOR CHANGE IN
METRO NASHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1–2 (2015), http://www.annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/
files/product/824/files/Nashville_Report_final.pdf.
422. Id. at 3.
423. Id. at 15.
424. Id. at 18.
425. Id. at 19.
426. Id. at 12–13.
427. Id. at 10.
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have been linked to rising student enrollment and graduation rates.428
Facilitators connecting the central administration with schools and
schools with one another can play a key role in the new governance and
political processes. An example is the corps of Senior Achievement
Facilitators (SAFs) New York City used to introduce educators to an
array of novel experimentalist tools.429 Former hierarchical supervisors
retrained as “heterarchical” facilitators,430 SAFs served as an outside
“push,” encouraging and training educators to use a new data system,
diagnostic assessments, and various data reports, and, crucially, as a
“sounding board” for reporting and validating school-level criticisms of
the tools back to the center.431 By promoting the new tools to field staff
while demanding needed changes from the center on their behalf, then
conveying the changes back to the field and showing that the center was
listening, SAFs enforced both sides of the DE social contract.432 SAFs
also provided educators with an important resource, linking them to
research and effective practices and reducing the strain the reforms placed
on their time.433
These examples include the following characteristics to varying
degrees: (1) meaningfully engaging educators in district, school, and
classroom decision-making; (2) educating educators, with a focus on
data-driven improvement of instruction and learning; and (3) providing
the time and support educators need to effectively implement reforms.
Acknowledging the importance of educator input while investing
educators with the responsibility and support they need to confront and
enhance transparent results fosters “internal” accountability and
motivates, empowers, and enables educators to think critically about how
428. MNPS,
HIGH SCH.
STUDENT
PERFORMANCE
TRENDS
4–5
(2015),
http://www.ncacinc.com/sites/default/files/media/documents/MNPS_High_School_Performance
_2015.pdf; MNPS, THE JOURNEY TO CREATING EXCELLENCE FOR EVERY STUDENT 1, 6, 10, 12
(2015), https://mnpschildrenfirst.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/metro-schools-journey-web.pdf;
RAYNOR, ET AL., ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, MNPS ACHIEVES YEAR 3 EVALUATION:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 1 (2012), http://www.annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/files/Nashville
Evaluation_Year3.pdf.
429. Joan E. Talbert, Collaborative Inquiry to Expand Student Success in New York City
Schools, in EDUCATION REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 90, at 131, 135.
430. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
431. Talbert, supra note 429, at 149 (“The process was so frustrating at times that I think if
there wasn’t an outsider pushing you, we just would have said: ‘No. It’s not working.’ . . . Just
having an outsider to keep pushing you and still be there was critical.” (quoting a teacher));
MARIAN A. ROBINSON ET AL., CONSORTIUM FOR POL’Y RESEARCH IN EDUC., A FORMATIVE STUDY
OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INQUIRY TEAM PROCESS IN NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
2007–08 FINDINGS 58 (2008), http://www.cpre.org/sites/default/files/researchreport/1030_
cfiresearchreport2008.pdf.
432. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
433. See Talbert, supra note 429, at 135, 137.
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best to improve outcomes.434 Learning to conduct and facilitate these
inquiries, however, requires educators to step out of their traditional role
as educators of children and into roles as educators of one another and
themselves.
2. Parents
As with educators, effective engagement with parents and their
communities requires that they have (1) an ongoing role in decisionmaking; (2) the information, opportunities consistent with other demands
on their time, problem-solving structures, and capacity or training needed
to do so; and (3) an assurance that their input is valued and will influence
the outcome or elicit an explanation of why it did not.435 Meeting these
goals is more difficult with parents and community members than with
educators, however, because the former are not trained, selected, and paid
to be present to problem-solve436 and are not obliged—and may not be
disposed—to address considerations reaching beyond their own
children.437
Incorporating parents thus requires officials—or, better yet,
Community Based Organizations (CBOs) playing a mediating role and
limiting opportunities for co-optation438—to meet parents where they are.
Officials and CBOs must provide multiple entry points geared initially to
parents’ concerns about their own children, schools, and neighborhoods;
ways of participating consistent with a range of capacity levels and time
commitments; disaggregation of complex problems into smaller projects
and steps; and “quick wins” that expand capacity, trust, confidence, and
disposition to devote available time to incrementally broadening
categories of issues and considerations.439 Manifestly, these steps require
massive, if gradual, shifts in officials’, educators’, CBOs’, and
stakeholders’ expectations, routines, and mindsets. These changes will
434. See GRANTMAKERS FOR EDUC., A TOOLKIT FOR TEACHER ENGAGEMENT 7,
https://www.edfunders.org/sites/default/files/GFEToolkit_FNL.pdf; supra note 92 (discussing
internal accountability).
435. See, e.g., EDUC. TRUST-WEST, BUILDING A MORE EQUITABLE AND PARTICIPATORY
SCHOOL SYSTEM IN CALIFORNIA: THE LOCAL CONTROL FUNDING FORMULA’S FIRST YEAR
26 (2014), http://west.edtrust.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/02/ETW-Building-a-MoreEquitable-and-Participatory-School-System-in-California-Report_0.pdf (“Districts that are
embracing the idea of participatory planning are engaging stakeholders throughout the year and
are building the capacity of [team] members to serve as leaders, community ambassadors, and
true partners.”).
436. See ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, FAMILY ENGAGEMENT AND EDUCATION 5–12
(2014) (discussing parent-engagement challenges in Pittsburgh Public Schools).
437. See supra Section V.A.
438. See infra Subsection V.B.3.
439. See, e.g., ANSELL, supra note 22, at 86; infra Subsection V.B.3.
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not occur automatically. As illustrated by the drug-court and Traxtonpolicing examples, they require thoughtful structures, protocols, and
facilitation that widen participation and perspectives and are easily
customized to context and adjusted in response to feedback and results.440
Without asking parents to transcend immediate concerns, schools can
create opportunities for them to collaborate with educators to accelerate
the learning of their own and other children, jointly track progress, and
adjust actions in accordance with transparently shared information.
Illustrating what is possible are Academic Parent Teacher Teams
(APTT), first developed in 2010 to replace traditional parent-teacher
conferences with periodic meetings at which teachers coach all parents in
their classroom on how to interpret their child’s performance by
comparison to “overall classroom performance, school benchmarks, and
state standards”; work with parents to “set goals for their students,
individually and as a class”; and develop “strategies and tools to support
learning at home.”441 The teacher and parents of each child agree on a
sixty-day improvement goal for the child and meet one on one after sixty
days to review progress, identify improvement areas and strategies, and
set new goals.442 As a group, parents identify strategies that have been
working at home, both to inform classroom instruction and spread
knowledge to one another.443 Steps are taken to assure broad parent
accessibility through translation of materials, transportation, childcare,
and distance participation via FaceTime or Skype.444
APTTs require only modest commitments and slowly build parents’
capacity to participate and partner with teachers and other parents in
improving the education of their own and other children. They also sow
seeds for greater parental engagement, including parent participation on
inquiry teams, which use close analysis of children struggling to learn or
educators struggling to teach particular skills to signal a need for and
identify targeted classroom-, school-, and district-wide changes in
learning conditions and instructional practice.445
440. See supra Subsections III.C.2, III.C.4, & IV.B.1.
441. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., AN INNOVATIVE MODEL FOR PARENT-TEACHER PARTNERSHIPS
(2010), https://www.ed.gov/sites/default/files/School%20Turnaround%20Newsletter%20-%20
December%202010.pdf; see Sarah D. Sparks, Parent-Teacher Conferences Get a Makeover,
ED. WEEK (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/09/30/parent-teacherconferences-get-a-makeover.html.
442. Empowering Families to Improve Student Learning, WESTED (Dec. 29, 2015),
https://www.wested.org/rd_alert_online/empowering-families-to-improve-student-learning.
443. See APTT, Stanton APTT Workshop, YOUTUBE (July 16, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1YNsWrFiYfY.
444. See, e.g., EDUC. TRUST-WEST, supra note 435, at 10.
445. See Data for Decisions: Frequently Asked Questions, WESTED, http://datafordecisions.
wested.org/data-use-basics/frequently-asked-questions (last visited May 20, 2017) (advocating
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Engagement strategies like APTT and collaborative inquiry that
gradually move parents’ focus beyond their own child’s instruction
infinitely expand the range of issues within reach of parent problemsolving. For example, parent working groups might assemble to address
small day-to-day problems at schools; create engagement tools and
strategies for district-wide use; offer advice and misgivings at each stage
of the goal-identification, design, piloting, and implementation of all
major district-wide initiatives; or develop plans for saving and models for
replacing failing schools. Of course, the further afield these initiatives go,
the greater the accessibility and capacity hurdles they face. Examples of
initiatives of just these sorts reveal, however, that the hurdles are not
insurmountable.
Efforts in 1995–2003 by parents and community organizers at the
McClure School in Philadelphia’s low-income, mostly minority Hunting
Park neighborhood exemplify what school-level parent problem-solving
can accomplish.446 McClure parents initially joined with community
organizers and school personnel to improve school security.447 Becoming
more adept at problem-solving, parents turned their attention to literacy,
winning the school’s agreement to assess students to determine their
reading levels.448 When scores well below grade level called into question
the high grades students were receiving in class, parents pressed for an
explanation.449 The principal reacted by withdrawing permission for the
group to meet at the school.450 Complaints to the district led to the
principal’s ouster and a chance to help select a new school leader
committed to focusing intensely on reading.451 In subsequent years, the
parents rebuilt trust with teachers by collaborating to refurbish the
school’s library and hire a librarian—again with strong parent
involvement—eventually convincing over 75 percent of the school staff
to invoke a waiver provision in the district’s collective-bargaining
parent involvement in “data-driven decision making processes” to enhance parents’ capacity to
help improve schools); supra notes 92, 139–40 and accompanying text (discussing inquiry teams).
Although “[n]arrow interpretations of the [Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g] have led many schools to restrict . . . information sharing” with parents, the APTT model
of sharing student-level data only with each child’s parents, data anonymization, and parental
consent can overcome these obstacles. TUCKER, supra note 138, at 10, 12; see U.S. DEPT. OF
EDUC., PRIVACY TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., DATA DE-IDENTIFICATION: AN OVERVIEW OF BASIC
TERMS (2013), http://ptac.ed.gov/sites/default/files/data_deidentification_ terms.pdf (listing ways
to share school data and protect privacy).
446. Gordon Whitman, Making Accountability Work, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
361, 361 (2003).
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
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agreement allowing a joint committee of administrators, teachers, and
parents to select all new teachers.452 Following these changes, the
percentage of students reading at grade level increased from 29 percent
to 53 percent.453
A district-level example arose from a miscalculation the New York
City Department of Education (DOE) made in designing its first set of
student, parent, and teacher surveys for rating schools.454 The 2007
inaugural version of the survey excluded fifty-plus “District 75” schools
for severely disabled students, because most questions did not apply.455
Facing parents upset by the snub, the DOE invited them, with central
support, to design the District 75 survey themselves. Without committing
to adopting their draft wholesale, DOE promised to explain any changes
it made to the parents’ proposal. To build capacity and facilitate without
steering or micro-managing, the DOE hosted the meetings, supplied data
and exemplars used in developing the surveys for other schools, and,
when asked but not otherwise, advised on draft language. In the end, the
DOE adopted well over 90 percent of the parents’ draft. The resulting
survey is used to this day.456
Kaya Henderson, Michelle Rhee’s successor as D.C. schools
chancellor, turned to experimentalist community problem-solving to
address an even more vexing issue: school closures. Instead of listing
schools the district planned to shutter and engaging in pro forma exercises
to enable opponents to make objections officials had already predicted
and rejected—the typical procedure—Henderson announced only “a
proposal, a pliable draft” to close schools, then invited affected teachers,
parents, students, and community members to develop concrete plans for
alleviating the poor performance and declining enrollment that landed
452. Id. at 361–62.
453. Id. at 362. McClure has not entirely sustained its momentum. See COMMONWEALTH OF
PA., 2015–2016 SCHOOL PROGRESS REPORT: ALEXANDER K. MCCLURE SCHOOL,
https://webapps1.philasd.org/downloads/school_profile/spr_reports/SY1516/7380_ES_SPR_SY
1516.pdf (reporting that only 39 percent of K-2 students were reading at grade level in the 2015–
2016 school year).
454. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC. supra note 81 (citing survey results).
455. Erin Einhorn, Disabled in Survey Snub, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 15, 2007, 4:00 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/disabled-survey-snub-article-1.251904. The lead author of
this Article managed this project in his capacity as head of the New York City Department of
Education’s Division of Accountability and Achievement Resources. The discussion here reflects
his observations of the process.
456. See NYC School Survey District 75, N.Y.C. DEP’T EDUC., http://text.nycenet.edu/
Accountability/tools/survey/district75.htm (last visited May 20, 2017) (“[T]he [District 75
survey] specifically addresses the unique experience in District 75 schools for all constituents.”);
N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., CITYWIDE QUESTION-BY-QUESTION SURVEY RESULTS FOR DISTRICT 75
SCHOOLS (2013), http://schools.nyc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/BC50BC6B-A873-4951-BF90-7B266D
0A7E12/0/2013SchoolSurveyCitywideResultsforDistrict75Schools.pdf.
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their school on the list.457 Making clear that plans would be evaluated on
the strength of their turnaround mechanisms, not the emotion with which
they were presented, Henderson urged communities to put skin in the
game, describing meaningful resources and actions they would contribute
alongside ones they needed the district to offer.458 Based on proposals
submitted, Henderson spared five of the twenty schools on the closure list
in the first run of the new process.459 The fact, however, that most of the
successful proposals came from middle-class, not poorer, communities
suggests that something more than the opportunity to engage is needed to
allow all communities to participate meaningfully.
To be sure, even effective outreach, training, and facilitation will not
entirely immunize collaborative problem-solving from all disparities in
power and access. But mitigating the egregious disparities that currently
exist—not magnifying them, as limited stakeholder engagement typically
does today460—is a vast improvement, which commitment and
perseverance by school leaders can accelerate.461 So can support from
CBOs, as the next Section elaborates.
3. Supportive Organizations
To help schools and districts build the capacity, provide the resources,
and safeguard the stakeholder autonomy that effective DE requires, CBO
facilitation and mediation may be essential. Having already built trust and
lines of communication with families and other stakeholders, assessed
their needs and capacities, and learned how to help them access services
and hold providers accountable, CBOs are often best placed to engage
public education stakeholders in appropriate types and levels of
engagement. Additionally, CBOs can provide the skilled facilitation
needed to coax participants into ethical situations in which they work
together to identify and address the most pressing problems facing the
entire community, assist stakeholders in interpreting and acting on data
acquired through the experimentalist process, and serve as a repository of
457. Emma Brown, D.C. Parents Develop Alternatives to Chancellor’s School-Closure
Plan, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/dc-parentsdevelop-alternatives-to-chancellors-school-closure-plan/2013/01/01/3e58f9e4-4b92-11e2-b709667035ff9029_story.html.
458. Id.; see, e.g., D.C. PUB. SCH., GARRISON ELEMENTARY—A COMMUNITY COMMITMENT:
FIVE-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN PROPOSAL (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.scribd.com/doc/117605412/
Garrison-Elementary-Chancellor-Presentation-Final.
459. Brown, supra note 457.
460. See supra Section I.B & Subsection IV.B.2.
461. See ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, CAPTURING THE RIPPLE EFFECT: DEVELOPING
A THEORY OF CHANGE FOR EVALUATING PARENT LEADERSHIP INITIATIVES 1, 8 (2016),
http://www.annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/files/product/893/files/capturingtherippleeffectre
portweb.pdf .
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past experience to inform new cases even as other participants move or
age out of the relevant community. CBOs also may be better equipped
than school officials for the difficult task of intimately guiding
stakeholders while letting them make key decisions and do real work,
though they, too, may be become excessively hands-on, coopting the
reforms and disenfranchising stakeholders.
Excel Bridgeport, a school-reform CBO in Bridgeport, Connecticut,
is an example of an organization that builds families’ capacity to use
collaborative problem-solving to improve schools.462 Illustrating the
organization’s approach is its sponsorship of a “problem-solving parent
group” (PSG) that undertook to rewrite the Bridgeport School District’s
previously pro forma Parent Engagement Policy, then convinced the
school board to adopt its redraft.463 The group’s decision to rewrite the
policy, and the process it followed in doing so, were themselves
experimentalist and democratic. When Excel Bridgeport teamed up with
Columbia University’s Center for Public Research and Leadership
(CPRL) to support the parent group, they assumed the group would
address a contained issue such as unkempt conditions at a single
school.464 From the outset, however, Excel Bridgeport and CPRL made
parent control the guiding principle and supported the PSG with protocols
that let it decide the problem to tackle and guided it beyond complaining
about the problem to working with the community and officials to solve
it.465
The problem-solving tools CPRL’s team developed on demand by the
PSG tell the story of the group’s work: Group Norms; Meeting Structure
Guidelines; Decision-Making Options (the team chose consensus over
majority rule); Sentence Starters for Group Discussion and Feedback;
Survey Distribution Options (for collecting community views on priority
problems); Problem-Selection Rubric; The 5-Whys: Finding the Cause of
the Problem; Brainstorming Solutions; Best Practices Research; Solution
Selection Assignment; Strategy Evaluation Worksheet; Performance
462. About, EXCEL BRIDGEPORT, https://excelbridgeport.wordpress.com/about (last visited
Feb. 11, 2017); Parent-Driven Reform: Bridgeport Parents Make History!, EXCEL BRIDGEPORT
(Aug. 10, 2012), https://excelbridgeport.wordpress.com/2012/08/10/parent-driven-schoolreform-bridgeport-parents-make-history (“The ‘problem solving’ approach to community
engagement empowers parents to tackle the challenges in their schools head-on and work toward
productive solutions. Through this model, parents (as active participants in school improvement)
have the potential to transform an entire school district.”).
463. Michele Molnar, Parents Take Lead in District’s Engagement Policy, EDUC. WK.
(Aug. 14, 2012, 2:41 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/parentsandthepublic/2012/08/the_
bridgeport_conn_board_of.html.
464. Telephone Interview with Maria Zambrano, Executive Director, Excel Bridgeport
(Nov. 12, 2013). The lead author of this Article is CPRL’s founding director.
465. Id.
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Indicator Worksheet (for developing success measures the group
thereafter tracked); PSG Reflective Guide (for analyzing success to date
and how to improve); After Action Review; and Presentation Tips. These
tools (since collected in a manual for subsequent PSGs)466 kept the focus
on attainable goals and encouraged team members to assess actions on an
agreed-upon objective basis—whether they demonstrably helped solve
the problem at hand—thus defusing ideological and other differences.467
As in the Traxton community-policing example,468 there were initially
capacity imbalances; only some parents had participated in civic action
before. Unlike in Traxton’s early stages, however, PSG participants from
the outset used structures to collect and prioritize district-wide problems,
assuring that less experienced parents were not drowned out.469 The team
member the others chose to facilitate was essential, doing a “remarkable
job” of bringing everyone into the conversation.470
Not everything went smoothly.471 Established parent groups known as
Parent Action Councils (PACs) worried that any success the PSG had in
changing the Parent Engagement Policy might reflect poorly on them,
and those PACs, together with school board members and central
officials loath to offend the PACs, initially resisted the PSG process.472
Union representatives resisted some engagement proposals as adding
work for teachers without compensation.473 Resolving to join not fight,
the PSG added PAC members to the team and gave more than thirty
presentations to individual PACs.474 Following eight months of
466. COLUMBIA UNIV. CTR. FOR PUB. RESEARCH & LEADERSHIP, PARENT PROBLEM-SOLVING
GROUPS: A NEW APPROACH TO PARENT ENGAGEMENT AND APPENDIX (2013) (on file with author).
467. Id. at app. I; see ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, supra note 461, at 3.
468. See supra Subsection III.C.4.
469. Interview with Maria Zambrano, supra note 464; see supra Subsection III.C.4
(discussing Traxton); see also CHRISTINE CAMPBELL, CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., ROOTS
OF ENGAGEMENT IN BATON ROUGE: HOW COMMUNITY IS SHAPING THE GROWTH OF NEW SCHOOL
OPTIONS 7 (2016), http://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/crpe-roots-of-engagement-4-2016.pdf
(“[T]o engage our community to become active in the well-being of students, change must come
from within . . . [, and] informed community demand is necessary to build long-term change in
urban education.” (emphasis added)).
470. Telephone Interview with Ayeola Kinlaw, Engagement Manager, Ctr. for Pub.
Research & Leadership (Oct. 18, 2013).
471. Molnar, supra note 463 (reporting one member’s surprise “at how much the parents in
the problem-solving group needed to advocate for the proposed parent engagement policy—
sometimes experiencing negativity from groups even when they had not read it”).
472. Interview with Ayeola Kinlaw, supra note 470.
473. Id.
474. See Bridgeport Parents Are Critical Partners in School Improvement, CT POST (June
7, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.ctpost.com/news/article/Bridgeport-parents-are-criticalpartners-in-3616550.php (describing “collaboration” between Excel Bridgeport and PACs);
Molnar, supra note 463.
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intensifying work, the PSG secured the school board’s unanimous
adoption of a policy calling for a more welcoming school environment;
better parent access to schools, teachers, and administrators; clearer
expectations; increased communication; and resources to build parents’
skills and knowledge to better help their children.475
There are other ways CBOs can facilitate experimentalist politics by
leveraging the expertise of disparate actors with a stake in change. Efforts
to create better schools provide two examples. In the decade ending in
2013, New York City closed numerous large high schools with
shockingly low graduation rates, replacing them with smaller schools that
eventually graduated many more of their students.476 To create new
schools, city officials developed a rigorous planning and approval process
and encouraged CBOs with experience improving schools to develop
new-school proposals meeting requirements for “strong and capable
school leadership, high-quality teaching across disciplines,
accountability for all students, an academically strong
curriculum, . . . parent and community engagement, and student
voice.”477 CBOs collaborated with union representatives, community
groups, and service providers to integrate “high-quality curricula, and
instruction and community resources into an extended school day.”478
The intense backlash the district later encountered when it expanded
school closures, including elementary and middle schools, and relied
more heavily on charter schools unengaged in local communities
suggests the importance of CBO participation in school closures and

475. BRIDGEPORT BD. OF EDUC., POLICY STATEMENT: PARENT & FAMILY ENGAGEMENT IN THE
BRIDGEPORT PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2012), http://bridgeport.ct.schoolwebpages.com/education/
components/scrapbook/default.php?sectiondetailid=67568&; see Molnar, supra note 463. When
last interviewed, Excel Bridgeport’s executive director was working to assemble more PSGs to
work with individual schools but noted challenges: Participation is labor intensive, disfavoring
single-parent families. Without strong facilitation, parental action tends to move away from
problem-solving toward traditional interest-group advocacy. See, e.g., Amy J. Cohen,
Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503,
547 (2008) (“[D]iscursive practices such as communication, problem solving, and collaboration
[may be] recast into skills [that] become conditions for securing interests, entitlements, and
benefits.”). The work required of CBOs to prepare parents for the work needed to engage in local
problem-solving and scale it to the district level is also demanding. See Interview with Ayeola
Kinlaw, supra note 470; Interview with Maria Zambrano, supra note 464; see also Lambeck &
Lockhart, supra note 385; Weiss, supra note 385.
476. See UNTERMAN, supra note 146, at 3–4.
477. Michele Cahill & Robert L. Hughes, Small Schools, Big Difference, EDUC. WK. (Sept.
27, 2010), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/09/29/05cahill.h30.html.
478. Id.
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creation as a way to enhance, not diminish, parent engagement and social
capital.479
Tennessee’s Achievement School District (ASD) takes over failing
Tennessee schools and restructures them, restarts them as charter schools,
or closes them outright.480 To avoid a “swoop-down-and-take-over”
model or fronting for charter school operators with no “footprint” in
Tennessee, the ASD created an “Achievement Advisory Council” (AAC)
for Memphis—the location of most of the state’s failing schools.481 Made
up of volunteers from across Memphis who act as a community
“sounding board,” the ACC collects information from an array of
“parents, students, community members, and education leaders” on
community-specific Neighborhood Advisory Councils that “assess the
strength and fit of school operators interested in transforming low
performing schools in their communities.”482 AAC recommendations as
to which intervention option to adopt and which schools to match with
those being replaced count for 40 percent of ASD decisions.483 Although
community leaders have sometimes described these engagement efforts
as “flash mobs,” on the whole they appear to have counteracted the sense
that something is “being done” to, not with and by, communities.484
C. Traditional Interest Groups
Suppose education reformers manage to engage stakeholders in
ethical situations favoring the demonstrable solution of problems over
pursuit of predefined interests, outcomes over inputs, and iterative
learning from implementation over negotiated final plans. And suppose
these structures surface and effectively serve a wider array of more
reflective values and interests than the few and fixed ones around which
interest groups typically mobilize their constituencies. The question
remains whether school officials and CBOs can implement the new
politics if, as past experience forecasts, powerful interest groups

479. See id. (“Partnerships stimulated and offered opportunities for increasing social capital
in communities–the talent, caring relationships, opportunities for student involvement, and use of
expanded learning environments too often marginal or established outside the school structure.”).
480. NELSON SMITH, THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., REDEFINING THE SCHOOL DISTRICT IN
TENNESSEE 2–3, 7 (2013), http://edex.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/publication/pdfs/20130423Redefining-the-School-District-in-Tennessee-FINAL_7.pdf.
481. Id. at 10–11, 18.
482. Id. at 10; Neighborhood Advisory Council, ACHIEVEMENT SCH. DIST.,
http://achievementschooldistrict.org/nac/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
483. SMITH, supra note 480, at 10.
484. Id. at 20, 24; see Jaclyn Zubrzycki, Tennessee’s Achievement School District Ranks
High on “Conditions for Success,” CHALKBEAT (Nov. 26, 2013), https://www.chalkbeat.org/
posts/tn/2013/11/26/tennessees-achievement-school-district-ranks-high-on-conditions-forsuccess (calling ASD a “national exemplar” in fostering public engagement).
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strenuously oppose the reforms as antithetical to their constituents’
immediate needs and their own long-term survival.
Interest groups indeed might fear a loss of relevance if forced to
compete for their members’ time and resources with highly participatory
and deliberative engagement opportunities that acknowledge a fuller
range of stakeholders’ interests and values and generate more positive
and productive relationships with districts, schools, and other
stakeholders than do interest groups’ typically zero-sum approaches.
Faced with this prospect, interest groups may well either transform or
resist—possibilities this Article briefly addresses in turn below.
By adopting experimentalist strategies or even evolving into
experimentalist organizations, interest groups could better serve their
constituents’ long-term interest in vibrant and successful public schools,
solidify a central place for themselves in the school improvement process,
and meaningfully enhance their members’ autonomy, professionalism,
and efficacy in their chosen careers. To do so, these organizations could
leverage and enhance their members’ trust and buy-in, contextualized
knowledge about crucial problems and solutions, and stake in school
improvement. Most importantly, unions and other established groups
could use their substantial resources and expertise to develop their
members’ problem-solving skills, which are no more difficult to instill
than the advocacy, organizing, and negotiation skills on which these
groups have traditionally relied. Additionally, given their systemic reach,
these organizations could help districts and states coordinate individual
teachers’ and parents’ disposition and capacity to fix local problems that
particularly bother them via responsibility and knowledge-sharing
structures that identify, reward, and spread learning that is useful beyond
its initial context. More than school officials and even CBOs, that is, these
organizations have the capacity to create ethical situations in which their
members hear and learn from each other—and ultimately from
unaffiliated stakeholders—to set aside or reprioritize interests they share
only with each other in favor of the broader, if contextualized, interests
of particular sets of children and communities as well as the educators
who serve them.
Educators 4 Excellence (E4E) is an example of interest-group
transformation of just this sort. Unlike traditional unions, which pursue
policies serving only the small number of assumedly fixed, typically
economic, interests that virtually all members have in common, E4E
gives “teachers who want to change the top-down approach to policymaking” an opportunity to develop and implement policy and participate
in decision-making, beginning with the problems they encounter in their
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everyday interactions with students.485 Its primary goals are to elevate the
quality and prestige of the teaching profession and to increase student
achievement, particularly for students affected by the opportunity gap.486
Working in part as affinity groups within existing teachers’ unions, E4E’s
chapters leverage their members’ influence and resources in support of
policies that prioritize teacher autonomy, flexibility, and efficacy and
differentiate among teachers and the contexts in which they serve over
wages, conditions, and seniority structures that aim to benefit all
educators uniformly.487 Examples include flexible teacher evaluations
prioritizing observation of low-performing teachers and mentoring of less
by more effective educators;488 increasing diversity in the professional
pipeline through targeted recruitment, induction, and retention;489
attracting teachers to high-needs schools through “School
Transformation Packages” offering greater-than-usual pay, support, and
autonomy;490 and basing layoff decisions on preserving the most effective
teachers rather than those with the most seniority.491 E4E chapters also
support reforms tailored to the needs of particular teachers, students, and
contexts, such as effective Common Core implementation among English
language learners and students with disabilities492 and elimination of
racial disparities in school discipline.493 These positions include specific

485. See EDUCATORS 4 EXCELLENCE, TEACHERS LEADING CHANGE: 2014–2015 ANNUAL
REPORT 3 (2015), https://www.scribd.com/doc/306671692/Teachers-Leading-Change-2014-15Annual-Report; Evan Stone & Sydney Morris, How We Started, EDUCATORS 4 EXCELLENCE,
http://www.educators4excellence.org/about-us/how-we-started (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
486. Telephone Interview with Evan Stone, Co-Founder and Co-Executive Officer, E4E
(Dec. 6, 2016).
487. Id.
488. EDUCATORS 4 EXCELLENCE CHI., THE EVOLUTION OF EVALUATION: A WAY FORWARD
FOR TEACHERS, BY TEACHERS 15, 18 (2016), http://educators4excellence.s3.amazonaws.com/
8/29/2/3104/E4E_CHI_EvolutionEvaluation_WEB.pdf.
489. EDUCATORS 4 EXCELLENCE MINN., CLOSING GAPS: DIVERSIFYING MINNESOTA’S
TEACHER WORKFORCE 9 (2015), http://educators4excellence.s3.amazonaws.com/8/e6/2/2606/
E4E2015_MNClosingGaps_Web.pdf.
490. EDUCATORS 4 EXCELLENCE L.A., BUILDING THE FUTURE: ATTRACTING AND RETAINING
GREAT TEACHERS IN HARD-TO-STAFF SCHOOLS 6 (2013), https://www.scribd.com/document/
147628923/Building-for-the-Future-Attracting-and-Retaining-Great-Teachers-in-Hard-to-StaffSchools.
491. EDUCATORS 4 EXCELLENCE, KEEPING OUR BEST TEACHERS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
SENIORITY-BASED LAYOFFS 2–4 (2016), http://educators4excellence.s3.amazonaws.com/8/1c/b/
1363/E4E_LIFO_White_Paper.pdf.
492. EDUCATORS 4 EXCELLENCE L.A., ONE SCHOOL FOR ALL: COMMON CORE FOR UNIQUE
STUDENT POPULATIONS 1–2 (2016), http://educators4excellence.s3.amazonaws.com/8/63/d/
3084/E4E2016_LACommonCore_WEB.pdf.
493. EDUCATORS 4 EXCELLENCE MINN., ENDING RACIAL DISCIPLINE DISPARITIES: AN
EDUCATOR’S GUIDE TO SCHOOL-BASED CHANGE 2 (2016), https://www.scribd.com/doc/
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recommendations at the state, district, and traditional union level and rely
on a data-driven approach that uses the implementation of reforms to
generate feedback about how to improve them.494
To develop these positions, E4E chapters engage in participatory and
deliberative problem-solving. Believing that the processes leading to the
development of many influential union policies do not sufficiently
integrate the voices of teachers, E4E’s founders created structures to
engage educators more directly.495 At schools, members form into teams
of fifteen to twenty teachers to draft white papers and recommendations
on issues surfaced by the group’s wider membership. Facilitators with
policy backgrounds help members synthesize research and identify key
findings. Teams conduct surveys and focus groups, then iteratively
review and revise their findings and drafts with participating colleagues
to assure that teacher experiences are accurately captured.496 Rather than
limiting proposals to ones reflecting interests all members have in
common, E4E has found that, as long as educators understand its iterative
process, have a meaningful chance to engage at every stage, and
understand why the ultimate proposal deviates from their preferred
outcome, they will support proposals with which they do not fully
agree.497
Not surprisingly, union traditionalists view E4E with intense
suspicion—criticizing its teacher-differentiating policies and ties to
reform-oriented education officials and philanthropies as “managementlinked interference with union affairs” and urging union members that
“[i]f you see them in your school, please let us know.”498 E4E’s model,
that is, might only heighten resistance to new politics and governance.
Thus far, however, E4E has leveraged its position inside unions,
support for collective bargaining, and rising numbers of chapters and
members into a potent, if not yet majority, force for change. 499 With
E4E’s encouragement, its members run for leadership positions in local
unions and currently hold over 300 such positions around the nation.
These and other members vocally support E4E proposals with which
unions strongly disagree—including teacher evaluation, limits on student
discipline, and layoffs based on teacher effectiveness rather than
309969205/Ending-Racial-Discipline-Disparities-An-Educator-s-Guide-to-School-basedChange.
494. Interview with Evan Stone, supra note 486.
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. BTU Staff, Getting to the Bottom of Educators for Excellence, BOS. TEACHERS UNION
(Dec. 4, 2015), https://btu.org/bottom-educators-excellence.
499. Interview with Evan Stone, supra note 486.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

97

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2

462

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

seniority.500 Citing unions’ ultimate goal of enhanced teacher quality and
prestige and their fiduciary duty to advance policies most members
support, E4E’s leadership believes that by enabling teachers to engage
meaningfully on policy affecting their day-to-day experience, the group
can pressure unions from within to alter existing special-interest
politics.501 Taken to its limit, this logic could lead to interest-group
structures that strengthen, rather than obstruct, experimentalist policies
and politics. As have environmental advocacy groups in the
environmental protection context, the Department of Justice for drug
courts, universities in Finnish special education, and CBOs in community
policing and education, unions and other education-sector interest groups
could become crucial partners in collaborative problem-solving—
particularly by representing, capacitating, and rationing the time
commitments of their members.
As the examples in Section III.C and this Section reveal, districts,
schools, CBOs, and evolving interest groups can enable authentic
problem-solving by a broad range of stakeholders operating at many
commitment and capacity levels. Under a more fully democratic model,
that is, there is no reason why teachers, parents, students, communities,
and groups representing them cannot come together to identify and make
progress solving most problems public schools face.
To be sure, this Article cannot predict the stance traditional interest
groups would take toward the reforms discussed in this Article if given
the opportunity previously denied them to engage fully and
consequentially—albeit through experimentalist, not pluralist, politics.
And if the best organized of those groups with the most at stake—
teachers’ unions, primarily—continue resisting rather than participating,
this Article cannot predict the fate of the reforms. This Article anticipates,
however, that by providing a meaningful role for more stakeholders,
nurturing a fuller range of those stakeholders’ interests and values, and
giving them more power to solve problems and enhance their personal
and professional efficacy and their children’s and students’ outcomes, the
new structures will place existing interest groups under serious pressure
to evolve in order to survive. This may be especially true in an era in
which public teachers’ unions and public education generally face new
pressures to improve services to key clients or be forcibly and radically
altered.502 Under these circumstances, the promising improvements the
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502. See, e.g., Harold Meyerson, Donald Trump Can Kill the American Union, WASH. POST
(Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/23/donaldtrump-could-kill-the-american-union; Valerie Strauss, Will Donald Trump Destroy U.S. Public
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reforms have shown to be possible may be the last best hope of the public
school system as we know it today.503
CONCLUSION
Having shed bureaucracy, the new public education reforms’
experimentalist governance is their sinew of steel, lifting student learning
outcomes and stabilizing a public education system at risk of collapse.504
But the reforms’ banishment of special-interest politics while offering no
replacement is the reforms’ kryptonite, alienating the populations that
most need the reforms and strengthening the special interests that in their
current form are the reforms’—and public education’s—nemesis.505 In
this as in other contexts, novel experimentalist forms of governance
cannot succeed without new, pragmatically participatory and
deliberative, politics.506
In the new education politics this Article envisions, parents and other
stakeholders participate in the reforms at every level of the system, using
an array of entry points, collaborative problem-solving frameworks, and
supports from districts, schools, CBOs, and reoriented interest groups. As
stakeholders work with others to address problems closest to home, they
gain facility and confidence as evidence-driven experimentalists,
readying themselves to take on bigger problems. As they integrate
governance and politics—watching diverse teammates coalesce around
problems to solve, causal hypotheses, provisional solutions, and
adjustments in response to results—and as they gain transparency into
how government works and see their efforts gradually improve outcomes,
stakeholders and school systems for the first time achieve legitimate,
accountable, and workable alternatives to bureaucracy and specialinterest politics.

Education?, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answersheet/wp/2016/11/14/will-donald-trump-destroy-u-s-public-education.
503. See supra Section I.C.
504. See supra Sections I.A, III.A.1, & IV.A.
505. See supra Introduction, Sections I.B, IV.B.
506. See supra Sections III.A.2, III.C.
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